Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement since 9/11 by Stalcup, Mary Margaret
  
CONNECTING THE DOTS. 




Mary Margaret Stalcup 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
 
requirements for the degree of  
 
Joint Doctor of Philosophy  






in the  
 
Graduate Division  
 
of the  
 
University of California, Berkeley  
 
 
Committee in charge:  
 
Professor Paul Rabinow, Chair  
Professor Dorothy Porter  
Professor Candace Slater  
 
 
Fall 2009  

  
The dissertation of Mary Margaret Stalcup, titled Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and 





Chair:  ______________________________________________ Date _____________  
 
______________________________________________ Date _____________  
 
















Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement since 9/11 
 2009  
by Mary Margaret Stalcup 
 1 
Abstract 
Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement since 9/11 
by  
 
Mary Margaret Stalcup 
 
Joint Doctor of Philosophy in Medical Anthropology 
with University of California, San Francisco  
 
University of California, Berkeley  
 




This work examines how the conceptualization of knowledge as both problem and 
solution reconfigured intelligence and law enforcement after 9/11. The idea was that more 
information should be collected, and better analyzed. If the intelligence that resulted was 
shared, then terrorists could be identified, their acts predicted, and ultimately prevented. 
Law enforcement entered into this scenario in the United States, and internationally. 
“Policing terrorism” refers to the engagement of state and local law enforcement in 
intelligence, as well as approaching terrorism as a legal crime, in addition to or as 
opposed to an act of war. Two venues are explored: fusion centers in the United States 
and the international organization of police, Interpol. The configuration can be thought of 
schematically as operating through the set of law, discipline and security. Intelligence is 
predominantly a security approach. It modulates that within its purview, wielding the 
techniques and technologies that are here discussed. 
The dissertation is divided into two sections: Intelligence and Policing Terrorism. In 
the first, intelligence is taken up as a term, and its changes in referent and concept are 
examined. The Preface and Chapter One present a general introduction to the 
contemporary situation and intelligence, via Sherman Kent, as knowledge, organization 
and activities. Chapter Two traces the development of intelligence in the United States as 
a craft and profession. Chapter Three discusses some of the issues involving the 
intersection of intelligence and policy, and how those manifested in the aftermath of 9/11 
and the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The second section examines the turn to 
policing terrorism, beginning, in Chapter Four, with how Interpol has dealt with 
bioterrorism, and an examination of the shifting conceptualization of biological threats in 
international law. Moving from threats to their consequences, Chapter Five takes up the 
concept of an event in order to analyze the common comparison of Pearl Harbor and 
9/11. Chapters Six and Seven turn to fieldwork done in the United States, with an 
examination of the suspicious activity reporting system and law enforcement’s inclusion in 
the Information Sharing Environment, focusing on fusion centers and data mining.  
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PREFACE 
Knowledge as Problem and Solution 
 
“Connecting the dots” as a metaphor for intelligence analysis became popular with 
the 9/11 Commission Report. What is the message in that child’s drawing game? 
Information is so many scattered, random dots. If joined together they will suddenly 
present an image of reality.   
From dots to picture corresponds to the transformation of information into 
intelligence. Analysis is equated with child’s play, but not unproblematically. This is a 
limited and stifling game. The dots are simply lying there on the page. There is one, 
correct way to connect them. Ignored are the practical and ethical challenges that 
collection really presents, and the potential for mutability of the pictures. Intelligence, an 
epistemologically unique and ultimately shadowy kind of knowledge, is equated with 
neatly linked pieces of data. The parallel is reductive but powerful, a rhetorical strategy, 
like the “war on terror” before it, which vigorously reshaped the intelligence assemblage 
after 9/11 in the United States and beyond.  
The reconfiguration of intelligence was guided by a conceptualization of the 
problem as one of knowledge. Rectifying knowledge then became the solution. This circle 
was rendered concrete as the need for more and better intelligence. The scenario was 
little questioned: if those in government got more information, if they analyzed it better, if 
they shared the knowledge, then they could prevent terrorism. The following study traces 
how this logic led in two directions. One tangible outcome of the “knowledge solution” was 
a move to integrate state and local police into the foundation of a new intelligence 
architecture. Yet too much information is also a problem. The mass digitalization of life—
captured and held in databases—presented too many dots. Techniques of data mining 
developed to process, filter and connect their otherwise overwhelming proliferation. 
The “knowledge solution” is linked to the challenge of prediction, and technological 
ambitions. A distinctive diagram of power has developed,1 one concerned with collecting 
and connecting dots into a “seamless web” of information. A web, however, is an intricate 
assemblage of many seams, threads and their conjunctions. Seamlessness is rather an 
ideal of circulation, without hitches or blockages. The technical web of intelligence is 
designed to discern threats and, by allowing decisions to be made, turn them into risks. 
The configuration can be schematically conceptualized, following Michel Foucault, as 
operating through the set of law, discipline and security. For analytical purposes, each is a 
distinctive and normative rationality. Security marshals legal prohibitions and disciplinary 
dictates to deal with unpredictable, unpreventable micro events, from suspicious 
behaviors to crimes. These are yoked into service as signs that point to truly catastrophic 
events, in order to avert them. Intelligence is predominantly a security approach. It 
modulates rather than strictly controls that within its purview, wielding the techniques and 
technologies that will be discussed in the following pages: ways of defining threats and 
                                                
1 Stephen J. Collier et al., "Concept Work: "Vital"," in Concept Work, Anthropology of the 
Contemporary Research Collaboratory (2009). 
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training officers to recognize them, standardizing behaviors, the creation of networks of 
surveillance, data analysis, and different types of data-mining.  
As a term—a word and its referent—intelligence refers to 1) a historically 
developed practice that produces 2) a specific and definable kind of knowledge. This is 3) 
a target of intervention because of perceived inadequacies, and 4) a technology of a 
larger security apparatus.  
In 2005, "national intelligence" was presented in a US government strategy 
document. The quotation marks were in the original. The writers wanted to signal a new 
concept, an integration of foreign and domestic intelligence that would exploit “risk while 
accepting the impossibility of eliminating it."2 The strategy, which would mature into, 
among other things, the Information Sharing Environment, drew its legal authority from the 
previous year’s Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.3 National intelligence, 
the Act mandated, would be explicitly oriented towards the future. There would be an 
institutional shift to a “preventative counterterrorism posture.” The goal was not simply to 
make it so that an attack of the magnitude of 9/11 could be detected and prevented, but to 
create an environment such that by default it would be. The dictum of conflict, that the 
defender must thwart all attempts, but the attacker need succeed only once, would be 
subverted. Attacks, or at least their preparations, would be taken from one side of the 
equation and put on the other. They would be enlisted as aids to grand scale prevention. 
This vision took time to coalesce. “To one single set of difficulties, several 
responses can be made. And most of the time different responses actually are 
proposed.”4 The elements that came together were less the result of unified interpretation 
or planning than a shared problematization. 9/11 introduced uncertainty across the 
spectrum of leaders and citizens, intelligence and law enforcement, federal and local 
government, the United States and the international community. The event’s formulation 
into a narrative with causes and consequences created the conditions of possibility for 
responses, “in their diversity and sometimes in spite of their contradictions.”5 The following 
work deals with a heterogeneous group of these that can be glossed as “policing 
terrorism.” Some took root, adapted and flourished; others still struggle or have withered 
away.  
Policing terrorism refers to the engagement of state and local law enforcement in 
intelligence, in order to “collect the dots” via surveillance and investigations. 9/11 
effectively brought home global terrorism to the United States. The previous divide 
between foreign and domestic intelligence was viewed as a mistake. Police had long dealt 
with domestic extremism, but now they needed to add national security to their law and 
order duties. The US Director of National Intelligence made this clear: “The unique 
contribution made by men and women on the ground is vital to US national security… 
State and local partners should no longer be treated as only first responders; they are also 
the first lines of prevention.”6  
                                                
2 "National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America,"  (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2005). 
3 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, PL 108–458, 108th Congress (17 
December 2004). 
4 Michel Foucault, "Polemics, Politics and Problematizations," in Aesthetics, Method and 
Epistemology, ed. James D Faubion (New York: New Press, 1998). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Mike McConnell, "Overhauling Intelligence," Foreign Affairs, no. July/August (2007). 
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This dissertation explores two venues for policing terrorism: fusion centers and 
Interpol. Fusion centers, one of which I interned in from 2006 through 2007, are physical 
nodes in the intelligence and preparedness network developed as part of the Information 
Sharing Environment Initiative. Interpol, where I also interned, is the International Criminal 
Police Organization. This is rather different than “international police,” although they are 
often referred to that way. They do not enforce international laws, but serve as an 
information exchange for police to better enforce the laws in their own countries. Policing 
terrorism also encompasses the idea of approaching terrorism as a legal crime, in addition 
to or as opposed to an act of war. The use of the category of crime, more prevalent, 
established and disseminated than terrorism, moves towards a rejection of Islamic 
jihadists as the orienting enemy trope but also expands the range of ideological causes 
that are included, and thereby the need for and reach of counterterrorism actions. This 
expansion was what brought law enforcement and intelligence to my attention and how 
they became, partly by chance, the subject of my fieldwork.  
My original focus was on the “war on drugs,” in the United States and Latin 
America. Narcotics officers were my incommensurable anthropological Other. I imagined 
three field sites, and made provisional trips to Brazil and Colombia, countries where I had 
spent time and in which I had contacts. In 2005, I began interviewing on the US side and 
arranged an internship with a counternarcotics group in California. When I began in 
counternarcotics in fall of 2006, joining an entering group of criminal intelligence analysts, 
I realized that something was in the process of happening. Human and financial resources 
were shifting from drugs to terrorism, and the motion was clearly a small part of a larger 
change. State, local and federal law enforcement agencies, single-issue task forces, and 
first responders were being gathered together in one of the then-new fusion centers that 
now populate almost every US state. Thus it was by chance that I found myself at the 
heart of counterterrorism efforts in a fusion center, but quite on purpose that I elected to 
follow this motion.  
9/11 instigated, among other things, a multi-agency, interdisciplinary scramble for 
metaphors, analogies and tropes. Law enforcement was to be the new frontline in the 
domestic war on terror, the eyes and ears of the intelligence community, the foundation of 
the new intelligence architecture.7 Police were no longer only first responders, but also 
first preventers. It was in order to see how far this shift went that, after finishing my 
internship at the fusion center, I went to Interpol, in Lyon, France. My internship there was 
in the Bioterrorism project, another intersection of law enforcement and counterterrorism 
efforts. My work was far removed from the on-the-ground counterterrorism of the fusion 
center. The project had two distinct thrusts. One provided trainings at a world regional 
level on how to deal with bioterrorism incidents. The other, where I worked, focused on 
implementation of the United Nations’ resolutions against the proliferation of biological 
weapons and potential bioterrorist acts. 
Frank, the deputy director of the fusion center where I interned and a figure who 
will reappear in the following pages, told me that intelligence could be used to identify a 
pattern of behaviors that in turn could be used to identify a potential terrorist. Or from an 
identified person, one could trace outward to find a plan for terrorism. This is the point, he 
said. 
Information—data and information—that has been analyzed becomes intelligence. 
                                                
7 Marilyn Peterson, "Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture," ed. Department 
of Justice (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005), 4. 
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The intelligence points in a particular direction. That direction is then shared back 
with the people who gather the bits and pieces of information, with some options or 
actions, which produces more data and information, which is fed right back into the 
system to be analyzed and reassessed.  
In the face of the failure of 9/11, creating a system to gather, preserve and share 
information was logical. Some fervently believe, and others equally as fervently deny, that 
there are terrorism indicators in the chaos of daily life that can be spotted. In practical 
terms, this means a domestic system of intelligence, and a global information exchange 
(as Interpol desired to provide). Historically, though, similar concessions to the needs of 
security and increases in power have led to abuse. This is a study of what a preventative 
counterterrorism posture means in the register of daily practices. In what situations, and 
how, does a police officer discern danger, crime, and terrorism on an innocuous street, 
turn these into reports, and send them to the right place? In the register of the political, 
what has happened to set this system in place and how has it worked?  
For the other deputy director of the fusion center, Jerome––another who will 
reappear in the following chapters––using all resources was due diligence. 
They always say that hindsight is 20/20 and it’s nice to say what people should 
have done. These guys just learning how to fly planes and not land them, it was a 
problem. Now it looks silly, but there are things going on right now with incidents 
that are tied together, if we hadn’t seen them ahead of time, we wouldn’t know who 
to focus on. And they are silly things, which seem silly now, similar to that. But we 
are going now, you know, “this is awfully suspicious behavior, we need to track 
these people.”  
As a result, street cops are trained to notice, document and share potentially terrorism-
related information that they come across on their beats. I studied how local law 
enforcement was being trained to serve as the most micro level of information-feed for 
domestic counter terrorism.  
Yet, intelligence agencies and law enforcement have different missions. The 
purpose of an intelligence agency is to gather information. The means can be justified by 
the ends. The purpose of law enforcement is to produce “law and order,” by its deterrent 
presence and the punishment meted out to those who break the law. In the criminal 
system, means must follow strict protocol or the ends will not be met. A concern in 
policing terrorism, as in related aspects of the Patriot Act and the transformation of law 
enforcement, is that using the police in an intelligence capacity will compromise their 
relationship to the law, and thereby corrupt their practice. Scenarios of concern include 
domestic surveillance, and investigations in situations that could not be justified for regular 
criminal pursuit, but have been justified for terrorist pursuit.  
Returning to intelligence, the ways that humans construct and authorize 
knowledge is one of anthropology’s oldest and most enduring topics. These inquiries 
share the question, what is knowledge and how can something can be known? As 
anthropology, they focus this philosophical query on the particular of both a time and a 
place. In the case of this dissertation, the anthropological goal is to offer substantive 
information about, reflection on, and insight into the “what, how and why” of a contingent 
present in the United States, and the indefinite realm of activity of international 
organizations, as I found it at Interpol. The history put together here is part of an iterative 
process to, in John Dewey’s words, “discover and formulate the conditions which describe 
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the problem at hand.”8 This account of some of the past and present history of 
intelligence, as a practice (craft, policy tool, discipline, science) is a quite literal 
examination of reasoning and rationalities, part of a project to anthropologize the west.9 
Public and academic discourses about the rapprochement of national security intelligence 
and criminal intelligence, and the role of the human sciences in national security are often 
curiously ahistorical, and a genealogical presentation of the pertinent histories mentioned 
above that will be developed. 
The dissertation is divided into two sections, Intelligence and Policing Terrorism. 
The first examines intelligence as a term, and its changes in referent and concept. 
Chapter One presents a general introduction to the contemporary situation and then 
focuses on intelligence as, classically via Sherman Kent, knowledge, organization and 
activities. Chapter Two traces the development of intelligence in the United States as a 
craft and profession. Chapter Three discusses some of the issues involving the 
intersection of intelligence and policy, and how those manifested in the aftermath of 9/11 
and the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  
The second section examines the turn to policing terrorism. The US rhetorically 
framed its anti- and counterterrorism initiative after 9/11 as war, a term that entrenched 
the physical space of the nation as a battleground, and justified a prolonged state of 
exception. The inclusion of native soil and the conceptualization of permanent threat 
made it simultaneously paradoxical and clearly logical to put law enforcement into the 
fight. However, the trope of war was gradually replaced with alternative approaches, one 
of which is “policing terrorism,” brought into being with a series of directives and laws that 
refocused the efforts of state and local law enforcement.10  
Part II: Policing Terrorism begins with Chapter Four’s examination of Interpol 
and bioterrorism, through the shifting conceptualization of biological threats in 
international law. In other historical situations, threats were understood quite differently, 
and different responses were formulated. The chapter looks at three international accords 
on biological weapons and describes for each what threat is being addressed, the object 
of protection, and techniques proposed for intervention. Moving from threats to their 
consequences, Chapter Five takes up the concept of an event in order to analyze the 
common comparison of Pearl Harbor and 9/11. Pearl Harbor in its time was a scandal and 
the subject of nine congressional investigations. 9/11 has had only one. Many of the 
strategies described in this dissertation can be ascribed to the interpretation of 9/11 as 
intelligence failure, which is turn stems, at least partly, from the stabilization of this view by 
the 9/11 Committee. This postulation greatly impacted the development of the “war on 
terror” and how it should be fought. Chapters Six and Seven turn to the rest of my 
fieldwork, with an examination of the suspicious activity reporting system and law 
enforcement’s inclusion in the Information Sharing Environment, focusing on fusion 
centers and data mining.  
                                                
8 John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, vol. 12, The Later Works, 1925-38 (New York, NY: 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1991), 345-46 quoted in Paul Rabinow, Marking Time: On the 
Anthropology of the Contemporary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 9. 
9 Paul Rabinow, Essays on the Anthropology of Reason (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1996). 
10 The FBI is a branch of law enforcement and is responsible for countering domestic terrorism. 
While it is also shifting, roughly from a focus on investigations of terrorist attempts to preventative 
investigations, the focus here is on the changes occurring state and local law enforcement.   
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Chapter One. Introductions 
 
Jerome greets everyone with a wide smile. He is possessed of unflappable good 
humor and energy. “Early on in life,” he recounted, “I decided I wanted to get into law 
enforcement. I grew up in a pretty impoverished area, lot of violence, lot of murders. There 
was a lot of seeing that growing up. I wanted to do something.” He started working vice in 
the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, and then went to a major crimes 
task force with the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement before moving to methamphetamine 
investigation for the state’s Department of Justice. Midmorning, September 11, 2001, he 
received a telephone call telling him he was being transferred to counterterrorism. “You 
got the call on the day?” I asked. 
They basically moved me and back-filled my old spot. I got transferred—I got a call 
on 9/11 saying, “you’re being transferred to a new unit.” I wasn’t even in town, I 
was in, where the hell was I? I was in some range, I was actually at firearms 
instruction training… I don’t remember the exact spot, but I was in some training in 
Northern California when they called me, and said “you’re being transferred. We 
don’t know what we’re going to call it, but you’re being transferred to a new unit.” I 
said, “Okay, whatever we need to do.” From there, there was an opening for a 
Criminal Intelligence Bureau Commander, that’s how I came here. 
Jerome was not alone; career trajectories from law enforcement to the sciences took a 
sharp turn that day, as the reallocation of personnel and funding to counterterrorism 
began. At once, the attacks were grasped as an event, ushering in a new era. Equally, if 
secondarily for most, they revealed that there was an existing problem. The terrorists were 
part of a bigger and organized group. They had lived in the United States and had 
common American lives before committing the attacks. These revelations and the 
challenges they presented to previous ideas about terrorism were to organize much of the 
response. 
Jerome continued:  
I went over to working the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center Task Force, 
CATIC was what they originally called us. So the CATIC task forces, our mission 
was to go out and work on these cases. Basically—and this was a big part—the 
state of California did not trust the federal government. They felt that there was 
such a lapse that created September 11th that we needed to do our own project 
and track down these terrorists. And basically we got sent out, no real training on 
intelligence at the time, just “go out there and find terrorists.” What do we do with 
them after we find them? “We’ll figure that out later.” 
Priorities, usually defined in government by an unending political dance between 
constituencies, were provided instead by a shared sense of threat and urgency. 
Organization is something that can be detected. It requires communication, transportation, 
and funding. These leave traces. The common American life, and even more so the 
criminal one, is now digitally documented, archived and analyzed. If these signs are 
among us, they can be discerned. How and whom to watch, and who should do the 
watching?  
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The director of the fusion center where I did fieldwork, who was a thirty-year local 
narcotics veteran, explained the problem that he was attempting to solve. 
There are a lot of cops in America. County and municipal and state and private 
cops, 750- to 800,000 of them, and we thought—well, we never, I guess, felt like 
we were engaged in the world of international terrorism. You know, that was 
something the intelligence community handled, and the FBI; and maybe something 
Customs handled a little bit and border patrol, in protecting our borders; and the 
DOD handled—nothing we handled. And so, post- 9/11 we realized when we 
looked at what was happening in cells in New Jersey and New York, when we 
looked at what was happening in flight schools in Florida, we decided, if we train 
state and local cops to understand pre-terrorism indicators, if we train them to be 
more curious, and to question more what they see, and got them into a system 
where they could actually get that information to somebody where it matters…  
“The responsibility for investigating terrorism still remains primarily with the FBI,” he went 
on. 
They have the ability to interface with the intelligence community, to look at 
information that state and local cops can’t look at, and probably shouldn’t look at, 
don’t need to look at. But we can get cops to understand how important their role 
is, how they are really the first line of defense, the eyes and ears on the ground 
when a bomb factory blows up and somebody thinks it was just a gas leak 
explosion. We were not looking for the right stuff, and so before it might get 
ignored and hopefully now it won’t be ignored. Or they see people living in a 
sparsely furnished room with a lot of jihadist literature and other stuff that looks 
suspicious, maybe it is suspicious, or maybe it is just part of their religion. Or you 
know: people trying to take flight training to take off, but they don’t worry about 
landing.  
What was apparent, as I began this work, was that around this set of problems, a national 
intelligence apparatus was emerging. There was no relatively stable network though. 
Things and practices were in flux. Paul Rabinow, following Foucault, identifies the 
apparatus as “a specific response to a historical problem.”1 Foucault specifies a series of 
elements. 
[A] thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said 
as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus 
itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.2  
The idea had emerged that law enforcement has privileged access to the public, and this 
access, and the data that results, needed to be utilized. Cops were assumed to know their 
beat, to have acquired experiential knowledge of the residents, businesses, habits and 
characteristics of their neighborhoods. This familiarity is joined with a mandate to enforce 
                                                
1 Paul Rabinow, Anthropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 54. 
2 Michel Foucault, "The Confession of the Flesh," in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 194. 
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the law, producing situations favorable to intelligence gathering in which law-breakers can 
be induced to become informants in exchange for lenience. Police officers’ place in and 
knowledge of the social fabric indicated that they could go beyond being first responders 
at the scene of an accident or crime, to being also first preventers of terrorism. The cops I 
met were of a mixed mind about their proposed role in counterterrorism.3 Some saw it as 
hype, others as a mandate. Some worried that the additional duties would impede their 
ability to do the basic work of policing. Others did not see it as different than what they 
already did. Or, they doubted that anything would actually change.  
Practically speaking, I approached the apparatus by embedding myself in it, 
training as a criminal intelligence analyst, attending counterterrorism courses, and 
interning at Interpol. As an analyst in training, I was welcomed and met with conversation. 
Street cops and those at the fusion center saw themselves as the good guys, and were 
willing, often eager, to tell their stories. Joining in their work meant I was accepted 
generally as being on the same side. It could have been otherwise though. “It is a very 
tight-knit community, ” one patrol officer told me,  
…(b)ecause you’re dealing with certain aspects of humanity that the average 
person may see on the clip on the five o’clock news and forget about because it’s 
dinnertime. When you go to a death of a child or something like that, you can’t talk 
to people about it because they don’t want hear it. That’s why I hang with cops and 
firefighters, and nurses and ER doctors. 
In addition to the internship as an analyst, one of my main forms of interaction with 
counterterrorism efforts was to attend Police Officer Standards and Training (POST) 
accredited courses on the topic. At the beginning of one class, the instructor asked if 
everyone was sworn law enforcement. I raised my hand. No, I was not. “Are you a 
hostage, a vacationer or an explorer?” he quizzed me, to laughter. Everyone who is in a 
training course, he told our group, fits in one of those categories. A hostage is someone 
who might not have any interest in the course content, but needed training credits. Or, a 
hostage could be an officer who didn’t want to come, but whose boss said, “We need 
someone in the department to go.” Because of this, there were train-the-trainer courses. 
These capacitated the attendees to return to their departments and teach a condensed 
version of the course, or at least be the go-to person on regulations concerning the topic. 
Vacationers are officers who needed credits as well, but had some time and/or funding, 
and thought the course location sounded like a good place to go. The instructor hoped, 
but was not hopeful, that most were in his last category. Explorers were “out to see what 
they could learn, whatever they don’t know yet.”  
At trainings, attendees had coffee breaks and lunch together. In longer courses, 
especially those for which people had travelled to attend, the group would go out to dinner 
or drinks. They were state and local officers spread among a wide variety of law 
enforcement entities. When I asked if the seamless information network sought by the 
fusion center had yet penetrated the daily function of law enforcement, they responded, in 
the words of one, “for the way we really do business, nothing has changed.” At the same 
time, most acknowledged that if they did happen to see a suspicious incident, there was 
now a person they knew to whom the information could be passed. The director was 
hopeful. 
                                                
3 As will be described in a later chapter, counterterrorism technically refers to proactive actions and 
antiterrorism, which has been subsumed under counterterrorism in popular usage, refers to 
preventative efforts. 
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We learned that we had to get trained better as first responders. Especially the 
uniformed police community, they had to get trained better as first responders. We 
had to develop systems—which aren’t fully developed yet but are still in process—
to prevent stuff from falling through the cracks, to better really connect all the 
information. And we had to develop a system to report suspicious activity, and 
known terrorist activity, so that it gets to the right people: the FBI and other people 
that need to know it. That is why it is important to participate in fusion centers. That 
is why it is important to have terrorist officer liaison programs and training. That is 
why it is important for state and local law enforcement to participate with the FBI in 
joint terrorism task forces, why we need to invest in better information-sharing 
protocols.  
His was a vision of law enforcement’s role in counterterrorism. Interpol, when I interned at 
the General Secretariat, was also attempting to centrally position itself in the field by 
campaigning for terrorism to be dealt with as a crime. If terrorism could be policed, 
Interpol’s importance, and funding, would increase. The organization was originally set up 
as a way for police to extend their reach beyond the borders of their own country by 
requesting assistance from another nation’s police. In addition to facilitating 
communication, Interpol acts as a repository for information about crimes and criminals. 
Taking a political stand is against Interpol’s charter; in as much as laws in most countries 
prohibit the same sorts of acts, however, Interpol defines crime as not being “political.” 
Horizontal exchange through Interpol, bypassing diplomatic channels, rests on a 
presumption about the universality of crime, or at least the criminality of some acts. The 
implementation project worked towards universal implementation of laws that would 
criminalize a range of acts everywhere. “Biocriminalization” fit conceptually within the goal 
of strengthening Interpol’s position, although institutionally the abstract project fit less well. 
There was conflict between the training and law-oriented thrusts of the project, as there 
was between the policing and legal aspects of the institution more generally. The director 
of the Bioterrorism project, who organized the regional trainings, never seemed clear on 
who I was or what I was doing, despite appropriate forms and protocols. The lawyer in 
charge of the latter, however, gave me a very necessary and helpful crash course in 
national and international legislation, and set me to work. 
“Terrorism is a Crime” 
[The] assumption, shared by other hard-line lawyers in the White House counsel’s 
office and in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, was that the 
criminal-justice system was insufficient to handle the threat from terrorism. There 
was consensus…that we had to move from retribution and punishment to 
preëmption and prevention. Only a warfare model allows that approach.4 
In 2001, counterterrorism was generally understood in one of two ways. The Bush 
administration, together with select legal advisors in the Justice Department and the White 
House, counted it as one of the tools of war. In counterpoint, both abroad and 
domestically, some pushed for counterterrorism to be approached using tested law-
enforcement practices that were strong in human intelligence collection, within the criminal 
justice system. On this view, which Interpol exemplified, terrorism was a crime and the 
                                                
4 Jane Mayer, "The Hidden Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White House’s War on Terror.," The 
New Yorker 2006. 
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perpetrators criminals. As time went by, the criminal justice approach did not so much get 
stronger as it adapted, and hybrid forms developed.  
The warfare approach, however, dominated in the years immediately after 
September 11, 2001. The attacks were defined as acts of war, and reprisal was 
authorized by Congress’s Joint Resolution of September 14th. The Bush administration 
claimed the president’s constitutional power to make war, and this power was expansively 
interpreted by the Justice Department. “The President,” argued Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General John C. Yoo, now infamously, “has broad constitutional power to use military 
force" and "the President's powers include inherent executive powers that are 
unenumerated in the Constitution." In the last line of the last footnote of a memo, Yoo 
added,  
[W]e do not think that the difficulty or impossibility of establishing proof to a 
criminal law standard (or of making evidence public) bars the President from taking 
such military measures as, in his best judgment, he thinks necessary or 
appropriate to defend the United States from terrorist attacks. In the exercise of his 
plenary power to use military force, the President's decisions are for him alone and 
are unreviewable.  
Yoo’s memorandum, dated September 25, 2001, cited a 1824 Supreme Court decision. 
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the high discretion 
confided to the executive, for great public purposes, to act on a sudden 
emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief, by summary measures, which 
are not found in the text of the laws.5  
Yoo’s argument was that if the President authorized something it was, in effect, legal no 
matter what. The unanimous court decision from which his citation is taken actually found 
that the government was liable for damages, even if motivated by perceived necessity.6 
Regardless of its legal sagacity, the Justice Department’s interpretation of executive 
authority held for the duration of the administration. 
The next significant executive position was that the situation called for preemptive 
measures. This was hotly debated as justification for a US invasion of Iraq, but with less 
fanfare also filtered into domestic measures. “Terrorism cannot be treated as a law 
enforcement issue,” editorialized the Wall Street Journal, “in which we wait until the bad 
guys actually pull the trigger before we stop them."7 The declaration, representative of a 
brand of counterterrorism rhetoric, conflated an argument and an assumption. That 
conflation provided a nexus, however, around which counterterrorism turned and 
developed. The argument was that terrorist acts must be prevented, rather than allowed to 
happen and then punished. The assumption was that law enforcement is only reactive. 
From its own origin stories of patrolling officers in London through fighting gangs, though, 
law enforcement has understood itself to be preventative.  
                                                
5 Lobel Jules, "The Commander in Chief and the Courts," Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 
(2007). John C. Yoo, "September 25, 2001 Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the 
President: The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against 
Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them," ed. Department of Justice (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Legal Counsel, 2001).  
6 The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 362, 366-67,(1824). 
7 "Editorial, the Limits of Hindsight," Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2003. 
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In the FBI we have been told that prevention is now more important than 
prosecution. This is pure common sense and, as such, predated the recent 
terrorist events, especially with respect to violent crimes.8 
The early idea was that police presence was a deterrent. A stronger version of prevention 
developed in relation to the mafia, other organized crime groups, and eventually drug 
traffickers. The tracking, documentation, use of informants and analysis, proponents 
argue, is actually the best preventative approach to counterterrorism.  
In 2001, however, the criminal justice system, including the police, was considered 
inadequate to handle the threat, although not because of the traditional divide between 
domestic and foreign, or public and national security, which clearly was in a shambles. 
9/11 made it evident that domestic attacks were possible, and by people legally and 
seemingly well established in the country. By extension, attacks could as well be from 
citizens as visitors. In addition, it was known that financial and logistic support activities 
occurred in the US and needed be addressed domestically. Yet, criminal intelligence was 
for a long time the poor cousin of national security intelligence, frequently ridiculed, in fact, 
as an oxymoron. Publications were limited to how-to manuals and training texts, and a few 
trade journals, equally oriented around practice. The result was a genre of activity at the 
core of law enforcement that was relatively unexamined and conceptually 
underdetermined. Police practices are shaped by the legal system within which they 
operate, which is to say that whether they follow them or not is explainable within this 
framework. Criminal intelligence is oriented toward producing concrete facts that can be 
assembled to support the assertion that someone has broken the law. This is largely, 
although not exclusively, the way that counterterrorism is done by police. They follow the 
clues of "supporting crimes” and add them to the counterterrorism apparatus. 
“The primary differences,” according to the Congressional Research Service, 
“between pure or traditional conceptions of intelligence and law enforcement intelligence 
lie in the following three areas: (1) the predicate for the intelligence activity itself, (2) 
intelligence clients and consumers, and (3) the legal regimes under which intelligence is 
collected.9 These gradually began to merge, and in parallel the conceptualization of threat 
and law enforcement shifted, leading, in the course of four to five years, to a vision of 
integration between the systems. The first stage of this was the increasingly accepted 
idea that domestic intelligence was necessary in a time of a war. Domestic spying was 
legally curtailed, certainly for the CIA and in complex ways for the FBI. But instead of 
moving to a criminal justice model, the idea was that the criminal justice system and cops 
who wanted to keep their communities safe could nonetheless contribute information to 
the war efforts. By 2008, a RAND study partially inverted this formulation. The study 
looked at how terrorism ends and concluded that both intelligence and law enforcement 
were vastly more successful than war. They examined terrorist groups active between 
1968 and 2006, and found that most (43 percent) ended by transitioning into the political 
process. For those that did not adopt nonviolent means (40 percent), RAND concluded, 
"policing is likely to be the most effective strategy." Both intelligence and police are better 
positioned to "penetrate and disrupt" terrorist organizations than the military, they argued. 
                                                
8 Coleen M. Rowley, "Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism, Senate Committee on the Judiciary," 
(Washington, D.C.: FBI, 2002). 
9 Todd Masse, Siobhan O'Neil, and John Rollins, "Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for 
Congress," (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 91. 
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It is also easier to punish perpetrators for crimes such as drug trafficking, rather than 
terrorism preparations, which may be legal.10 
Domestic Intelligence 
If dealing with terrorism as an act of war has negative consequences, there are 
also problems with treating it as a crime, and engaging law enforcement as “first 
preventers.” Domestic intelligence in the United States has a troubled history of abuse. In 
the 1970s, the Church and Pike Committee investigations traced the twin expansion of 
power and abuse over the previous decades. The US intelligence apparatus had been 
largely abandoned after World War I, and then reassembled circumspectly by Roosevelt 
in the buildup to World War II. During the war, Roosevelt placed responsibility for 
investigations of domestic espionage, sabotage and subversion with the FBI, and the 
Bureau held on to this prerogative. After the war, the CIA was officially assigned 
responsibility for foreign intelligence, with the explicit limitation that it "have no police, 
subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions."11 With the FBI 
responsible for domestic intelligence and law enforcement, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover 
greatly increased the size of his empire and there were but limited checks on the power of 
either agency.  
During the Cold War and continuing through 1971, the FBI and CIA repeatedly 
violated their authority, often in arenas related to civil liberties. The CIA’s Operation 
Chaos, for example, had the stated mission “to gather and evaluate all available 
information about foreign links to racial, antiwar, and other protest activity in the United 
States.”12 It also followed up on inquires from the FBI about Americans traveling abroad, 
and “amassed thousands of files on Americans, indexed hundreds of thousands of 
Americans into its computer records, and disseminated thousands of reports about 
Americans to the FBI and other governments.”13 The FBI’s counterintelligence programs, 
the most famous of which is COINTELPRO, focused first on the Communist party, which 
had been stripped of “rights, privileges and immunities attendant upon legal bodies 
created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States” by the Communist Control 
Act of 1954. Techniques such as unlawful wiretaps and surveillance used against them 
were extended to groups that ranged across the political spectrum, from the Klu Klux Klan 
to the New Left. The “Rabble Rouser Index,” for example, was a 1967 list of people who 
fomented racial discord, later expanded to those “with a propensity for fomenting” any 
disorder.14 Ultimately the FBI targeted political figures that Hoover wanted to discredit.   
Yet after 9/11, the question of if there should be a domestic intelligence apparatus 
was sidestepped by preponderant agreement that connecting and collecting the dots was 
essential.  Specific programs that will be discussed later, such as the Pentagon’s Total 
Information Awareness project, received publicity that seemingly served only as detours 
from any real debate, veering discussion from if to instead what form domestic intelligence 
                                                
10 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al 
Qa’ida (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 41. 
11 "National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3 (D)(1))." 
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13 Ibid. 
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should take. Put differently, the focus on information sharing avoided the question of what 
information and where it comes from. 
From Collecting to Connecting the Dots 
After fusion centers collect the dots, the next step is how they are connected, a 
combination of human and computer manipulation. Data-analysis and data-mining aim to 
turn information into intelligence. Some experts distinguish between subject-based, rule-
based and pattern-based data mining.15 Others propose a division into specific, relational 
or link, and general.16 None of the labels perfectly categorize the different techniques, 
which can be and are combined into sequential processes.  
“The problem,” Jerome noted, “when you get to a large perspective is you get too 
much information.”  
We have that flipside: information overload, which is a big thing. Maybe the biggest 
problem is information overload. There has to be way to scan the information 
properly and quickly and in a timely manner, and put it into actual, readable space. 
My thinking is if it takes you more than 3 sentences to explain something, your 
average cop isn’t going to read it. Maybe your average person but I know your 
average cops won’t because they don’t think that far. You get to three sentences 
and if it doesn’t have it all in there, it’s gone. So we’ve got issues with that, that is 
going to be one of the things we fight once we have the information coming in. The 
discerning and sifting through the real information, what is usable to what is the 
chaff and needs to be set aside.  
The ambition is to harness the mass of data instead of being thwarted by it, and to push 
forward to predictive power. The identification of patterns and development of models is 
also an attempt to overcome Roberta Wohlstetter’s classic dilemma of signals and noise, 
warning and decision. The desire to preempt terrorism, to shift from reactive to pro-active, 
and from preparedness to preemption, impels research onto better, more powerful 
technologies.  
A subject-based search or structured query begins with looking up a specific 
person, examining, for example, listed addresses and telephone numbers. This is what 
detectives and intelligence agents did manually, before the information was available for 
searching in digital form. Relational data-analysis looks for links between people or 
attributes, and is still a computer-aided version of standard criminal investigative 
practices, although more complex and proportionally more empowered by automation. “Of 
course, such a method must be used with care,” one RAND study admitted.17 “Given 
enough links, everyone would be on such a list.” A search can also be conducted by 
attribute, instead of subject, or to seek relationships between attributes. For example, an 
analyst can create a list of rules to search databases for behaviors worrisome enough in 
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conjunction to warrant further investigation. Buying large quantities of explosives, firearms 
and stocks of provisions, given the violent history of the Branch Davidians in Waco, 
Texas, could warrant further investigation of individuals matching these criteria. Both 
subject and link analysis can be described as searches for patterns, including 
associations, sequences, classification, clustering.18 They can be thought of as mining 
data for tactical or strategic intelligence. These are not, generally, new techniques but an 
enhancement of old ones.  
The “data-mining” that is a major focus of concern, in contrast, “represents a 
difference in kind rather than degree.”19 It is “a discovery approach, in which algorithms 
can be used to examine several multidimensional data relationships simultaneously, 
identifying those that are unique or frequently represented.”20 A computer program can be 
created to automatically search for non-obvious relationships, a technique developed for 
Las Vegas casinos that has found security applications. At its extreme, predictive data-
mining goes further. It takes up the social life of the population as functionally equivalent 
to the biological one, and expects that it will present natural patterns. This requires 1) 
massive quantities of data and 2) an assumption that such patterns exist. Previously, 
known patterns were needed for comparison, patterns extracted from history, from prior 
attacks, or at most invented possible scenarios. Patterns do exist for many kinds of crime, 
and for many other behaviors. The classic example is Amazon.com’s comparison of one 
consumer’s purchases to those of other buyers in order to suggest products. Similarly, 
credit card fraud is flagged by luxury purchases, rapid expenditures and buying things that 
can be easily fenced. The debate as far a technology goes is if there is such a pattern for 
“terrorism.”  
The director of the fusion center had a different kind of concern: “There’s been a 
lot of technology development as a result of kind of the war on terror in the homeland 
security arena,” he observed. 
But—and it’s important—but the technology won’t solve the problems, the real 
problems are political problems: how do we all agree to share information, how do 
we all agree to accept each other’s clearances, how do we all agree what systems 
we will share in common?  
 
Intelligence: Knowledge, Organizations, Activities 
Intelligence encompasses surveillance and research, wrote Sherman Kent in 
1949, those “attempts to establish meaningful patterns out of what was observed in the 
past and attempts to get meaning out of what appears to be going on now.”21 What is 
remarkable is both how consistent this understanding of intelligence has been, as well as 
the way in which it shows continuity from the very earliest uses of the word. Intelligence 
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comes from the Latin “to understand,” intelligere, and its roots are inter and legere.22 
Literally, it is to collect or choose between things. By 1390, in English usage this referred 
to an inherent ability to choose well, and to express this by word or speech. Intelligence 
was also understood to pertain to the branches of knowledge, forerunners of disciplines 
and scientific departments. By 1450, the word had added nuance. It could mean 
“knowledge of events,” especially of military value, as well as communication about those 
events. Thus early on, there was a producer of information, a recipient, and knowledge 
understood as a good, brokered between them. In the sixteenth century, the word came to 
refer to the communications of spies, secret or private agents. Secrecy had been 
introduced. Intelligence was not just the acquisition of knowledge but also a certain kind of 
practice, one that could involve deception to acquire it, or to keep it from others. By 1602, 
it was used for an agency that obtains secret information.  
Kent, who will reappear in the next chapter, defined categories that corresponded 
closely to the various meanings the word had developed: knowledge, organization and 
activities. Intelligence for him was, first, a kind of knowledge. Second, it was the 
organization that produced that knowledge, meaning institutions and the arrangement 
between and within them. Third, intelligence was the result of activities or processes. 
Elaborating on the original meaning of collecting and choosing between things, collecting 
became today’s surveillance, “the many ways by which the contemporary world is put 
under close and systematic observation.”23 Selecting, or sifting, as Frank put it, became 
research and analysis, the attempts to establish meaningful patterns.  
Kent wrote pages on “intelligence is knowledge,” with descriptions of the types of 
intelligence a policy-maker might need, during war or peace. This should be organized by 
function, not in “an almost endless listing of the components of humanity and nature.”24 
What is unclear is if he followed his own advice, given his list of types: topography, 
environment, multiform permanent structures (cities, agricultural and industrial 
enterprises), people, status of the arts, sciences, technologies, and armed forces, 
character of the political system, economies, social groupings, codes of morality and “the 
dynamic interrelations which prevail among all of these.”25 
His section on “intelligence is organization” contained a substantive and still 
pertinent analysis of US institutional relationships. “Intelligence organizations are in 
competition with each other,” he reminded readers. He took the contentious position that 
an intelligence agency should resemble a “university faculty.”26 By this he meant that it 
should have access to references, be dedicated to scientific research and the goal of 
objectivity, and produce results that that indicate significance, and long-term trends. Such 
an agency must also “have many of the qualities of our greatest metropolitan 
newspapers,” which “watch, report, summarize and analyze” using well-placed sources, 
exercising editorial control, and meeting deadlines. Finally, it “must have certain 
characteristics of a good business organization,” by being “engaged in the manufacture of 
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a product (knowledge) out of raw materials (all manner of data) and labor,” and this 
product “must be packaged in a multitude of ways to suit the diversities of consumer 
demand.”27 Intelligence professionals, like all businessmen, must meet the needs of their 
consumers: 
They must study the market and develop its unexploited interstices. They must 
maintain small forces of decorous and highly intelligent salesmen who not only 
push the product and appraise the consumer reaction to it but also discover new 
consumer problems with an eye to the development of new products. They must 
plan for the future. 28  
Kent’s compromise regarding the complex issue of how to organize intelligence analysts 
was that a “regional breakdown should be used as far as possible,” with functional 
specialists (in economics, for example) at as specific a regional level as their knowledge 
permitted. He justified this strike against the traditional division of academic disciplines on 
the grounds that “if an economist who is thinking the French coal problem works with a 
political man who is thinking French politics the result is likely to be a better result than 
otherwise.”29 The need for regional specialists was widely agreed-upon, and affected not 
only CIA organization but also area studies and funding initiatives in academia still in 
place today.30  
Kent’s exposition of intelligence as an activity was not a lesson on how to overhear 
conversations or surreptitiously lift data, but rather an analytical method for producing 
what he hoped would be truly objective knowledge. Analysis was the core practice.  
After a confrontation of the problem and some decisions as to how it should be 
handled, there is a ransacking of files and minds for all information relating to the 
problem; and an evaluation, analysis, and digestion of this information. There are 
emergent hypotheses as to the possible aggregate meaning of the information; 
some emerged before, some after its absorption. No one can say whence came 
these essential yeasts of fruitful thought. Surely they grow best in a medium of 
knowledge, experience, and intuitive understanding. When they unfold, they are 
checked back against the facts, weighed in the light of the specific circumstances 
and the analysts' general knowledge and understanding of the world scene. Those 
that cannot stand up fall; those that do stand up are ordered in varying degrees of 
likelihood.31 
Paraphrasing Kent’s exposition, what comes first is the appearance of a 
substantive problem, which may be identified by someone who already knows a good 
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deal, has an inquiring mind, and puts it to the task of potential problems. Alternatively, a 
problem may spring into relief as something new emerges. Or, it may come at the request 
of a consumer who, engaged in practical matters and negotiations, inevitably lacks some 
piece of information. The second stage is analysis of the problem, not only to discover and 
discard what is irrelevant, but also to shape the problem so that a solution will be 
applicable. Third is the collection of data, which may mean requesting it from someone 
who has it, or may initiate a surveillance operation to obtain the data. The fourth stage is 
evaluation of data. This, he notes, is complicated when the source of information is overly 
protected. He gives the pointed example of a French political figure’s speech decrying the 
misery in a US-protected city in Algeria. In a report the speaker was rated “unreliable” 
because the evaluator knew the conditions were not that bad, but the real value of the 
report was that a supposed ally was promulgating “violent adverse criticism” and the 
issues of trust and trustworthiness this raised. Kent’s fifth stage is the hypothesis. “[W]hat 
is desired,” he expounds, “is…quantity and quality,” so that there are as many 
interpretations of the data as possible. Kent contended, as everyone still does today, that 
too much security and internal rivalries block this from happening because these impede 
information from reaching the analyst. How alternative hypotheses are created, and what 
happens to them, is related to another important question: how intelligence supports 
policy and how policy directs intelligence. Kent noted that there was always the next-to-
last stage, “more collecting and more testing of hypotheses” and gives his sixth stage as 
presentation of the hypothesis, “a new and better approximation to the truth.”32  
Kent excluded from his definitions of intelligence whole realms that others, even 
then, felt were integral. Intelligence meant strategic intelligence, the knowledge needed by 
policy makers as they devised and implemented national strategy. In Kent’s optimistic 
assessment of future US actions, this was “the constructive knowledge with which we can 
work toward peace and freedom throughout the world, and the knowledge necessary to 
the defense of our country and its ideals.”33 Operational, tactical and combat intelligence 
were out, all of which have to do with immediate, situational knowledge for an operation or 
battle. He also excluded counterintelligence and “any other sort of intelligence designed to 
uncover domestically-produced traitors or imported foreign agents.”34 Anything in the 
United States or related to police function was ignored, although Kent was well aware of 
how fears of an “emergent American Gestapo” and bureaucratic territoriality negatively 
impacted the structure of the 1947 National Security Act. The act, he noted, specified that 
when the CIA “wants information which it feels may be possessed by the FBI, [the] CIA 
must ask for it in writing. In the best of circumstances this procedure constitutes a barrier 
between the two organizations, and in circumstances other than the best it can become 
an impenetrable wall.”35  
Some of the limitations that Kent imposed in his definition of intelligence came 
from the effort to differentiate his project from that of the Soviets. For them, “the concept 
of ‘intelligence’ embraces the broad range of Communist clandestine operations, which 
are made feasible by clandestinely procured information.”36 Kent argued long for a more 
scholarly approach, and deemphasized the covert operational activities of the CIA. In 
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keeping with the wartime intelligence structure, he argued that clandestine activities 
should be understood as support provided by field officers to the home analysis group. 
The issues Kent diagnosed with secrecy and policy still plague the intelligence 
community. Central Intelligence was conceptualized in its early days as a hub of 
information from the entire intelligence community on national-level concerns. Ideally, it 
produced on its own only what did not already exist. For this to really work, the CIA would 
have needed to be authorized to review everyone else’s data. Final reports would not do. 
Such access would have to be enforced at the highest levels of government. This lacking, 
Kent correctly predicted that the CIA would embark upon its “own full-scale surveillance 
and research activities.”37 Competitiveness and isolation would lead to duplication of 
effort, and information would be hidden in the space between the CIA’s “right to 
inspection” of intelligence from everywhere, and the special case of FBI intelligence, 
which would be “made available.”  
Kent was optimistic that the National Security Council, charged with reviewing 
operations, would exercise adequate control. The doctrine of plausible denial, which 
ultimately undermined this oversight structure, was far in the future. Covert actions 
eventually did not always pass through formal approval procedures, in order to shield 
high-level officials in case of public exposure. This protected politicians from the fallout of 
authorizing illegal or polemic actions, but also created a situation where agencies ran 
amok with little likelihood for accountability, and hence little incentive for self-regulation. 
So light a paper trail was left of CIA attempts to kill Fidel Castro that no one could 
ascertain if the CIA’s actions had been authorized or not.38 As a result, the House and 
Senate Select Committees on intelligence were established in the mid-1970s in order to 
better oversee covert operations. A document called a Presidential Finding was required 
for any proposed covert operation, which the intelligence committees could evaluate and 
discuss. Their internal review was designed to substitute for open public debate 
(incompatible with secrecy) on the desirability or advisability of a certain course of action.  
Their evaluation would hinge, in part, on the congruence between available data 
and the planned course of action. Does intelligence indicate that the operation is 
necessary to some goal, likely to succeed, and better than an alternative? These are 
questions about the operation itself; they pertain to the means, as opposed to the ends. 
The other part of evaluation is the desirability of the goal, which might be to destabilize 
another country, or support an unsavory regime. The presidential finding is supposed to 
make a case for why a covert action should be taken, by the means proposed and for the 
desired end. Intelligence provides both the foundational support for this argument, and the 
occasion for fissure.  
In a sense there is no “raw” data, as for any bit of information multiple evaluations 
pertain: on the reliability of the source, the possibility of error as well as deception, and 
potential effects. The fact that so much judgment is involved is at the core of the two most 
significant axes of dispute in intelligence: secrets and policy. The next chapter explores 
the development of national security intelligence through the life of Sherman Kent, and his 
part in the development of an intelligence apparatus during World War II. The involvement 
of US academics before, during and after World War II made the academic discourses of 
that time foundational to intelligence epistemology. The debates within intelligence 
paralleled, and for a period of time influenced, those that took place within the humanities 
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and social sciences. The intelligence establishment during the war actively debated the 
relationship between fieldwork and writing, practice and theory, and the puzzle of 
epistemological and moral relativism. Focusing on Kent’s rendering of intelligence as it 
developed in the Research & Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services during 
World War II, the next two chapters will focus on the debates over espionage proper, 
deception, counterintelligence and secrecy in general, and the appropriate relationship of 
intelligence to policy. 
  21 
Chapter Two. Science and Secrets 
 
Sherman Kent 
The description of Sherman Kent as “larger-than-life” and his role as “the father” of 
strategic intelligence, when given by the Kent Center in the Sherman Kent School for 
Intelligence Analysis at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) University, combines to 
produce a tribute curiously public for a spy agency.1 Although certainly “one of the 
architects of the US intelligence community,” as CIA literature describes him, the 
accolades position Kent as an avatar of the particularly American style of intelligence 
forged during the years of the Second World War.2 In the Research & Analysis Branch of 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, forerunner to the CIA), two generations of scholars 
from across academic disciplines and throughout the political spectrum came together 
with the directive to apply a “positivist standard of objectivity” and produce tactical and 
strategic information to be used by the US government during and after the war.3 The 
formative power of this intellectual and social experience influenced the work done in US 
intelligence and in academia for decades to come. 
The ongoing homage to Kent, hand in hand with still-active detractors, stems from 
the canonical status of his 1949 book Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. In 
it, he so ably expressed a version of intelligence that he and the book became 
synonymous with “the American view.”4 Kent was a young professor and former graduate 
student in the Yale University Department of History when he was tapped to aid the US 
government in preparing for entrance into World War II. He brought with him the methods 
of scholarship in which he had been trained, resulting in his approach towards intelligence 
as a social science, a science of hypothesizing, testing and refining. For Kent and his 
World War II cohort, intelligence would be a work-in-progress that could produce the same 
incremental accumulation of knowledge as any other discipline, but that carried with it an 
additional standard of proof in its use in fighting the war. “Intelligence work is in essence 
nothing more than the search for the single best answer,” Kent stipulated, “upon which a 
successful course of action can be rested.”5 The process, carried out by scientifically 
trained, rational minds, might be imperfect but was the best hope for estimating the future, 
and therefore to guide policy, available to any government.  
Sherman Kent was not a radical innovator himself. He was a product of his times 
and the specific intellectual tutelage in the Research & Analysis branch of the OSS. He 
was what Paul Rabinow has called “a technician of general ideas.”6 A capable and 
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assiduous scholar, he became dedicated to developing an epistemology of intelligence. A 
dedicated and sincere advocate for his craft, well aware of the changes his brand of 
intelligence represented, he provided a readable, synthetic articulation of the new 
intelligence. His book was designed for pedagogic use, aimed at the up and coming 
generation of intelligence practitioners. He was notably also a proponent of using 
academic standards, such as publishing and methodological, rigor for maintaining quality 
and incorporating improvements. 
Kent’s life bridged a period when universities and intelligence united for a time, 
developed in tandem, and then became disillusioned with each other. His antecedents 
aggregate many of the factors that affected how intelligence came to be defined in the 
United States: the practices of research and analysis, their institutionalization, and the 
focus on strategic results in the form of National Intelligence Estimates. With a privileged 
and sympathetic family, an elite education and connections, wartime experience, a quick 
pen, and writing support from the then-new War College, Kent became indelibly linked to 
intelligence’s future. The path of his life, then, leads us through the development of the US 
intelligence apparatus, up to and continuing from the National Security Act of 1947.  
 
*** 
As has been said, historical research is much like research in the natural sciences. 
It consists of gathering facts—old and well known ones at first, and later, with the 
help of deeper knowledge of bibliography, new ones. It consists of forming 
hypotheses on the basis of these facts, of testing these hypotheses on the basis of 
these facts, of testing these hypotheses for traces of one's own ignorance or bias, 
of cleansing them if possible. The goal of research is to build better hypotheses 
than already exist and to establish them as relatively more true: it is to reveal a 
sharper picture of what happened and to make a closer approach to actuality than 
anyone has yet contrived. In the end, it results in giving to the world a new and 
original statement of what happened..."7 
Sherman Kent, Writing History (1941) 
Sherman Kent’s father was a wealthy Yale-educated businessman who married 
the daughter of a professor. He took her to Chicago, where Kent was born in 1903, and 
then moved the whole family to California. Their sweeping property at the base of Mount 
Tamalpais would become the wealthy residential enclave of Kentfield, just north of San 
Francisco in Marin County. When the senior Kent ran successfully for US congress, the 
family maintained bicoastal residences. Sherman studied in Washington and at what 
would become the Thatcher School in Ojai Valley, California, which sent most of its 
students to Yale. His early school friendships, as well as the others he developed in his 
trajectory through the thoroughly aristocratic American educational system of the time, 
would reappear throughout his life in academia and intelligence.8 This social web was in 
many ways the basis of the OSS, later the analytic branch of the CIA, and now the 
National Intelligence Center (NIC). Yale historian Robin Winks tellingly noted, “those who 
were suspicious of the OSS, perhaps thinking that it was a refuge for the socially well-to-
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do (since it contained more than its share of names from the social register), said that 
OSS stood for ‘Oh, So Social,’ ‘Oh, So Swish,’ or (since some also thought it was full of 
limousine liberals) ‘Oh, So Socialist’.”9 Kent’s privilege and wealth were standard for those 
in the Ivy League, and an Ivy League background was standard in the early era of US 
intelligence.10 
“Sherm” was also known at Yale as “Buffalo Bill, the Cultured Cowboy,” a 
reference to his California boyhood. Despite a lackluster undergraduate performance in 
which he notably did not pass introductory history on the first go-around, his combination 
of being personable, conscientious, and eager led professors to encourage him to pursue 
a PhD in history. As he began to focus on his studies, he received the distinction of being 
hired as a lecturer, before passing to candidacy, for the core freshman history class he 
had first failed. He went on to develop a course, first for undergraduates and then 
graduates, on “liberal and national movements of 19th century Europe.” The father of US 
intelligence was actually considered a rather leftist specialist in the Enlightenment. His 
eventual dissertation topic and first book, published by Yale University Press in 1937, was 
on French “Electoral Procedure under Louis Philippe,” and was described by a reviewer 
as concerned with exactly that: not the results of elections, but the injustice of the 
procedures by which men were denied suffrage.11 Some critics of the Kent school of 
intelligence, self-identified students of Leo Strauss, would later disparage what they 
identified as its basis in the political tenets of the Enlightenment, especially the idea of the 
accessibility of truth to the common man, or anyone with access to scientific methods.12 
Kent understood intelligence as almost coterminous with what he knew best, 
namely, history as a scientific endeavor. Writing History, his second book, was for 
students and detailed how to conduct independent research. History was thrilling to him, 
breaking new ground by practicing science to find out truths not about nature, but 
humanity. "Not that this pattern of progressive steps was new, nor even the general 
argument, for the method of history is closely akin to the method of science which Francis 
Bacon put forth in the early seventeenth century,” he admitted. The new “use of the 
techniques of the natural sciences upon purely man-made evidence,” however, was full of 
possibility, whether applied to the primary source documents of historical research or to 
vital papers snatched from an enemy nation, analyzed and transformed into intelligence.13 
World War II became the applied arena for this vision of scholarship. Kent’s words 
of guidance on historical research were slightly tweaked and reinscribed as methods of 
analysis in his 1949 Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy.14 In his book on 
history he wrote, "we live in the middle of history. We consume as much history as air.... 
The doctor uses it in the diagnosis of symptoms; the businessman and the statesman use 
it when they reflect upon the smart move or the socially expedient move."15 It was only a 
small switch to reapply this: "Intelligence is a simple and self-evident thing. In a small way 
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it is what we all do everyday. When a housewife decides to increase her inventory, when 
a doctor diagnoses an ailment...".16 What changed were the ends, but not the means. 
*** 
In 1941 President Roosevelt invited lawyer, businessman and World War I hero 
William J. (or “Wild Bill”) Donovan to remedy the United States’ lack of a centralized 
intelligence agency with global range.17 “It seemed that Mr. Roosevelt,” wrote Sherman 
Kent in his autobiography, “was far from pleased with the kind of intelligence support he 
was getting from the armed forces and was also inclined to disbelieve or give low 
credence to the political and economic information that was coming into the Department of 
State from its many diplomatic missions overseas.”18 Roosevelt wanted not just an 
intelligence organization, but specifically one attached to the Office of the President.19 
Donovan used his extensive contacts to staff what would become the Office of Strategic 
Services, described as bringing together “the functions of at least four British intelligence 
organizations,” and in this twist of history with lasting repercussions, coming “far closer to 
combining all the purposes of intelligence than any democratic society had previously 
allowed itself in peacetime.”20  
Prior to the war, an intelligence agency such as the OSS was vigorously opposed 
in the United States. The country went through cyclical periods in which domestic 
surveillance was permitted, and each time curtailed because of abuses.21 These episodes 
fueled on-going suspicion, which helped maintain strong support for states’ rights and 
decentralized government. Information gathering and collation was therefore divided 
among the departments of State, Treasury, Navy and War, with agencies who specialized 
in specific topics or technical types of information. Pockets of foreign human intelligence 
expertise existed in parts of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Customs, and the State 
Department, but this could produce, at best, a piecemeal picture. The general population’s 
opposition to top-heavy government and the rivalry between the extant intelligence groups 
were both factors that influenced how the US intelligence community was set up and 
developed.  
The country’s willingness to take up arms and eventually allow a centralized 
intelligence agency was in large part due to President Roosevelt’s skillful capitalization of 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Before that event, US participation in World War II 
was hotly debated. Roosevelt had campaigned on a promise of no foreign wars, and there 
was such strong domestic opposition that he was—and still is—accused of manufacturing 
the Japanese surprise assault, by purposefully goading them, ignoring intelligence, or 
both.22 Many believed war was inevitable, but only after Pearl Harbor did the mood 
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change enough to make a declaration of war politically tenable. Thus the President quietly 
ordered the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) into existence in July of 1941 
(before Pearl Harbor), then transformed it into the OSS in June of 1942.23  
When Kent described the initial situation in which COI was born, he wrote,  
From our visits and meetings with the various intelligence officers of the Armed 
Forces, we had some pretty solid evidence that any active intelligence work must 
have ended with the First World War. There were a lot of things that had changed 
in those twenty-three years, and, as far as anyone could determine, none of the 
operatives in the Army, Navy or the Marine Corps had done more than a lick or 
two to keep any of the files up to date. As much could be said for the State 
Department, with the sole exception of the Near East Division.24  
His description is seconded in the official history of the OSS, written by Michael 
Warner of the CIA History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence:  
Important and timely information went up the chain of command, perhaps even to 
the President, and might be shared across departmental lines, but no one short of 
the White House tried to collate and assess all the vital information acquired by the 
US government. State and the military developed their own security and 
counterintelligence procedures, and the Army and Navy created separate offices 
to decipher and read foreign communications. Senior diplomat Robert Murphy later 
reflected, “it must be confessed that our Intelligence organization in 1940 was 
primitive and inadequate. It was timid, parochial, and operating strictly in the 
tradition of the Spanish-American War.”25 
*** 
The OSS would become an all-purpose spy organization, with an on-the-ground 
presence around the world that included covert operations and counterintelligence. Yet 
the Research & Analysis Branch retained a distinctly intellectual bent. How did elite 
scholars become established at the heart of US intelligence? Part of the explanation is 
contained in Kent’s description of the files he found when he started at COI: they were 
woefully outdated and the government needed primary information about the state of 
other countries in order to operate in them, or even simply to negotiate. Thus much of 
what the war apparatus needed was in libraries, the domain of scholars. Kent’s 
pedagogical interest in teaching young minds how to do original research fit neatly into the 
task of collecting, sorting and compiling such data. Further, people with other skills or 
inclinations, or less choice, had been drafted into active duty, whereas scholars and their 
students still in school were available. Among these were European academics seeking 
refuge. They had expertise in regions of conflict, needed employment, and were invested 
in the outcome of the war. Finally, a number of established professors, well positioned in 
the small overlapping circles of wealth and privilege that existed between government, 
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Wall Street, and the universities, made the elements of an academic intelligence branch 
come together.26 
In the many articles and books on the origins of the CIA and its “American” 
approach to intelligence, few note that as new analysts came out of the ivory tower of 
academia, the war was their first exposure to intelligence. This was, however, significant. 
“The London R&A outpost was a huge affair,” wrote Kent in his autobiography. “It was 
under the nominal control of Crane Brinton, a famous Harvard professor of history who 
had never had more than a moment's contact with the intelligence business before Langer 
packed him up and sent him off to run the London office. Here he was in charge of an 
office with thirty or forty members maintaining liaison with the British and other 
governments."27 It was no wonder then that they crafted intell in the mold of what they 
knew, precisely because it was what they knew, rather than along the lines of the 
espionage-focused work done by other nations’ more established institutions. The 
“graduate student” approach would imprint the American conceptualization and 
institutionalization of the field.  “Specialists” in a region had generally acquired their 
expertise in undergraduate language study, spent some time abroad, taken courses 
dealing with the region and then done narrowly focused graduate research on a specific 
topic. When the CIA moved into its permanent headquarters in Virginia, in fitting reference 
to both employees and aspirations it was called “the campus”.28 In time Kent proposed, 
with eventual success, an intelligence institute after the manner of the Princeton Institute 
for Advanced Study, and a journal that would carry on a meta-conversation about the 
epistemology of intelligence, best practices and precise vocabulary. 
Bureaucratically, the pre-Pearl Harbor Office of COI had been directly responsible 
to the president, although technically within the then-new Joint Chiefs of Staff system. 
Reorganization after Pearl Harbor put the transformed office in a position of needing to 
prove its worth to its unfavorably predisposed military overseers.29 Operation Torch, 
launched in November 1942 against the Vichy French army of North Africa, was an early 
effort by OSS to muffle bureaucratic enemies and justify itself. The operation also 
provides a snapshot of what Research & Analysis did in the war. Efforts from the 
operational branch in Africa to Kent’s section in Research & Analysis exemplified the 
accomplishments and mistakes of the war office. They also illustrated many of the future 
strengths and weaknesses of US intelligence.  
In his autobiography Kent recounts his group’s frenetic work of collecting and 
writing up a massive quantity of facts and suggestions to support the invasion. 
"Information on conditions Allied forces could expect to meet in North Africa, from the 
level of surf at the Casablanca beaches to details about North Africa's roads and railways, 
was all furnished on a lavish scale" and was widely praised for its accuracy and tactical 
usefulness.30 However, notes historian David Walker, “American Military Intelligence, G-2, 
could have done the same job, as it had done similar jobs in the past,” and precisely in the 
arenas where the OSS claimed added-value, it seemed to fall short.31 Almost all of their 
guerilla troops failed to meet their objectives, and, on the part of R&A, their prediction of 
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the French response was wrong. Analysts had reasoned that because French resistance 
would amount to throwing in their lot with the Axis powers, they would instead capitulate 
easily, “allow American forces to occupy North Africa, and would perhaps even join the 
Allies.”32 The French, however, fought back at full intensity. While "OSS personnel were 
correct in assessing that the French were fundamentally pro-Allied," notes Walker, "what 
they did not understand was that the French were also prepared to defend their own 
national interests, and would obey the orders of their leaders. OSS partially realized the 
importance of honour and obedience in the French army [but]...[t]he main problem facing 
French pro-Allied sentiment at the time of Torch was that there was no clear indication 
that the Allies would win the war."33  
Although supporters claimed victory as proof of OSS usefulness, an alternative 
interpretation was that US success instead stemmed from two (unforeseen) serendipities. 
First, a French admiral who was visiting his polio-stricken son fell into American hands in 
Algiers. He had the power to order a French cease-fire, a necessary although perhaps not 
sufficient step to end the conflict. Second, and perhaps rendering the first superfluous, 
Hitler broke the 1940 armistice by invading the unoccupied zone of France (probably 
fearing that the French would go over to the Allies, and as a result provoking this reality). 
Yet by these coincidences, Operation Torch’s reputation was made. The genuinely 
effective contribution of the R&A branch had been the grunt effort to prepare information 
on the vital systems of strategic regions, culling libraries, government archives, 
newspapers and any other source of data written or human that they could find to create 
maps, tables and reports. In general, this was what one would now call “open-source” 
information, although data gleaned from an unsuspecting foreign visitor added to what 
was not available from library research. The utility of this information (some would say its 
preeminence over covertly acquired particulars) and the process of analytically weaving it 
together would become hallmarks of the CIA approach to intell for many years. This was 
part of the significant legacy of R&A, and Kent as the codifier of its efforts. 
OSS influenced US intelligence in other ways as well. According to the scholar R. 
Harris Smith, briefly a CIA employee and subsequently a historian, “In a conscious effort 
to subordinate all political considerations to defeat of the enemy, OSS became very 
tolerant of the political left,” and those leftward leaning experts on Europe came with their 
own academic pedigree.34 Barry Katz, historian of the R&A branch of OSS and its 
considerable intellectual legacy, describes how in the Washington, DC, headquarters of 
the OSS, “a cadre of the most outstanding Marxist scholars from the European emigration 
forged a tactical alliance with the executive wing of the US government.”35 Leading 
theoreticians of the exiled Frankfort Institute for Social Research, including Franz 
Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, and Otto Kirchheimer, formed “one of the strangest of the 
illicit political liaisons of the 1940s.”36 These intellectuals fleeing the Nazi regime, together 
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with US academics from Sherman Kent’s world, were joined and often managed by scions 
of US money society, the Mellons and Mellon in-laws, J.P. Morgan’s sons, Vanderbilts, 
Duponts, and many others from Wall Street firms and oil companies.  
Although OSS contained a remarkable spectrum of political beliefs, overt 
ideological bias in favor of a position or discrimination against that position was forcefully 
limited.  “Donovan was as quick to defend his corporate officials, blue-blooded members 
of the establishment, and conservative émigrés,” describes Smith, “as he was to protect 
his liberals, Socialists, and Communists.”37 This combination allowed a heterogeneous 
scene to develop within the OSS, at least some of which carried over to the (pre-
McCarthy) CIA. This “ideological coexistence” was reputedly more successful in R&A than 
in the operational branches, where the endpoint was of course not scholarly objectivity but 
rather action that effectively achieved a goal. A certain percentage of wartime participants 
were captivated by the intellectual intensity combined with immediate real-world 
application, and, like Kent, either stayed with the agency despite its travails after the war, 
or returned within a few years. To counter the Soviet Union’s support of Communist 
organizations around the world, these former Ivy League academics devised aid 
measures for moderates in other nations, “the non-Communist political left around the 
world— trade unions, political parties, and international organizations of students and 
journalists.”38 As odd as it may seem today in light of the conservative, homogenized 
reputation of the post-McCarthy intelligence community, critics of the CIA decried it as a 
liberal bastion, and indeed, this and FBI director Hoover’s enmity was what eventually 
lead to drastic and damaging purges during the McCarthy years. 
There were other formative carryovers from OSS days. In 1972, Smith wrote, "The 
Office of Strategic Services was the direct lineal ancestor of today's Central Intelligence 
Agency… The CIA is no aberrant mutation of 'Donovan's dreamers'; it is in many ways the 
mirror image of OSS."39 One key aspect was that the “CIA inherited from OSS the crucial 
Donovan principle of merging Secret Intelligence and Special Operations in the same 
organization" and “the decision "was never seriously challenged when the CIA was 
created six years later."40 Whether intelligence and covert operations should be housed 
together continues to be a matter of debate today. "Even more fundamental,” according to 
Smith, “was the CIA's inherited justification for clandestine political operations unrelated to 
espionage and intelligence analysis.”41 The OSS foreign interventionism that was 
unquestioned in its moral justification against wartime fascism was neatly bequeathed to 
the CIA, and “The most notorious CIA-fomented coups in Latin America, Asia and the 
Middle East were, technically speaking, only extensions of Donovan's mandate for 
political warfare... [and] former OSS men who had once aided underground partisans 
became leading experts on counter-insurgency and the suppression of left-wing 
rebellions."42 
*** 
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The reports requisitioned from R&A during the war covered a vast range of topics, 
from trade routes to political structures, and “analysis” ranged from the production of 
tables of quantities and weights to subjective, if reasoned, plans for the future social 
structure of Germany. The Central European Section (led by Neumann, Marcuse and 
Kirchheimer), contributed “a minutely detailed picture of the social, economic, political, 
and cultural structure of totalitarianism, and its points of vulnerability and resistance within 
it.”43 Overall, the Branch’s encyclopedic compilations of “facts” were better received than 
its reports providing “evaluation of ‘objective possibilities’ inherent in given situations.”44 
Given its concentration of social theorists, jurists and scholars, the Central European 
Section’s most direct effect was less on the war than on planning the peace, postwar 
governance and war crimes prosecution. Neumann, for example, argued against counting 
on psychological warfare (largely separated into a different branch of the OSS), because 
morale “is an inconsequential factor in the German situation and will continue to be so 
until military defeat smashes the elaborate system developed by Nazi-ism to control 
morale.”45 
For the future epistemology of intelligence though, it is equally important that R&A 
sustained a “theoretically explicit inquiry into the nature of objectivity” throughout its 
work.46 Some direction came from Donovan, who recognized and supported the need to 
present an “impartial” product because of the politics of bureaucracy. The process of 
actualizing impartiality, however, necessitated an explicit epistemology and this was 
evident to the R&A coterie. They took up their own intelligence production as data for 
“basic analysis of the whole process of scientific thought in the social field,” considered in 
reports with such titles as “The problem of objectivity in R&A Reporting” and 
“Memorandum Regarding Some Weaknesses in Our System of Research and Write Up 
with Suggestions How to Remedy.”47 The collected nationalities, socio-economic 
backgrounds, education and professions of R&A meant that there were diverse personal 
positions about the geopolitical turmoil of the time. From the war to Communist expansion 
and revolutions, many held differing opinions about what the future world should look like 
and how that should be achieved. Yet if their work were to have impact, and they were to 
survive bureaucratically, they needed to invent “a new mode of political writing.”48 
The Projects Committee was created in 1942 to put impartiality into practice. Some 
in R&A quickly decried its epistemological naïveté, arguing that “data do not exist outside 
of an interpretive framework.”49 Nonetheless, the committee monitored and edited output 
by pruning auxiliary verbs such as “ought” “should”, and “must”, exposing “subjective 
inflections posing as the views of unnamed foreign sources,” withdrawing impolitic 
insinuations and removing rhetorical embellishments.50 Subject to the demands of 
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customers, analysts were also forced to accelerate the pace of writing. If the historian 
Leopold von Ranke (whose historiographic methodology using varied primary sources 
was influential on the generation of historians in R&A) had “only wanted to show how it 
really had been,” they needed to describe the present “as it was actually happening.”51 
The result was an experiment in the methodological issues of applied social 
science. These scholars, émigrés and American academics concentrated their 
considerable intellectual talents and training on the problem of knowledge in war. The 
lesson that “facts do not speak for themselves through a language of protocol-sentences 
that is transparent and politically neutral,” was, according to Katz, “never fully mastered by 
the OSS, much less by the CIA,” but was dispersed instead through those who left R&A to 
become the next generation of social science and humanities professors.52 Perhaps 
logically, those who continued in intelligence maintained a practical concern with how to 
achieve objectivity and communicate it, rather than holding objections as to its 
impossibility. For them, writes Katz, “The antinomies of fact and value, scholarship and 
partisanship with which Max Weber had struggled so heroically had been largely 
resolved.”53  
More accurately, deep paradoxes of “objectivity” became matters of organizational 
structure and methodology. “This transformation of a group of obstacles and difficulties 
into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response” signals 
that intelligence was reproblematized.54 On one level, what changed was the way “speech 
acts are taken to count in the register of true and false, as well as the ways in which such 
speech acts are produced and authorized,” or the “mode of veridiction.”55 Intelligence 
became a profession and began an ongoing conversation about whether it was truly a 
science, a craft, or an art. The war analysts introduced new “ways of ordering 
interventionary practices,” what Rabinow and Bennett have identified as the “mode of 
jurisdiction” and as intelligence practices were institutionalized, “a specified range of 
activities [was] discriminated as appropriate and subsequently ordered, i.e. organized in 
relation to one another.”56  
Academia continued to struggle with issues of objectivity, representation and 
responsibility, but within the CIA, a set of functional answers to these major 
epistemological questions were in place. Like the natural sciences, intelligence agreed 
upon a “mature doctrine,” “difficult and important methodologies,” and a “common 
technical vocabulary”. Epistemology was considered settled and could be disconnected 
from methodology, which along with the bureaucracy of intelligence became the operative 
framework for problems. When insightful work was done by Richards Heuer, bringing to 
bear the advances of psychology on the cognitive process of analysis and biases, it was 
incorporated into the methodological paradigm.57 Conceptual tools, such as the culture 
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concept, continued to be used unchanged, despite anthropology’s thorough dissection of 
this (formerly foundational) idea’s epistemological limitations. American intelligence, 
largely—although not completely—cut off from outside input, continued its experiment in 
applied social science. It was in part because of this isolation that Heuer’s work was 
received with such excitement within intelligence.  
There were occasional critiques, and investigations (especially after notable 
failures), but the epistemology of intelligence was not again addressed as intensely or with 
such a rich background of knowledge as in the Research & Analysis Branch during World 
War II. Mostly, the practices and procedures developed during the war became routinized. 
The National Security Act of 1947 officialized institutional barriers. Concerns over or 
challenges to that system were often lost to immediate demands. The congressional or 
internal interventions that occurred nonetheless maintained the epistemology espoused 
by Kent, and accordingly changes were organizational and methodological.  
The 9/11 Commission’s conclusion that a “failure of imagination” was responsible 
for the events of September 11, 2001 is the sort of non sequitur that perhaps indicates 
emergent re-problematization. In the interim, however, an institutional correction was 
nonetheless supplied by the creation of the position of Director of National Intelligence 
and the Department of Homeland Security. Intelligence seems to have continued 
fundamentally unaltered and unchallenged, with one consequential and calamitous 
exception found in what may be called the “Straussian” school of intelligence.58  
*** 
If the Central Intelligence Agency insists on trying to perform the entire intelligence 
job and in so trying endeavors to reduce departmental organizations to impotence, 
it will not succeed. It will emerge from the battle perhaps still an agency but not 
central, and it may not even warrant the name intelligence. 59 
Sherman Kent, 1949 
The Research & Analysis Branch’s supportive intelligence effort continued 
throughout the war and extended into preparation for the massive reordering and 
reconstruction of Europe. By 1944 the end of combat was foreseen; Donovan had already 
begun lobbying President Roosevelt to grant the OSS permanent status. The founding of 
an agency that could impinge on the powers of the military’s Joint Intelligence Committee, 
Hoover’s FBI, as well as the Department of State, was not, to be sure, unopposed. The 
technical means for different kinds of intelligence collection were still split between the 
Army, Navy, State Department and FBI (imagery, radio interception, cryptology capability, 
as well as regional expertise). The leaders of each were opposed to a general intelligence 
or “strategic information” service outside of their control, and united in their objections to a 
coordinator of information with any power over them. Their concerns included budget 
allocation, fears that confidential matters would be compromised, and also the control of 
information. Who would ultimately decide what intelligence the president would receive? 
Although none of the major intelligence players denied the need for centralized processing 
of intelligence, and all nominally agreed to the creation of the CIA, no one wanted to cede 
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turf or access. Knowing Donovan, they further feared the threat to their domains if he were 
left in charge. 
FBI Director Hoover struck a blow in this bureaucratic battle by leaking a secret 
memorandum from General Donovan, written at the president’s request, on turning the 
OSS into a permanent “central intelligence service.” Presaging more recent (and now left-
wing) opposition to intelligence, conservative journalists denounced it as a proposal for a 
"'super-spy system' in the 'postwar New Deal'," an "all powerful intelligence service to spy 
on the postwar world and to pry into the lives of citizens at home."60 These sorts of power 
plays and public opinions did not stop intelligence’s transition into permanence during 
peacetime, but the government had to take them into account. 
When Truman took office after Roosevelt’s sudden death, Donovan lost the 
leverage of a personal relationship with the president, which meant the OSS lost its 
advocate. "Well before those if us who had chosen to stay on had had the time to plan 
how the R&A Branch would fit into the post-war government and continue to contribute to 
the national cause,” Kent recounted, “we read in The New York Times that General 
Donovan had been removed from the head position at OSS, and, in fact, the OSS itself 
had been disbanded. General Donovan himself also learned of these happenings from the 
newspaper."61 Those employees who had not returned to their prewar employment, 
waiting in the hope of continuing in the heady intellectual environment of the OSS, were 
shuttled off to more conservative places in government, such as the regional sections of 
the State Department. 
About a year later, President Truman proposed the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Two widely held understandings helped overcome the previous opposition to a centralized 
service. First, many of the multiple government reviews of Pearl Harbor accorded with the 
public assessment that it could have been avoided if there had been a central, 
coordinating group with both official and real access to all of the pre-incident intelligence. 
Second, as the war ended, the United States assumed a position as a major international 
power. Huge numbers of soldiers who were now familiar with abroad were returning. The 
newspapers carried daily reporting on the horrors of the war as revealed at Nuremberg 
Trials. Isolationists who had been against the entry into the war were in a weak position 
(but according to the official CIA historical account, still active) for arguing that the US 
should retreat behind its borders.62 In early 1946 George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” from 
Moscow warned, “World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on 
diseased tissue. This is the point at which domestic and foreign policies meet.”63 The 
argument that the country needed information to support worldwide action had become 
quite plausible. 
Secrets 
By the reissue of his book in 1966, Kent himself felt the need to address what he 
called the communist sense of the word “intelligence.” He had been criticized for the all-
source analytical approach; admitting that for the Soviets, his “overt intelligence” was 
“pretty much a contradiction in terms… [I]t is almost wholly espionage, counterespionage, 
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and the fruits thereof.”64 One of his more vocal detractors was General Alexander Orlov, a 
high-ranking Soviet intelligence officer who defected in 1938, and lived in the United 
States until his death in 1973. Orlov published the Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla 
Warfare in 1963, which approvingly portrayed a Soviet emphasis on obtaining secret 
documents from other governments’ files and disparaged Kent-style scientific analysis, 
especially as a gauge of nations’ future actions.65 He mocked such practices as being “but 
one step from mysticism and metaphysics.”66 A sympathetic review of Orlov’s book in the 
internal CIA journal, declassified in 1993, eagerly championed this alternative to the social 
science version of intelligence:  
This Soviet preoccupation must be impressed on the American intelligence officer, 
who, in all likelihood, has been overtrained in the relative insignificance of covert 
information. American students of intelligence work—usually they are scholars and 
therefore committed to research—take pleasure in stressing that clandestine 
collection of information plays a rather minor role in the aggregate activity. The 
finished intelligence product, they say, usually contains not more than ten per cent 
of clandestine data.67  
“In Orlov's opinion,” wrote the anonymous CIA reviewer, who must have been 
somewhat frustrated with the dominant currents in US intelligence, “this Western reliance 
on overt information often leads to unprovable hypotheses and at the worst to wild leaps 
into the unknown.”68 Kent disagreed, protesting that “a single document or group of 
documents which contains the desired secret” can only be obtained, evaluated and used 
as the basis of a strategic decision together with “costly, voluminous, and subtle sorts of 
information and a lot of rigorous, thoughtful analysis.”69 While no one argued against the 
need to contextualize pieces of information, covertly obtained or not, Kent distinctly shifted 
analysis into position as the main activity. 
                                                
64
 Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, xiii. 
65
 Aleksandr Ivanovich Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1963). 
66
 Winks, Cloak & Gown : Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961, 462. 
67
 "Book Review of Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare by Alexander Orlov," Studies in 




 Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, xxiii-xxiv. 
  34 
Chapter Three. Politicizing Intelligence 
 
National Intelligence Estimates and the Iraq War  
[W]hereas knowledge of the objective situation is of highest desirability, any non-
omniscient Being (i.e. Any frail human being) probably can never apprehend the true 
objective fact. He should, however, strive until it hurts. 
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence1 
 
[O]bjectivity is not something to be valued in and of itself. 
Gary J. Schmitt2 
 
In the CIA’s first two years, the bureaucratic battle between extant intelligence 
groups and the new agency was fueled by a batch of CIA reports downplaying the danger 
of direct Soviet action and thereby undercutting support for military spending. Already 
antagonistic to their new competition in producing intelligence, the (also new) Department 
of Defense complained that CIA leadership was a “wild-eyed bunch of intellectuals whose 
colleges don't want them back.”3 Such disparagement, even if self-serving, gained 
credibility when the CIA failed to foresee Communist North Korea’s 1950 invasion of 
South Korea. As part of the redesign of national intelligence, in late 1950 Sherman Kent 
accepted an invitation to return to government service, permanently resigning his 
professorship at Yale to join the Office of National Estimates. He ultimately became its 
director, and Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, a position he held until 1967. 
The Board, which by 1979 had morphed into the National Intelligence Council, produced 
National Intelligence Estimates, or NIEs. These reports were envisaged as data and 
thought-intensive research products that would synthesize for policy makers the 
“coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community [IC] regarding the likely course of 
future events,” providing the IC’s “best analysis of specific issues of national importance.”4 
The unchanged Kent-style orientation towards intelligence is notable even in these 
modern snippets, with their catchphrases of coordination, judgments on future events, 
analysis, and circumscription to issues of national importance.  
Writing from the British perspective, Michael Herman notes that “intelligence as 
information is as old as government; so too is secret intelligence,” but he identifies as 
hugely significant a shift that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, when “the term also 
gradually came to be associated for the first time with government institutions established 
specifically for 'intelligence' purposes, separated from decision-taking and policy-making, 
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and distinct from the machinery of embassies and foreign offices which continued (and 
continue) to combine information-gathering with these executive functions.”5 Herman is 
not marking the development of intelligence agencies per se, which had long existed. He 
is emphasizing the independence of intelligence from policy, the development of a specific 
configuration “objectivity.” “[U]ntil the mid-nineteenth century,” he emphasizes, “there was 
little in the way of specialised, permanent intelligence institutions. Controlling collection 
and evaluating the results were integral parts of statecraft and military command. 
Intelligence as an institution was a Victorian innovation."6 The British system is now often 
proposed as a model for the opposite reason, by American commentators who hold that 
its current formulation:  
encourages commingling in the belief that the best policy decisions are likely to 
result from a pooling of knowledge from among the country's international affairs 
experts. The British approach claims an additional advantage: policy officers 
brought into the analytic process are apt to view the finished intelligence products 
as more legitimate and acceptable since they have played an intimate role in their 
crafting.7  
The US adopted the separation of intelligence and policy as the best practice, to be 
striven for if not always achieved, but the intersection of the two has been the site of 
significant dispute in the field. The ends of the spectrum are differentiated in their 
genuinely different beliefs about the character of knowledge.  
Kent, representative of one end, accepted that even the most rigorous scientific 
methodology could not eliminate bias, but certainly the attempt was a virtue. Analysts 
needed to focus on producing the best information, not what would be done with it.  
[T]o wish simply for influence can, and upon occasion does, get intelligence to the 
place where it can have no influence whatever. By striving too hard in this 
direction, intelligence may come to seem just another policy voice, and an 
unwanted one at that.8  
Kent did not mince words about situations where intelligence organizations were not 
administratively separate, that is, they were under the administrative control of its 
consumers in plans or operations. Every once in so often it will swing “into line behind the 
policy of the employing unit…, prostituting itself in the production of what the Nazis used 
to call kämpfende Wissenschaft, ‘knowledge to further aims of state policy’.”9 In keeping 
with this concern, the Board, and indeed the Central Intelligence Agency, were designed 
to be structurally independent from policy makers. At a minimum, such handicaps to 
objectivity as direct administrative and financial control should be countered.  
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The middle ground in the debate on the proper relationship between intelligence 
and policy is inhabited by intelligence professionals who accept the social science tack 
and ideal of objectivity, but have concluded that the timeliness and contextualization of an 
analytical product is compromised by too little policymaker contact. They suggest various 
models of integration with policy makers, such as embedded analysts who would “not be 
subject to the same tests of loyalty or ideological affinity that may be appropriate for 
‘political’ appointees” or centers that blend intelligence and policy planning roles but retain 
“two distinct reporting lines.”10  
There is another school of intelligence at the far end in favor of integration with 
policy, which argues that analysis should “help the policymaker shape the future.” This 
can be done by identifying opportunities to advance US interests, as well as the 
vulnerabilities of foreign elements, the factors subject to US influence; and the likely 
results of given US courses of action on foreign societies.11 What may not be clear in this 
listing is the deeply divergent epistemology at its root. Silent Warfare: Understanding the 
World of Intelligence is a primer by Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, widely praised 
and included on introductory intelligence reading lists. Shulsky, the original author, served 
the Washington establishment in different capacities over the course of his career, from 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to researcher at the Rand Institute to the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He received his doctorate from the 
University of Chicago in 1972, and wrote the first edition of Silent Warfare (1991) based 
on a course he taught there in 1985, in order to present the “basic concepts and issues 
involved in the practice of intelligence.”12 Shulsky wanted to avoid narrow topicality, but 
following the book’s publication he surmised that new laws and changes in the 
international political scene were of sufficient impact to indicate substantial revision, and 
he asked Gary J. Schmitt to take up the task. Schmitt had graduated from the University 
of Chicago in 1980, and also transitioned to government and policy. He succeeded 
Shulsky as minority staff director of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was executive 
director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under Ronald Reagan, and 
subsequently held a series of think-tank and contract positions, including teaching as an 
adjunct professor in International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Perhaps most 
significantly, he was the executive director of the Project for the New American Century, 
an organization that advocated for US foreign policy of “global leadership” through military 
strength and moral clarity. The epitome of their message, communicated for years in 
letters, reports, op-eds and articles, were calls to depose Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.13 
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Shulsky and Schmitt also co-wrote “Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence (by which 
we do not mean Nous),” a chapter in a 1999 tome on the political philosopher Leo 
Strauss’s legacy, and were the principal authors of a 1996 critique of intelligence 
performance, issued by the Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National 
Strategy Information Center (NSIC), entitled “The Future of US Intelligence.”14 These 
pieces (a third edition of Silent Warfare was published in 2002), plus Schmitt’s post-9/11 
“Truth to Power? Rethinking Intelligence Analysis,” are expositions of their opposition to 
Kent on both theoretical and practical levels.15 
Although Shulsky and Schmitt kept the basic categories of intelligence as 
“knowledge, organization and activity,” they took issue with placing analysis instead of 
espionage at the heart of intelligence, as well as the idea that intelligence should 
maximize objectivity by staying apart from policy makers. They argued that there is a 
peculiar and misplaced moral superiority associated with American post-war intell.16 
According to them, aspiring to place “international relations on a higher plane” ignores the 
reality of struggle between nations, and avoids the perhaps distasteful necessity of 
counterintelligence and deception. Analysis "as a variant of science and thus partaking of 
its prestige” gives too much credit to an imperfect methodology. They identify morality as 
one of the causes of a US preference for “clean” technical intelligence (technint) over 
“messy” espionage, but warn that technology, like science, gives an illusion of 
omniscience. They attribute the qualms of Americans about counterintelligence—such as 
domestic surveillance—to distaste for the reminder this entails that there is in fact an 
enemy, rather than to constitutional or “big-brother” government concerns. Shulsky and 
Schmitt disparage the inclusion of peripherals such as narcotrafficking for being remote 
from the core issue of struggle between nations. Worse, for them, is intell as a “morally 
neutral provider of information” rather than an information service for policy.17 The 
purpose of intelligence for them is fundamentally the support of policy objectives, not the 
utopian goal of knowledge itself: “truth is not the goal, but only a means toward victory.”18  
These points are all part of a cohesive counter school of thought on intell. It can be 
recognized in aspects of government that may otherwise seem peripheral, as in the 
resistance of the Pentagon to dealing with poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, despite 
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arguments that opium provides critical funding for the violence that is more obviously in 
the military’s domain. The contrast is Kent, for whom "Impartiality, not neutrality, is the key 
to the correct, proper, and just presentation of history within the bounds of systematic 
study."19 In this he emphasizes that there should be equal consideration of possibilities, 
but the analyst should not ultimately withhold opinion on analytic decisions. Shulsky and 
Schmitt disagree on both accounts, that is, the goal of impartiality and that the place of 
analyst’s work once it reaches the stage of opinion has any special value. Through the 
title of “Speaking truth to power?” Schmitt questions if this “speaking” is either feasible or 
desirable.  
In this article Schmitt’s pragmatic objections are readily accessible and historical. 
On the one hand, there is no unbiased truth, "Independence from policy making or 
budgetary preferences,” he details, “does not guarantee objectivity. For much of the Cold 
War, for example, the CIA had an institutional interest in acting as ‘the corrective’ to 
Pentagon and military service estimates regarding Soviet military matters."20 Not only was 
their accuracy no more guaranteed than the military, but their prestige and indeed 
relevance was "tied to this role" of dissident. A second problem Schmitt had with 
objectivity was that analysts develop positions in their areas of expertise, in which they are 
subsequently invested. Third, he argues that even attempts to build independence into 
bureaucracy are structurally flawed, because the CIA is not really independent, but 
ultimately subordinate to the president.  
Given these limitations, analysts have no claim to truth, and therefore should not 
attempt to speak it to power.21 Instead, they should collect the information policy makers 
need. Defensively, this includes different possible threat scenarios so that adequate 
preparedness policy can be devised: “a head’s up about those things [the policy maker] 
should worry about and should possibly take action to head off.” On the offensive, the 
analyst should seek out and work at “alerting policy makers of potential opportunities for 
taking advantageous action.” The analysts’ supportive effort requires that they be 
“sufficiently close to the policy process to understand policy objectives.”22 This is the 
reason “objectivity is not something to be valued in and of itself.”23 
Rather than try to conjure objectivity from analysts, Schmitt suggested letting 
“various analytic centers, working for different bosses, develop their own views on the 
same topic.”24 One of the correctives to intelligence frequently proposed is for these 
analyses to be coordinated, and “contribute to the preparation of a range of community 
products.”25 Or, the centers could produce alternative analyses for policy makers, whose 
responsibility and presumed competence is to make choices between them. “The 
downside usually tied to this suggestion,” Schmitt admitted, “is that a policy maker will pick 
the analysis that fits his or her existing predilections. Yet given the speculative nature of 
many estimates in any case, there is no reason an experienced senior policy maker will 
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not feel justified in trusting his or her own judgment, regardless of whether he or she is 
faced with one consensus-driven assessment or multiple competing ones.”26  
In Shulsky and Schmitt’s version of the intelligence apparatus, the analyst must be 
part of the policy team, but cannot claim any special scientific authority in advising what 
the policy should be. Given their rejection of “objective” scientific methodology, it follows 
that unless the analyst holds the same or similar view on what “best” means, his or her 
work probably wouldn’t be very useful. Or in other terms, if “truth is not the goal, but only a 
means toward victory,” the prerequisite for victory as an objective is that the definition of 
victory is known. Their certainty is a clue. They are not simply proposing procedural 
improvements but rather are operating under a fundamentally different epistemology 
where there is a “right” way and it can be known (but not, they repeat, through social 
science). The unstated presuppositions underlying their practical concerns and solutions 
are grounded in a tradition of political philosophy that works with a different theory of 
knowledge than the one in which Kent-style intelligence is grounded.  Intelligence, they 
agree, is produced via analysis, “the patient piecing together of bits of information to yield 
the outlines of the larger picture.”27 Often, analysis hinges “on such major questions as the 
nature and characteristic modes of action of a foreign regime.”28 In Shulsky and Schmitt’s 
use of the word “regime”, in their focus on morality in comparing “traditional” and 
“American” intelligence, and in their certainty of a specific truth, they signal their 
connection to the teachings of Leo Strauss.  
Studying political philosophy with Strauss proved to be a valuable counterweight to 
the doctrines that were then prevalent, not only in the academy, but in intelligence 
analysis as well. By emphasizing the distinction among regimes as the basic 
political fact, political philosophy prepared one for a much better understanding of 
the world than did the “scientific” social science, which sought to understand the 
various regimes in terms of universal categories.29  
If a universal category assumes all people share a common human nature, Shulsky and 
Schmitt believe to the contrary that “the regime shapes human political action in so 
fundamental a way that the very souls appear different.”30 Ignoring the primacy of the 
regime leads to “explanations that rest on the subpolitical” and this is a fatal flaw if the 
political is the key to producing good strategic intelligence, and any knowledge of the 
social and political world more generally.31 
It is perhaps not immediately clear why the category of regime and its Aristotelian 
types do not indicate simply another universal, or why the category of a country’s regime 
would tell one anything about how its citizens actually live and think. Another Straussian, 
Eugene F. Miller explains as follows: Leo Strauss argued that sense data “given 
immediately or filtered through scientific constructs” cannot disclose the reality of social or 
political things. These things “come to presence in speech”; they exist because people 
talk about them, and therefore “social science must begin with speech,” specifically, 
serious speech about matters vital to the community, the most fundamental of which is 
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“the question of who should rule.” This brings us to the primacy of a regime, because (if 
this logic is accepted) it shapes “a community’s way of life, its dominant patterns of 
thought, and its manners.”32  
A second key point is the rejection of value-free science. The decision about who 
should rule and the right form of government is understood to be a value judgment, of 
what are virtues and who is “best”. If social science (and by extension, intelligence) 
forswears these kinds of judgments, “it is unable to make distinctions of morality or justice 
that are required to see regimes as they really are.” One is forced to accept all 
governments as potentially equally valid. The paradigmatic example of this error (on this 
interpretation of Strauss’s work) was the failure to recognize Hitler’s government for 
tyranny.33 If careful application of the scientific method leads to false objectivity, via a 
renunciation of value judgments, and yet Straussians champion “objective” truth, then 
there must be some other basis for non-relativistic epistemology. According to Strauss, it 
could be found through careful reading of the ancient Greeks, and "efforts to restore 
political philosophy as the quest for knowledge of political things as they are and as they 
ought to be."34 
The classicist scholar M.F. Burnyeat reviewed a posthumous publication of Leo 
Strauss’s essays in 1985, and an acrimonious exchange with the Straussians was begun, 
in which Burnyeat presciently observed: "The point, as I expressed it, was that ‘something 
more than an academic quarrel is taking place’ when Strauss defends his eccentric views. 
His misreadings of old books are not merely influential. They could have consequences in 
the real world of politics." Hadley Arkes, a Straussian professor at Amherst, endorsed 
such consequences, “The Straussians may supply a direction to Republican leaders, 
precisely because the teachings of Strauss are far more in accord with the sentiments of 
that broad public which has been bringing forth now a conservative majority.”35 
 
Noble Lies 
Leo Strauss was doing research outside of Germany when the Nazis came into 
power. He made his way to the United States in 1938, where he taught political 
philosophy until his death in 1973. The largest block of this time (1949-1967) was in the 
Political Science department at the University of Chicago. This was the principal site from 
which he raised a generation of students who identified as conservative or 
neoconservative, many of whom went on to academia and government. Strauss is linked 
to esoteric writing, popularly described as his argument that “the works of ancient 
philosophers contain deliberately concealed esoteric meanings whose truths can be 
comprehended only by a very few, and would be misunderstood by the masses.”36 He 
contended that the risk of persecution compelled “all writers who hold heterodox views to 
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develop a peculiar technique of writing,” one “in which the truth about all crucial things is 
presented exclusively between the lines.”37 An exoteric book contains “two teachings: a 
popular teaching of an edifying character, which is in the foreground; and a philosophic 
teaching concerning the most important subject, which is indicated between the lines.”38 
The true esoteric message is disguised so that only careful readers might perceive it in 
the midst of a discourse that could well be diametrically opposite, or hidden in the speech 
of a disreputable character. It will be marked, however, by features that are enigmatic if 
one assumes a supremely masterful writer, who knew exactly what he was doing when he 
produced a text that contained “obscurity of plan, contradictions, pseudonyms, inexact 
repetitions of earlier statements, strange expressions.”39 
Of course, the question is, did Strauss himself write in this style? What his 
message was hinges critically on if one believes he did or not. Given the parameters he 
identified, there has been much debate on if he considered himself a heterodox writer, 
and if he considered himself at risk for persecution. Heterodoxy is integral to the 
Straussian mystique, so the answer generally given to the first part is yes: against the 
behavioralist orientation of Chicago political science he brought back the classical thinkers 
of political philosophy. On this level, the answer to the second question is also yes, as 
Straussians like to claim persecution from liberals for their endorsement of a common 
sense, self-evident morality. For Strauss himself, the answer depends on if his true 
message was anti-democratic. A passage, putatively interpreting Plato’s Republic, might 
carry his real opinion: “the simply best regime would be the absolute rule of the wise; the 
practically best regime is the rule, under law, of gentlemen or the mixed regime,” 
suggesting that a benevolent dictatorship by wise “philosopher kings” would be ideal, but 
second best would be for philosophers to guide kings from behind the scenes.40 Most of 
his students argue that he thought that liberal democracy was the best option available 
but for this very reason he did not shy from critiquing it.41 This defense does not actually 
deny that he thought a benevolent dictatorship would be better if possible, nor settle 
definitively if he thought that expressing this idea in the US would lead to persecution, and 
therefore employed esoteric writing. 
Many of his students and their intellectual descendants have been in positions to 
influence or make policy, often on security, defense and intelligence. What Strauss meant, 
or more pragmatically, what his students took from his teachings regardless of what he 
sincerely believed, is therefore important. It is pointless to argue if Strauss’s adherents 
correctly or incorrectly applied his teachings, or even what they were, especially in light of 
a doctrine of purposeful obfuscation. There are seemingly endless reports in the popular 
press, scholarly articles and books from all sides of that debate. What is of concern is how 
the understanding that was adopted from Strauss shaped a counter voice of intelligence. 
The first point of agreement between supporters and detractors is that Strauss 
believed in the importance of absolute truth, good and evil.42 This is not to say that 
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everyone agrees he believed in truth or good or evil, but certainly he held them to be 
useful. Eugene Miller, the Straussian political science professor cited before, argued that 
according to Strauss, value judgments can be “verified empirically,” and are founded in 
"nature."43 Miller does not quite state this directly, but instead uses a technique of 
inversion common to Straussians, stating that contrary to the traditional view (i.e. the 
ancient Greek view, via Strauss), positivism’s reliance on science to verify assertions 
denies the possibility of knowledge of the good and just. The Straussian moral-
epistemological position is, by inference: "there can be genuine knowledge of what is 
good and just, or of the standards (‘ideals,’ ‘values’) that ought to guide political choice."44 
This knowledge can be found in the Greek philosophical texts. Straussians believe that to 
find—to uncover—is actually a process of recovery, not interpretation. They aim to 
understand the ancient writings as their authors understood them. Unfortunately, 
contemporary seekers after knowledge cannot but reason through “the medium of 
concepts inherited from a complex tradition of political philosophy as well as the medium 
of the new natural science that emerged in early-modern times.”45 One must attempt to 
learn the style of thinking that preceded these misleading interventions in order to recover 
this “common sense” understanding that provides a basis for absolute truth.  
Straussian epistemology is generally set up in contrast to positivism, and relativism 
(or in German tradition, historicism), which Strauss viewed as the dominant 
epistemological theory that had replaced positivism. Straussians consider Strauss’s 
reading of Max Weber to be a definitive refutation of these other approaches to 
knowledge. From this base, they dispute the more accepted understanding of Weber as 
quite clear that science or any human pursuit of knowledge was not free from 
presuppositions. Weber wrote that “the capacity to distinguish between empirical 
knowledge and value-judgments” is necessary to the virtue of intellectual honesty, 
although he struggled with the inherent dilemma in attempting to make that distinction with 
tools that are themselves formed within the same ethical and epistemological system. 46 
By the fact of that struggle, Weber can indeed be taken to represent another pole, 
opposite the idea that there is a fundamental truth to be found in nature or revelation, 
which indicates what “ought” to be. 
For Weber, the most that science can do for someone is to “make him realize that 
all action and naturally, according to the circumstances, inaction imply in their 
consequences the espousal of certain values—and herewith—what is today so willingly 
overlooked—the rejection of certain others. The act of choice itself is his own 
responsibility.”47 This did not remove ethical considerations, to the contrary, Weber 
declared, “[t]he program to which we wish to adhere with ever increasing firmness” is 
“fulfillment of the scientific duty to see the factual truth as well as the practical duty to 
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stand up for our own ideals.”48 Yet science, or political philosophy for that matter, could 
not provide the content of those ideals. Who aside from big children, asked Weber, think 
that science could “teach us anything about the meaning of the world?”49  
Strauss countered that Weber “never proved that the unassisted human mind is 
incapable of arriving at objective norms or that the conflict between different this-worldly 
ethical doctrine is insoluble by human reason."50 He contended that the scientific attempt 
to grasp things as they really are is defeated by the subjective evaluation inherent to 
observation. Any attempt to remove that element of judgment in pursuit of objectivity 
reduces reasoning to reflexivity, human processes to historical artifacts. Strauss, 
explaining political philosophy (which was, for him, first among the social sciences and a 
surrogate for knowledge generally), said,  
All political action is concerned with either preservation or change. When it is 
concerned with change it is concerned with change for the better. When it is 
concerned with preservation, it is concerned with avoiding something worse. 
Therefore all political action presupposed opinions of better and worse. But you 
cannot have an opinion of better and worse without having an opinion of good or 
bad.51  
If one’s judgments are historically conditioned, relative to time and place, then “modern 
science is merely ‘one historically relative way of understanding things which is not in 
principle superior to alternative ways of understanding.”52 Within this relativistic 
epistemology, there can be no absolute basis for truth, which, for the Straussians, is 
theoretically untenable.  
“When you see that you follow an opinion, you are by this fact driven to try to find 
knowledge, to replace opinion by knowledge.”53 The true lovers of knowledge are the 
philosophers, and this leads to Strauss’s discussion of classic natural right, which is the 
basis for the accusations of masked anti-democratic lessons in his writing. Following 
Plato, men are divided into wise (philosophers), gentlemen (rulers) and the vulgar. 
Decisions should be the province of philosophers, in order to rule, or, second best, 
provide guidance to the policy-making rulers of the unwitting common man. The 
accusations against the Straussians (Paul Wolfowitz and Abram Shulsky are commonly 
named, among others) is that they position themselves in this “natural inequality” as the 
philosophers, best suited to advise the rulers and arbiters of real right and wrong.  
Philosophers, as advisors, are justified in using “noble lies,” as well as hiding “the 
still more noble truth” in their esoteric writing.54 Strauss of course did not announce that he 
wrote in this way, but offered that for fellow philosophic readers, the esoteric writer “would 
do almost more that enough by drawing their attention to the fact that he did not object to 
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telling lies which were noble, or tales which were merely similar to truth.”55 Certain 
opinions and truths “must remain the preserve of a small minority.”56 Philosophers must 
conceal these “from all but other philosophers”; both rulers and the masses are subject to 
this deception, for their own good. Noble lies are permissible, even “one's social 
responsibilities" when used to hide a too-harsh truth, or accomplish that which is 
necessary or good, but that not everyone will understand.57 For Shadia Drury, a prominent 
academic opponent of the Straussians, this is both an impoverished understanding of 
Plato’s concept of the noble lie and one of the keys to Strauss’s esoteric message. His 
doctrine, in her words, is that:  
the masses need myths and illusions. They need to believe that is an unchanging 
moral law sanctioned by a divine creator and backed by the powers that be. If the 
vulgar were to discover, as the philosophers have always known, that God is dead, 
they might behave as if all is permitted. Strauss does not say all this explicitly 
because a wise person ought not to say publicly that there is no God and no 
unchanging moral law. Genuine philosophers know that people's love of 
knowledge has brought them only grief. But modernity succeeds in making things 
worse by bringing philosophy to the masses. Nothing, says Strauss, separates the 
ancients from the moderns more than the attitude they have "noble (or just) lies" 
and "pious frauds.”58 
Schmitt and Shulsky cite Strauss’s theory of esoteric writing as a reminder that 
deception is widespread and must be taken into account. His claim that the “common 
sense understanding of political things is primary” points them towards the regime as a 
lens for intelligence.59 If "human things cannot be understood apart from judgments of 
good and bad," then the fact-value distinction is a false premise for intelligence analysis.60 
A morally neutral scholarship, including intelligence, cannot perceive a regime for what it 
is, and will be blind to what its actions indicate. 
 
Iraq 
The United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq was predicated on intelligence reports 
that the country had prohibited weapons with mass destruction capabilities (WMD).61 In 
the early months of the war, soldiers and inspectors scoured the country for weapons they 
were sure they would find, but were not successful. It became clear that the collective 
assessment of the world’s intelligence agencies had been wrong. On the part of the US, 
the 2002 NIE Iraq's Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction, "one of the 
most high-visibility and policy relevant NIEs in years” had deeply erred, missing four out of 
five key assertions.62 In the face of such a monumental mistake, many suspected that the 
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White House had manipulated evidence to get authorization for a war that they wanted. 
Suspicions began to circulate in the popular press that “a small cluster of policy advisers 
and analysts… based in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans [OSP] had co-opted the 
intelligence process.63 They were accused of dismantling “the existing filtering process 
that for fifty years had been preventing the policymakers from getting bad information, 
creating “stovepipes to get the information they wanted directly to the top leadership.”64 
The group, in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, was reported to 
have instigated the war with skewed assessments fed to the Administration and leaked 
selectively to the press. The “alternative analyses,” as they were later defended, set great 
store by later discredited informants, in suspect data about Iraq’s weapons development 
and presented overly favorable outcome scenarios for a post-war Iraq.  
If the prohibited weapons had been found, the Straussians might have remained 
active but unobtrusive participants in government and political circles. In 2003, however, 
Paul Wolfowitz was the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He had authorized the creation of 
the Office of Special Plans, of which Shulsky was the director until he shifted from within 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the Office of Northern Gulf 
Affairs.65 Schmitt, on his part, had been publicly advocating preemptive action against Iraq 
for years via the Project for the New American Century (Wolfowitz and Shulsky, as well, 
were members). There were many other actors in the build-up to the war, and also other 
intellectual influences even on the Straussians, such as the Chicago-based defense 
strategist Albert Wohlstettor. The events and Strauss’s reputation, however, put Shulsky 
and Schmitt’s statements in a different light. Leo Strauss, they had written, alerted them to  
the possibility that political life may be closely linked to deception. Indeed, it 
suggests that deception is the norm in political life, and the hope, to say nothing of 
the expectation, of establishing a politics that can dispense with it is the 
exception.66  
The imputation in the media, and later by irate members of congress, was that some 
people in the Administration wanted war with Iraq, and not only cherry-picked analyses 
that supported it, but in order to do so had set up competing centers in the Pentagon so 
that trusted people could produce those analyses. 
A congressional investigation was launched in the summer of 2003 to ascertain 
why the intelligence community had been wrong, or if it had been politically pressured into 
its false results. Phase I found fault was found throughout the intelligence community, 
although as primary drafter of the National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA bore 
responsibility. The investigation reported that “analysts began to look for evidence that 
Iraq was expanding WMD programs. Analysts interpreted ambiguous data as indicative of 
the active and expanded WMD effort they expected to see.”67 Everyone already thought 
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they knew the answer: “The presumption that Iraq had active WMD programs was so 
strong that formalized IC mechanisms established to challenge assumptions and ‘group 
think,’ such as ‘red teams,’ ‘devil’s advocacy,’ and other types of alternative or competitive 
analysis, were not utilized.”68 Under a 21-day deadline, they had quickly updated a 
previous NIE, but little new data had come in, and most of that turned out to be wrong. 
The analysts and their managers were accused of sharing policy-makers’ mindset, 
thereby distorting their analyses, but in the absence of new data there was little to provoke 
a significant shift. The Butler Report on British intelligence, which along with other 
European nations had equally failed, doubted that any other judgment could have been 
reached. It would be difficult to imagine, they said, “in terms of good analytical tradecraft 
as opposed to a blind leap of faith, how an assessment might have been written that 
would have come to the conclusion that Saddam was telling the truth and that Iraq did not 
have WMD in 2002.”69 
Thus the Phase I report accepted that the faulty 2002 NIE covered the major 
reasons given for war, and found no evidence of overt political pressure. The Intelligence 
Community’s own errors of data evaluation and analysis were to blame. Yet the 
intelligence cited at the time that arguments were being made to go to war had been 
classified, and therefore the public and much of congress had not been in a position to 
evaluate it. Phase IIa, however, laid out exactly which statements justifying the invasion 
had not been substantiated by mainstream intelligence. The discrepancy completed the 
circle back to the origin of the information, and although the Under Secretary of Defense 
roundly denied it, multiple fingers pointed back at the Pentagon, the policy office and its 
subunits.  
As Gregory Treverton, a RAND scholar who was vice chair of the National 
Intelligence Council (which produces NIEs) in the first Clinton administration, noted dryly, 
“There is no evidence that the Pentagon operation had a direct effect on the October 2002 
NIE, but its perspective became part of the broader intelligence in the run-up to war, 
supporting political arguments that the mainline intelligence agencies did not.”70 Phase IIa 
pointed to the gap between what had been supported, even incorrectly, by intell and what 
senior Administration officials had claimed. There was (mis)information and no source. 
The Select Intelligence Committee requested a Department of Defense’s internal 
investigation. The “Review of Pre-Iraqi war activities of the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy" concluded that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy had: 
developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments 
on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were 
inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-
makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in 
our opinion, inappropriate given that the products did not clearly show the variance 
with the consensus of the Intelligence Community and were in some cases, shown 
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as intelligence products. This condition occurred because the OUSD(P) expanded 
its role and mission from formulating Defense Policy to analyzing and 
disseminating alternative analysis.   
The Under Secretary’s office defended itself by arguing that their policy office 
produced informational briefs to assist in developing policy, not intelligence. Their 
explanation rested on the definition of intelligence. Only a full process of validation, 
correlation, analysis, interpretation, presentation and dissemination, can be considered 
intelligence, and so they claimed it a distortion to label a single activity, such as analysis 
or interpretation, as "Intelligence Production.”71 Phase IIb tried to trace the trail back, but 
was unable to prove wrong-doing. 
Gannon describes the distortion of analysis as having “two well-established 
forms—politicization and analytical bias. Politicization, the willful distortion of analysis to 
satisfy the demands of intelligence bosses or policymakers” and bias, “a subtle but 
pervasive influence based on the unconscious exertion of pressure.”72 Treverton adds that 
politicization can include “commitments to perspectives or conclusions, in the process of 
intelligence analysis or interaction with policy, that suppresses other evidence or views or 
blinds people to them.”73 Some speculated that those working in the Pentagon’s policy 
offices had been captives of their convictions, developing analyses from a position of 
ideological certainty that matched that of the bellicose administration. Others interpreted 
Strauss’s writings on the role of philosophers as advisors to rulers, and the legitimacy of 
the noble lie for the greater good to suggest that the analysts engaged in bad faith 
collusion, manipulating data to buttress a policy they already supported, and giving it to 
those in power.  
 If a primary, common sense understanding of political things is used, "the 
mind can grasp nature as it is and, on the basis of such knowledge, apprehend what 
ought to be."74 Behind Schmitt’s argument that “Our Basic Instincts Were Sound” in a Los 
Angeles Times opinion piece defending the US invasion of Iraq was this “common sense” 
understanding, and the primacy of the regime. “What we lack in detailed intelligence about 
weapons programs is more than offset by our strategic intelligence about particular 
countries' intent.”75 Kent spoke directly to this possibility, stating with some acerbity,  
The procedure which moves from the known to the unknown with a certain amount 
of tentative foraying as new hypotheses are advanced, tested, and rejected is merely the 
most respectable way. Its very opposite is sometimes employed, though usually with a 
certain amount of clandestinity. The follower of this reverse method first decides what 
answer he desires to get. Once he has made this decision, he knows the exact locus of 
the apex of his pyramid but nothing else.76 
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PART II  
POLICING TERRORISM 
 
Chapter Four. Tracking the Biological Weapons Threat 
 
Weapons of mass destruction have the World at Risk, declared the arrestingly 
titled report from the US Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 
Terrorism, published December 2008. They opened with the claim that it is “more likely 
than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in 
the world by the end of 2013.”1 Biological weapons, they added, were the most likely 
terrorist choice. Exactly what “biological weapons” refer to, what they threaten and how 
they have been imagined and contained within the realm of international law (and 
correspondingly, the avoidance or enforcement of those laws) will be addressed in this 
chapter. 
There are much-repeated examples of how biological weapons have existed since 
time immemorial: plague-ridden corpses were thrown over city walls during the 1346 siege 
of Caffa (now Feodosia, Ukraine); Pizarro passed smallpox-contaminated clothing to 
South Americans in the 16th century; British commander Sir Jeffrey Amherst infected 
blankets during the French-Indian War (1754–1767). These can be counted as weapons 
only a loose sense though, one frowned upon by most military historians, in that they were 
tools of total war used to target the civilians. They lack the industrial age mechanization of 
disease, or the later equation of biological weapons with existential threat.  
As well, what has been understood as the target or object of bioweapons has been 
unstable. In the pertinent international accords, the object shifts variously between 
international order (biological weapons would unbalance relations between nations), 
soldiers on the battlefield, the civilian population of a country at war, and the civilian 
population at risk of terrorist attack. At this point, many have come to assume that the real 
problem with these weapons is their hype. They were, for example, the primary 
justification given (if not believed) for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Others argue that they 
drain intellectual and financial resources from more pressing human health needs, and 
that the risk of accidents overshadows the benefits of the research. Finally, in view of the 
opprobrium associated with biological weapons, research and development is held to 
weaken international ties of good will.   
The warnings in the World at Risk report were repeated by the news media and 
circulated on blogs. Some commentators scoffed that it was scaremongering, and some 
members of congress responded that many important preparedness steps had already 
been taken. There were scattered observations that vaguely declaring a just more than 
fifty percent chance of ill-defined weapons being used somewhere in the world only 
established a secure position from which to insist, in the event of an event, that warning 
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had been given. But the report, despite its hazy phrasing of alarm, recommended a series 
of specific domestic and international measures that should be enacted to prevent 
terrorism with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Prominent among 
the suggestions that related to biology were calls for achieving universal adherence and 
effective national implementation of two international agreements, the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540. 
The year before the World at Risk WMD report was released, I interned with the 
Biocriminalization Project at the headquarters of Interpol (the International Criminal Police 
Organization) in Lyon, France. The project was subsumed under the training-oriented 
Bioterrorism program, which focused on capacitating law enforcement to deal with 
biological incidents. Both program thrusts were primarily funded by the Sloan Foundation, 
as part of the American philanthropy’s Selected National Issues program. The 
biocriminalization sub-project received additional support, at least for translation, from the 
US Department of State. Fundamentally a legislative endeavor, however, and never a 
good fit for the police organization, it was subsequently migrated by the lawyer in charge 
to the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), an NGO founded 
in 1986 “to promote effective and efficient verification as a means of ensuring confidence 
in the implementation of international agreements and intra-national agreements with 
international involvement.”2 Why “confidence in the implementation” is important will be 
explored presently. 
My work consisted of completing ‘legislative surveys.’ These were compilations of 
nations’ laws that fulfilled obligations assumed under the BWC, or mandated by UNSCR 
1540, for the prohibition and prevention of biological weapons proliferation. I was tasked 
with Interpol’s Spanish, Portuguese, and Catalan-speaking member states. The 
assignment meant locating and reviewing all the pertinent laws and regulations of those 
nations, then sorting them into the relevant provisions of a survey template, with 96 
discrete analytical criteria. The laws I examined pertained to customs; crimes; export–
import; terrorism; money-laundering; international cooperation on judicial and criminal 
matters; public, animal and plant health; biosafety and biosecurity. The literal text was 
copied into the survey template, so that nations still in the process of creating their own 
legislation would have a model to follow, and, ultimately, the national law pertaining to 
“biocrimes” for every country in the world would be collected in one, consultable place. 
Yet, the order and conceptual clarity implied by the categories of the template may give 
the misimpression that the real world was similarly mastered. Biocriminalization convenes 
much of what is contested about terrorism and crime, emerging science and means of 
achieving international security.  
 
Biolaws and Biocrimes 
The accords I worked with are, or at least aim to be, a step in the creation of 
international public law: law that applies to the conduct of sovereign states, and some 
organizations.3 There is no true authority governing relations between nations that can 
                                                
2 "Vertic: About the Centre." http://www.vertic.org/aboutus.asp 
3 For a review of the discussion of legal definitions for “international community”, “sources of 
authority” and the other terms used here, see G M Danilenko, Law-Making in the International 
Community, ed. M. Nijhoff, vol. 15, Developments in International Law, (Boston: Dordrecht, 1993). 
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autonomously make and enforce decisions, meaning that “law” is a less definite matter 
than within a country.  
[R]ules have never been perfectly clear. International law has always been a legal 
system which largely lacked strict formal requirements regarding law-making. As a 
result, the identification of legally binding rules of conduct among states has 
always been a difficult task which often depended on extra-legal factors and 
circumstances.4  
International law develops and functions through the perception and consensus of the 
international community. Contingent processes form recursive movements between 
claims of truth and their jurisdictional enactment. Treaties, conventions, and resolutions 
are some of the types of documents that are accepted as authoritative.5 A “source of 
authority” has two allied meanings: “One sense is related to the origins of the relevant, 
substantive norms and principles. The other sense is grounded in identifying the actual 
texts involved in the process.”6 Authors sometimes try to create a norm by writing a text. 
Other times, the goal of producing a text is to formalize an already accepted norm. 
Significantly for biological weapons agreements, the 1899 and 1907 Hague “Laws of War” 
do both. If an agreement is widely adopted and applied in practice, it produces a 
recognized legal obligation and creates “custom.” If this happens, in that there is a primary 
written document, consistent compliance with it, and this is accompanied by a perception 
of legal obligation, the result is deemed customary international law—the normative 
process having produced a law that applies to independent nations.7 The diffusion of the 
norm occurs in a grassroots fashion through legislative adoption and bureaucratic 
application.  
Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900, by 
Seth Carus, has become a key reference for definitions. Prefixing “bio-” indicates the use 
of a biological agent, meaning a pathogen or toxin. Terrorism and crime are differentiated 
by motive. So, bioterrorism is “the threat or use of biological agents by individuals or 
groups motivated by political, religious, ecological, or other ideological objectives.” A 
biocrime, in contrast, has a “criminal” motive. 
Interest in biological agents is not confined to groups with known political agendas. 
Indeed, most individuals and groups who have used biological agents had 
                                                
4 Ibid., xiv. 
5
The legal corpus actively guiding international affairs today has been built from two, largely 
European traditions—the law of nations (jus gentium or natural law), and agreement among nations 




A third source of authority is derivation from general principles common to major world legal 
systems. Kent McKeever and Last Updated, "Researching Public International Law," Arthur W. 
Diamond Law Library Research Guides(2006), 
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rnational%20Law.   
7 To be included in this corpus, laws must be “accepted” by the international community of states, 
and there are several kinds of evidence that can be used to evaluate that acceptance. These 
include judgments and opinions of national and international judicial and arbitral tribunals, scholarly 
writings, and purposeful pronouncements by nations that refer to something commonly accepted, 
intended to become the reference for the law. 
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traditional criminal motives. Hence, it is essential to separate the clearly criminal 
perpetrators from those with political agendas, whether the motive is sectarian, 
religious, or ecological. The available evidence, in fact, suggests that the vast 
majority of cases involve criminal motives.8  
The bioterrorist, he specified, is a non-state actor, thereby sidestepping the issue of 
nation-states’ potential use. While terrorism is sometimes more narrowly defined as an act 
of violence committed with the intent of effecting political change, Carus wanted to make 
sure that the acts of a doomsday group seeking to catalyze Armageddon would count. 
The goal of such groups might not be defined as strictly political, since they do not want to 
influence governments; they want to completely destroy them, together with most of 
humanity. Yet these are the groups that are of course most interested in weapons of mass 
destruction, and so the definition of bioterrorist reasonable needs to encompass them. 
Carus also wanted to include individuals or groups who choose bioweapons for 
expediency’s sake, rather than purposefully aiming to induce terror through the use of 
disease. Carus was compiling cases that involved the use of biological agents, and his 
goal was to provide empirical data that countered what he considered to be apocalyptic 
visions on the one hand, and the dismissal of a valid threat on the other. These 
distinctions may seem overly fine, but such is the aim of legal categories. And despite 
intent, what actually happens in the world escapes their boundaries.  
The episode of the globe-trotting, non-compliant tuberculosis carrier, Andrew 
Speaker, which briefly sparked media attention in 2007, highlights some of the questions 
about what constitutes a biocrime in a real-world situation. Speaker, a 31-year-old lawyer 
in the state of Georgia was engaged to be married when he was diagnosed with 
tuberculosis and began treatment. The strain was identified as multiple-drug-resistant 
tuberculosis (MDR-TB) and he was informed that he needed to go for special care in 
Denver. The arrangements, however, would take several weeks, the time in which his 
wedding and honeymoon in several European countries were scheduled. County officials 
and his doctor met with him and his family, and, although they said they would prefer he 
not travel, also stated their belief that he was not a risk to others. Speaker elected to carry 
out his wedding plans, and flew to Europe, as reports came back to the Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) that he might have extensively drug resistant tuberculosis (XDR-
TB), a more deadly if usually less contagious form. He was contacted in Italy and informed 
that he should entrust himself to the Italian health authorities, but Speaker decided to 
return to the US, flew to Prague, then Montreal, and then drove across the border. The 
border guard received a computer warning when he scanned the passport that the CDC 
should be contacted, but decided to admit Speaker anyway because he did not look sick.9 
Speaker was quarantined and hospitalized; during treatment it was discovered that his 
form of tuberculosis was indeed MDR-TB, and thus, unlike XDR-TB, responsive to an 
aggressive antibiotics regimen.  
Keeping someone away from other people is called quarantine when the situation 
is that of exposure to a disease, and isolation when disease has been confirmed. These 
are generally combined powers. The problem, as then-CDC Director Julie L. Gerberding 
testified, was that her authority pertained to “keeping people out and containing them,” not 
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restricting them from leaving the country.10 Tuberculosis, as one of the most ancient of 
human diseases, and of great concern in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe 
and America, comes with a legacy of laws and regulations developed to control it. Yet one 
carrier wreaked havoc on county, state, federal and inter-nation preparedness plans. 
Speaker, in the end, was not charged with a crime. However, seven of the people he 
came into contact with on airplanes filed a civil suit. The sequence of events revealed the 
ambiguity of biological threats, which do not always have to do with bioweapons, and the 
resultant inadequacy of “biolaws” and legislative gaps, including the fragility of biomedical 
expertise, the question of individual versus collective rights when it comes to public health, 
and cross-border authority.  
A crime is an offense prosecutable by the state and punishable by penal law. For 
biocrimes to exist, there must be laws that carve out the difference between permissible 
and prohibited “biology”-related actions. This is where biocriminalization comes in. Often 
though, these laws had little to do with scenarios such as Speaker presented. The 
template I used at Interpol had space instead for a whole range of actions related to the 
potential malicious use of a biological organism or agent as distinct crimes. The 
Bioterrorism program description presented its work as follows. 
In many countries, criminal justice systems are constrained by inadequate legal 
frameworks governing the detection and repression of bio-weapons. Frequently, 
no law is violated until the disease or biological agent is actually deployed. Law 
enforcement officers are therefore unable to begin preliminary investigations into 
the development of such weapons. Without lawswhich criminalise activity relating 
to bio-weapons, there is no basis for legal assistance or co-operation to prevent 
their production and transport.11 
There is, the rationale continues, an urgent need to ensure that countries are adequately 
prepared for, protected from, and able to deal with would-be bioterrorists. Law 
enforcement agencies have a crucial role to play, in collaboration with a range of other 
national and international bodies. The country-by-country database of legislation was 
intended to underpin the creation of a coherent overlay of laws that made biocrimes a 
uniform legal reality everywhere in the world, without the need for an (impossible) 
international law that would make it so.  
Disease, intentionally spread or natural, is understood to respect no borders, and 
hence the database would aid to identify countries with legal gaps. Places without 
regulation were cause for concern, in that they might provide havens for bioterrorists to 
set up shop, or the flow of potential weapons materials would go unnoticed and 
unimpeded. Biolegislation needed to be global because the threat thus conceptualized 
could come from anywhere, and disease could go anywhere. For a variety of pragmatic 
and political reasons (discussed later), efforts were focused on getting national 
legislatures to implement the relevant treaties, rather than strengthening multilateral treaty 
regimes themselves, through, for example, international verification commissions.   
There are two aspects of the idea of biolegislation that I want to bring up. First, 
practically speaking, the laws criminalize a vast number of acts, such as the transfer of 
                                                
10 Alyson M. Palmer, "The Legal Questions Behind the Tb Case," in law.com (Incisive Media US 
Properties, 2007).http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=900005555593 
11 "The Bioterrorism Threat: Strengthening Law Enforcement," INTERPOL. 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/default.asp 
  53 
materials or technology. Implicitly or explicitly, they negotiate the “dual-use” dilemma, 
which is, from the law enforcement perspective, that most acts leading up to an actual 
attack could be legitimate for research or business purposes. The dilemma is usually 
framed from a biotechnology perspective though: how can biotechnology both advance 
towards a producing a brighter human future while taking adequate security measures for 
the concomitant but unlikely threat of misuse? These share the unacknowledged 
challenge in the fact that using biolegislation to authorize a law enforcement investigation 
would, in preventative cases, often hinge on a tenuous gauge of motive. As the Speaker 
case illustrates, a biological incident may not always be an intended biocrime, which in 
turn may not relate to bioterrorism. This could be the case in a research-related biological 
incident, but even more significantly, it is not necessarily simple to discern criminal or 
ideological intent. Yet, the basis for this new kind of crime often rests on such 
discernment.  
The second issue relates not to preventative investigations, but to how the laws 
would affect prosecutions. A simple example would be that a federal prosecutor, instead 
of charging generic homicide or attempted homicide, would charge homicide with a 
bioweapon in order to request stiffer penalties. This kind of specificity, however, has been 
of little use for pursing (for example) hate crimes, because it puts a greater burden of 
proof on the officers and the prosecutors.  
Housing the biocriminalization project at Interpol was part of the organization’s 
move to expand and become a more significant actor on the international scene. Contrary 
to popular lore, the organization is not an international police force, with arrest powers 
around the world. Founded in 1923 as mechanized travel (and hence escape) became 
widely available, “it facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists 
all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat 
international crime.”12 Perhaps its best-known service is to facilitate communication 
between law enforcement in different countries about a missing person, a body, a 
suspected criminal, or a fugitive, thus bypassing diplomatic channels. The color-coded 
notification service is most frequently mentioned in the press (e.g. “red notices” for arrest 
with a view to extradition), and these are graded with a required standard of evidence. A 
less formal “diffusion” for a wanted person can also be used. Interpol Response Teams, 
which can provide on-the-ground assistance with victim identification after a disaster, or 
verification of the chemical composition in a drug bust, perhaps come closest to actual 
police operations. Most of Interpol’s work, though, is serving as an information 
switchboard.  
Ronald K. Noble, the first American Secretary General, was eager to raise the 
profile and power of the organization. Under him, Interpol entered the computer-age, 
began “24/7” staffing at headquarters, and strategically selected directions in which to 
grow. One of these was fighting terrorism and, at least for a while, this included 
bioterrorism. As Paula Olsiewski, the Sloan Foundation’s Bioterrorism Program Director, 
told me in an interview, “Ron Noble came to me with Berry Kellman (a US law professor, 
later a consultant on the Interpol Bioterrorism program), and said he thought bioterrorism 
was a threat and wanted to work on it. This was the leadership of an international 
organization saying he thought biosecurity was important, and most people don’t.”13 At 
Interpol’s first general assembly after September 11, 2001, Noble announced a 
reorganization that would focus more resources on terrorism; the creation of a database 
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for stolen, counterfeit or forged identify documents; and a proposal for making “the 
issuance of Red Notices for terrorists the highest priority.”14 By 2005, the Secretary 
General would declare with drama, “there is no criminal threat with greater potential 
danger to all countries, regions and people in the world than the threat of bio-terrorism.”15 
Noble maneuvered through tricky terrain with this statement, as he simultaneously defined 
bioterrorism as 1) a crime 2) of great potential danger to the world’s population.  
The definitional gambit—which aimed to depoliticize bioterrorism—was a 
prerequisite to Interpol’s involvement, because its constitution prohibits “any intervention 
or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.” There is the risk, for 
example, that a country’s request to other nations to arrest someone is a way of defining a 
political opponent as a criminal. Interpol employs a team of lawyers in the Office of Legal 
Affairs to scrutinize submissions of red notices and other public actions. Of course 
perpetrators will generally claim to act for a reason that would place them beyond the 
reach defined by Interpol’s constitution. So while police officers must attempt to discern 
motive when investigating a potential terrorist operation, the lawyers must turn to the 
exact act itself and its verifiable illegality.  
Noble’s second declaration, that bioterrorism is at least coequal with other major 
threats in terms its potential harm usefully encapsulates what skeptics critique and 
biopreparedness experts claim. “Whether this unhappy Temper was originally raised by 
the Follies of some People who got Money by it; this is to say, by printing Predictions and 
Prognostications I know not; but certain it is, Books frighted them terribly," wrote Daniel 
Defoe in his 1722 A Journal of the Plague Year, raising both the specter of fear 
profiteering and its success, which will be discussed below.16 
When Interpol sought and received money from the Sloan Foundation (the 
Bioterrorism Program’s first conference was in March 2005), international terrorism and 
efforts to counter it were a major focus of US, European, and UN efforts. A “war on terror” 
approach was imparted largely by US President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair, but from the outset journalists, academics and other politicians critiqued the 
war framing. When Gordon Brown took over as the new Prime Minister, in June 2007, he 
directed that the UK rhetoric change. Terrorism was redefined as a crime problem. In an 
article on this shift, David Rieff wrote, “Brown’s new home secretary, Jacqui Smith, 
articulated the basic message. ‘Let us be clear…terrorists are criminals, whose victims 
come from all walks of life, communities and religions.’”17 Rieff added, “By emphasizing 
the criminality of terrorism, Brown effectively changed the terms (and the temperature) of 
the British debate: he redefined a world historical threat as a manageable danger.” The 
official US stance, as presented in public pronouncements, gradually began to shift as 
well. Rhetoric showed the influence, for example, of Australian-born advisor to the US 
Department of State and military, social scientist David Kilcullen’s vision of a “global 
counterinsurgency” and moved increasingly towards a fusion of intelligence, policing and 
military action. Following experience in disrupting organized crime and especially drug 
cartels, the financial side of terrorist organizations was targeted. Interpol was keen on 
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fitting itself into this shifting scene. Housing the biocriminalization project was an attempt 
to position terrorism within the purview of law enforcement, and this fit with the 
organization’s maneuvering to position itself as a global player in counterterrorism. 
The 2008 World at Risk report brought together discourses and approaches 
already available, among them those discussed here. It can be examined as an album of 
certain snapshots of the contemporary—the threat, what needs protection, and how to do 
it. One picture was of biological weapons, in terrorist hands, which threaten humanity and 
are best dealt with by a series of domestic and international measures to prevent, and 
prepare for, an attack. In order to understand how these elements came into place, I will 
describe the coupled development of some of the significant norms and texts: the 1925 
Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540. 
 
Binding the Conscience and the Practice of Nations 
Signed in Geneva on June 17th, 1925, a succinct one-page “Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” condemned and foreswore “the use in war of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices…by the general opinion of the civilised world.” The “High Contracting Parties” 
agreed “to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare” 
(viruses were not distinguished from bacteria at the time). The Protocol, however, is often 
described as “toothless,” and not very meaningful, because it lacked verification or 
enforcement mechanisms for impeding the proliferation of either type of weapon.18 The 
criticism is of course revisionist in its definition of meaningful, and yet is quite accurate in 
its assessment that the protocol made no move to keep biological weapons—which in the 
sense of “a thing designed for inflicting harm”19 did not yet exist—from coming into 
existence. What, then, did it aim to do?  
Paraphrasing Richard Price on chemical weapons, if it currently seems “a platitude 
to state that the use of [biological] weapons is a particularly reprehensible and morally 
unacceptable means of conducting armed conflict,” this view dominates because of the 
success of a normative apparatus that includes the major international agreements.20 The 
perspective from which the earlier accords are judged depends on several now-accepted 
truisms: there is an inherent human aversion to poisons and disease that makes their use 
as a weapon generically odious,21 the potential consequences of deployment are too 
horrific, i.e. they are “weapons of mass destruction,”22 and that their use would be 
uncivilized and repugnant.23  
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19 The New Oxford American Dictionary,  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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Price points out. 
[N]umerous weapons have provoked cries of moral protest upon their introduction 
as novel technologies of warfare. However, as examples such as the longbow, 
crossbow, firearms, explosive shells, and submarines demonstrate, the dominant 
pattern has been for such moral qualms to disappear over time as these 
innovations became incorporated into the standard techniques of war.24 
One entrée to understanding the development of the claims about biological weapons 
(and up to a certain point, nuclear and chemical weapons share the same path) is to 
examine the precise elements of the 1925 precedent. There is a list of objects, a regime 
for governing them, and a rationale for why that presents an implicit moral positioning. 
Poisons, gases and bacteriological weapons are listed together, and thereby linked. What 
is prohibited is “use in war.” The justification given is the opinion of civilized nations.  
Poisons, and later toxins, bridge the biological and the chemical. By the time of the 
signing of the Protocol, the use of poison was unquestioningly regarded as ignominious. 
But as Nietzsche notes, “there are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral 
interpretation of phenomena,”25 and the legal history of poison casts doubt on the idea 
that there is an innately human and, in that sense, timeless taboo against it. There were 
scattered rejections in Rome and India, but “the formative period for a robust and absolute 
prohibition against poisonous weapons in Europe appears to have been between the 
fifteenth and eighteenth centuries.”26 Seventeenth-century legal scholar Grotius explained, 
and thereby went a long way towards establishing, that while arms could be used in the 
protection of the king’s life, he was humbly vulnerable to poison, unless its use was 
deterred by “respect for law and fear of disgrace.”27 Correspondingly, any ruler of enough 
stature had cause to promote a normative injunction against poison. From another angle, 
poison was delegitimized by its association with women. It was, according to Margaret 
Hallissy, "an insidious equalizer of strength in the battle of the sexes,"28 and deemed a 
less valiant and manly method of attack than openly declared combat. Grouping 
asphyxiating gases and bacteriological methods of warfare together with poison assisted 
in tainting them, but poison’s own historical course discredits the idea of an inherent moral 
compunction against their use. 
In this era before antibiotics, infectious diseases had very high fatality rates and 
were certainly feared. By 1921, the French, at least, imagined “liquid cultures loaded onto 
shells and bombs…detonated to form ‘microbial clouds’ with great infective power,” and 
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had initiated a formal biological weapons development program.29 Germ theory was 
generally accepted by the signing of the Protocol, and some have suggested, from 
records of an earlier conference, that the representatives intended the prohibition to 
include purposeful spreading of disease.30 For all that, it is misleading to equate the 
conceptualization of biological weapons at the time with contemporary biological 
“weapons of mass destruction.” Such an elision posits that the prohibition of bioweapons 
was based on a belief that they could pose an existential threat to the human race.31 In 
1925, the example at hand of “bacteriological methods of warfare” was the infection of 
pack animals intended for the Allies, which combined a variety of underhanded elements, 
appropriately despicable for an enemy, but not catastrophe.32 One German naval officer 
entered the US dressed as a woman, carrying a vial with the highly infectious, but almost 
exclusively equine disease glanders (Burkholderia mallei). His organisms did not survive, 
although another German agent described infecting horses stabled in New York City: 
The germs were given to me by Captain Hinsch in glass bottles about an inch and 
a half or two inches long, and three-quarters of an inch in diameter, with a cork 
stopper. The bottles were usually contained in a round wooden box with a lid that 
screwed on the top. There was cotton in the top and bottom to protect the bottles 
from breaking. A piece of steel in the form of a needle with a sharp point was stuck 
in the underside of the cork, and the steel needle extended down in the liquid 
where the germs were. We used rubber gloves and would put the germs in the 
horses by pulling out the stopper and jabbing the horses with the sharp point of the 
needle that had been down among the germs. We did a good bit of work by 
walking along the fences that enclosed the horses and jabbing them when they 
would come up along the fence or lean where we could get at them. We also 
spread the germs sometimes on their food and in the water that they were 
drinking. Captain Hinsch gave me the instructions as to where I would find the 
horses and also gave me bottles of germs and the money. 33 
These low-tech German efforts, reputedly part of a repertoire that also included anthrax, 
the plague, cholera and wheat fungus, were described as sabotage, an attempt to use 
germs to disrupt the machine of war fighting. They were perhaps tactically significant (the 
Germans believed they stopped horse shipments from Argentina) but not a threat to 
humanity. Some commanders and scientists had qualms about the use of bacteriological 
disease bombs, but even among those who did not, there was doubt about their battlefield 
utility. Instead, with the increasing power of airplanes, they were envisioned as a tool of 
total war, to be used “against reserve troops or against civilians in industries and cities, 
and against livestock, crops and water supplies”.34  
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Clearly chemical and biological weapons did not produce apocalyptic visions, or 
even repulsion, for everyone. Proponents advocated in favor of their potential for 
lessening the destruction caused by conventional weapons. Gas warfare was suggested 
as “a way to shorten war with overwhelming surprise attacks on the enemy,” and “a 
humane alternative to high explosives because they avoided battlefield blood and gore.”35 
Some British experts “saw biological weapons as a more humane way not of killing 
soldiers but of killing civilians already doomed… by aerial attacks with high explosives.”36 
The potential for non-lethal use of these alternative weapons, which is still retained in the 
use of tear gas for law-enforcement purposes, was also proclaimed in their favor. 
Although representatives of the United States were involved in developing the 1925 
Protocol, advocates of the weapons kept it from being ratified in the US Senate until 1975. 
One senator in the 1920s justified his objections by contending that if the Protocol passed 
the US would be constrained  
from using gas against the next savage race with which we find ourselves in war, 
and would compel us to blow them up, or stab them with bayonets, or riddle them 
and sprinkle them with shrapnel, or puncture them with machine-gun bullets, 
instead of blinding them for an hour or so until we could disarm them. That is the 
'humanity' that is attempted to be worked out by the Geneva Protocol.37  
These positions belie the assertion that prohibition was the incontestable march of 
civilized progress.  
The Protocol, plainly, did not come into existence because of now commonplace 
beliefs or fears about the catastrophic potential or horror of chemical/biological-induced 
death. It was important, however, in how these claims attained the status of largely 
unquestioned truths. While the beginning of the pertinent history of biological weapons 
control is usually located on that June date in Geneva, to paraphrase, John Dewey, this 
was in many ways already midstream.  
Targeting civilians was in fact the real heart of the debate. At the 1874 Brussels 
Conference on the Laws and Customs of War, more than 50 years before the Protocol, 
the states represented cemented the anti-poison foundation laid by Grotius, forbidding the 
“employment of poison or poisoned weapons.”38 The 1874 declaration did not enter into 
force but its core proposals became part of the 1899 Regulations Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, signed in The Hague. These also included an agreement to 
“abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or 
deleterious gases.”39 Both entered the 1907 Hague Declaration, which went on to become 
a foundational agreement in the governing of warfare, and one of the first documents of 
then-developing public international law.40  
The growth of the chemical industry during the period when these conventions 
were held brought it to the fore, and concerns were substantialized in discussions of 
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“noxious clouds” as new possible weapons.41 The specific mention of projectiles diffusing 
asphyxiating gases is noteworthy, however, because they had not yet been developed. 
Since, in general, protests against new weapons are lost to their demonstrations of power, 
it is significant that the gas projectiles were banned even before their advent. Richard 
Price argues persuasively that this preemptive prohibition was the necessary and truly 
emergent factor at the 1907 Hague convention. The focus of efforts in the creation of 
“laws and customs of war” was not on banning technologies, which were viewed as value-
neutral, but on constraining their use to combatants. The goal was for war to be civilized, 
and the defenseless population excluded from its horrors. The first factor in the ban’s 
passage was that asphyxiating bombs were envisioned as being used against 
defenseless towns with women and children, which made them unsuited to civilized war. 
(This was long before the destructive bombing with high explosives that later shifted the 
argument to better and worse ways for civilians to die.) The second factor was that, 
because they did not yet exist, the proscription was not relevant to any specific party, and 
little fuss was raised.42 
The prohibition of use became more important than any inherent attribute of the 
weapons. Key actors sought to include warfare in a modernizing vogue and the idea of 
poison gas projectiles gained attention at a crucial juncture. The fact of being singled out 
then became the basis for future politicization. The successful use of chemical weapons in 
World War I did not erode the ban, as had historically been the case in the introduction of 
new technologies. Instead, nations hurled accusations of violations of the Hague 
Declaration at each other, strengthening its normative status. An ongoing movement 
towards creating customary international law had been initiated.  
The Geneva Protocol tried to “bind alike the conscience and the practice of 
nations”43 to produce civilized warfare. Since biological weapons did not really exist yet, 
although they had been imagined, linking “bacteriological methods” to poisonous and 
asphyxiating gases was an attempt to extend the solidifying normative injunction against 
chemical weapons to future biological ones. The technology, however, was not similarly 
bound. The Protocol was concerned with regulating the conduct of war, not the 
development of science, or weapons. Asterisks were affixed to the signatures of nations 
that claimed exceptions to the Protocol’s prohibitions. Their own freedom of action was 
only restrained in relation to other countries that had signed, ratified or acceded to the 
treaty, and would no longer hold for “any enemy State whose armed forces or whose 
allies fail to respect the prohibitions.” This right to and possible need for retaliation 
provided a justifying logic for research into and development of biological weapons.  
*** 
Despite the reservations and incomplete ratification among signatories, there was 
a general lull in bioweapons research after the signing of the Geneva Protocol. Having 
made a gesture towards “no first use,” and given experts’ doubts about the potential for 
precision, governments gave funding priority to arms that would provide battlefield 
advantage. Only Japan, convinced by military biologist General Ishii Shiro, saw the 
opportunity to build a stronger hand by developing a type of weapon that most of the rest 
of the world had forsworn for offensive purposes. The efforts of German science were 
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limited, in part by Adolf Hitler’s personal aversion to biological weapons, and in part by its 
turn to eugenics, and eventually death-camp experiments.44 Until the mid-1930s, the 
British avoided the arena. Their entrance was the result of a determined pro-biowarfare 
campaign on the part of the influential civil servant Maurice Hankey, who served as 
Secretary to the War Cabinet during World War I, and continued in a long string of 
secretary, ministry and other bureaucratic positions.45 When the Second World War was 
imminent, his personally assembled panel of science advisors was still unconvinced that 
bioweapons posed a huge threat. They suggested that public health measures were the 
best defense (in part leading to Britain’s system of socialized medicine), and most were 
unwilling to work on developing offensive capacity. Amid dubious reports of German 
success in bacteriological aerosolization, Hankey nonetheless advanced a program 
focused on anthrax, which over the course of a few years produced “cattle cakes,” and 
prototypes for airplane spraying and bombs. He recruited a like-minded bacteriologist to 
head the secret biological weapons department, one who saw no moral impediment to the 
research. The bacteriologist, Paul Fildes, believed wholly that a disease such as anthrax 
was a humane alternative to high explosives: 
Is it any more moral to kill Service men or civilians with HE (High Explosives) than 
with BW?...It seems clear to me that a substantial majority of the population would 
conclude that, if they had to put up with war again, they would prefer to face the 
risks of attack by bacteria than bombardments by HE.46  
Under his guidance, the department developed bombs, first detonated just off the ground 
by remote control and then dropped by airplanes from various heights, which successfully 
killed herds of sheep. The British scientists’ own success convinced them (incorrectly) that 
the Germans must also have made the same breakthroughs. At this juncture, US help 
was requested, and granted, for industrial manufacture.  
Aiding the UK proved the decisive threshold for launching the American 
bioweapons program, although circumstances were already primed. The Geneva Protocol 
had linked biological and chemical weapons, and after the Japanese attacks on Pearl 
Harbor, Secretary of War Henry Stimson decided that on the basis of chemical weapons 
alone, the United States would not be bound by the not yet-ratified treaty. Compliance, as 
he saw it, might “through introduction of domestic, political and moral issues, impede our 
preparation, reduce our potential combat effectiveness and be considered, by our 
enemies, an indication of National weakness.”47 By winter of 1940, the US was supplying 
poison gas to the British. The US National Academy of Sciences put together a secret 
War Bureau of Consultants that, in contrast to the British advisory panel which needed 
considerable prodding from Hankey, judged that biological weapons could seriously 
threaten human, animal and plant life, and recommended that the US move forward with 
offensive and defensive measures.  
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Bioweapons research was centered in Maryland, at then-Camp Detrick, and 
swelled to around 250 buildings, with over 3400 employees. According to Matthew 
Meselson, a Harvard professor of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology who became a 
major influence on efforts towards restricting chemical and biological weapons, 
Large-scale production was planned to take place at a plant near Terre Haute, 
Indiana, built in 1944 for the production of anthrax spore slurry and its filling into 
bombs equipped with twelve 20,000-gallon fermentors, it was capable of producing 
fill for 500,000 British-designed 4-pound anthrax bombs a month. Although the 
United Kingdom had placed a large order for anthrax bombs in 1944 and the plant 
was ready to go into weapons production by the following summer, the war ended 
without it having done so.48 
There was a brief period after the war, from 1945 to 1947, of US government 
transparency about this biological weapons program, and even though limited to the 
defensive research that had occurred, the result was too much media attention for the 
Army’s taste.49  
This was a period in which a fundamental conceptualization of weapons, and 
hence bioweapons, shifted. The development of the atom bomb forged a new relationship 
in terms temporal, conceptual and affective, between politics, science, and life. The 
decision could be made to destroy an entire city, and a single pilot could carry out the 
order immediately. The two demonstrations of this power, by the United States against 
Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945, entered the public imaginary 
around the world. Within a couple of years, the size of the weapons had increased to the 
equivalent of 750 Hiroshimas. Opponents, including Manhattan Project leader Robert J. 
Oppenheimer, argued that such massive destructive potential, enough to destroy cities 
the size of Moscow or New York, in effect moved them from battlefield weapons to tools of 
genocide.50 A 1995 newspaper article on the Cold War as an age of apocalypse gave this 
description of the mindset, 
Plutonium—an element created by man and named for the Roman god of the 
dead—changed the way people thought about time. The future became finite. 
Student groups in the 1960s came to call themselves "a generation with no future.” 
A certain madness set in. Military planners talked earnestly of "city busting" attacks 
and casualties in the tens of millions. War, and life on the planet, would be over in 
a matter of minutes. By the twisted logic of the bomb, fear of that enormous 
destruction was good. It would so scare the enemy that the cataclysm would never 
come. Politicians called it "Mutually Assured Destruction.51 
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Arsenals were described as existential threats, “enough bombs to kill the world population 
many times over.”52 
This sense of threat was not, however, strongly associated with the biological 
sciences. Biology, and especially the new field of molecular biology that would lead to 
recombinant DNA techniques, genetic engineering, and eventually contemporary 
genomics and molecular systematics, was advancing rapidly. The bacteriophage had 
been isolated during World War I, and the “phage group” of scientists, beginning around 
1940, used the bacteria-infecting viruses as its model organism to develop a systematized 
approach that contributed not just to the understanding of bacteria but also to establishing 
the field of molecular biology. The 1953 publication of the structure of DNA was one of the 
more prominent examples of how basic scientific knowledge was multiplying. There were, 
it is true, black and white educational films and government pamphlets on how to protect 
against biological warfare attack.53 Yet, in showing the citizen taking personal health 
measures, and scientists identifying the unknown bio-assailant, these ultimately reinforced 
the idea of manageable danger, and positive techno-scientific power. Advances, 
predominantly, were linked to medicine and the betterment of human life, not mass 
destruction.54  
For weapons scientists, however, the power of nuclear weapons changed the 
stakes, on the ground-level reality of career, prestige, and funding. If nuclear weapons 
had generated new relationships between bodies and politics, biologists would have to 
keep up, with their own formula about when, how and how many people it was imaginable 
to annihilate. Historian Guillemin argues that “Nuclear weapons would set the standard for 
the next twenty years of biological weapons development, making it imperative for 
biological warfare scientists to show how pathogens could devastate populations at the 
same enormous scale.”55  
 According to multiple sources compiled by bioweapons specialist Jonathan Tucker, 
the Army conducted tests with live agents over the Pacific Ocean in 1965 and 1968.56 The 
first demonstrated, with caged monkeys on the decks of anchored tugboats, that an 
aerosol spray could be infectious over several hundred square miles. The second used a 
toxin, and the result calculated was that 30 percent of a population spread over 915 
square miles would be been incapacitated. “Biological weapons,” the army concluded, 
“could be employed for strategic, mass-casualty attacks against cities and other 
population centers.”57 They were deemed truly, not just hypothetically, weapons of mass 
destruction. However, development of the weapons tested had taken a considerable 
investment of time and resources, and another conclusion drawn was that only nation-
states with an adequate science, technology and military infrastructure would be able to 
reproduce the feat. The concern arose that in developing the know-how, the United States 
was simply making it available for the wrong hands to grasp. 
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*** 
On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon announced the official end of the 
US offensive bioweapons program, promising that no more weapons would be developed 
or created, and all stockpiles would be destroyed. Biological attack, he declared, would 
have “massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences. It may 
produce global epidemics and profoundly affect the health of future generations.” Many 
saw his announcement as a public-relations stunt. It was certainly a political maneuver 
that took into account his image domestically and abroad. A series of events had focused 
negative public attention on chemical and biological weapons, and the resultant domestic 
and foreign pressure led to congressional requests for an inquiry. Safety was an issue, the 
making, testing, storing and disposing of the weapons and the feeling was that this, far 
from contributing to the defense of American citizens, endangered them. Abroad, the idea 
of the United States’ lack of adherence to what was now customary international law 
against biological weapons, traceable from the 1925 Geneva Protocol, was seized upon 
as an asset in Cold War jockeying. Behind the scenes in the White House, though, the 
secret Pacific Ocean weapons trials, lack of support outside the military, and the absence 
of a lobbying constituency parallel to that for nuclear and chemical weapons were central 
to Nixon’s decision.  
One shift in the public mood can be traced to an influential television documentary 
in February of 1969, which reported that a year earlier, 3,000 sheep had died near open-
air army testing grounds in Skull Valley, Utah, together with revelations about negligent 
practices for the disposal of obsolete chemical agents. In July, an accident in Japan 
exposed that the US army had deployed sarin-filled bombs there without even the 
knowledge of the White House, and shortly thereafter came news about chemical 
weapons stockpiles in West Germany. The incidents fed neatly into Soviet Union and 
allied accusations, begun in 1964, that the US was violating the Geneva Protocol in 
Vietnam by its use of Agent Orange as a jungle defoliant, and tear gas to force 
combatants out of tunnels and bunkers into the zone of fire.  
With Congress members pressing for an inquiry, and foreign nations raising 
concerns, Kissinger issued National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 59. On behalf 
of the president, NSSM 59 ordered a thorough review of government programs on 
chemical and biological weapons. The work was divided among Interdepartmental groups. 
Members of the Intelligence Community were supposed to assess the programs and 
capabilities of foreign powers; officials from the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Bureau of Political Military affairs (the Department of State’s link to the Department of 
Defense) were to assess practical deployment of chemical and biological weapons; and 
the legal office of the State Department was to examine “the US position on arms control, 
including the question of the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.”58 The use of these 
subcommittees was a regular part of the NSSM process, but at the urging of well-
connected members of the scientific community, and in recognition of the technical nature 
of the questions, an additional report on the scientific aspects was requested from experts 
on the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). 
 The PSAC report concluded: 
 
                                                
58 Henry A Kissinger, "National Security Study Memorandum 59," (Washington D.C.: National 
Security Council, 1969). 
  64 
biological weapons were far less reliable in the field and predictable in their military 
effects than chemical weapons, and had a much shorter shelf life. Moreover, 
microbial pathogens posed potential long-term hazards because of the possibility 
that a disease agent could mutate into a more virulent or uncontrollable strain, or 
could infect wild animals to create persistent foci of disease that would pose an 
enduring threat to public health.59  
Their negative pronouncement, as well as that of the State Department, suggested 
discontinuation of the US program.  
In the Department of Defense, however, the two sub-reports that would feed into 
the final evaluation were in conflict, one largely dismissing the value of biological weapons 
and the other maintaining that they were “reliable and controllable in the field,” without 
mention of their drawbacks.60 The Secretary of Defense at this time was Melvin R. Laird, a 
popular congressman in the House of Representatives, who accepted the secretary 
appointment but made clear that he only intended to serve one term. He had no 
allegiance to the agenda of the defense establishment or the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
personally. Handed these contradictory analyses, he transferred responsibility for the 
report to a third office. The Office of International Security Affairs commonly staffed the 
secretary for meetings with the National Security Council and with State. It lacked 
expertise in chemical and biological weapons, however, and therefore asked permission 
of the President’s Science Advisory Council to draw on their report, which they graciously 
approved. As a result, the official Department of Defense position, dissented from by the 
Joint Chief of Staff alone, was virtually identical with the Department of State, and the 
president was presented with nearly unanimous advice to shut down the program. 
The change in US policy opened the way for international negotiations to produce 
the first significant international legislation addressing biological weapons to be developed 
since 1925, the 1972 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.” 
(BWC)61 In the time between the two, the conception of the weapons themselves changed 
fundamentally. In 1925, it was a technology on par with conventional weapons, but like 
submarines or missiles (about which similar debates occurred), they were fraught with the 
potential for use against civilians. These weapons were an advance in technology, but a 
step backwards in movement of mankind. But by 1972, the idea of mutually assured 
destruction had taken hold. The subtext of the Convention was not early twentieth-century 
concerns with modernity but Cold War fears. Whereas the object of intervention in 1925 
was, literally, the “use in war” of biological weapons, the 1972 Convention prohibited 
processes of development, production and stockpiling, in order to strengthen “confidence 
between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere.” 
 In its status as a bellwether lies precisely the problem with the BWC accord. If it 
were supposed to improve the international atmosphere, that atmosphere would thwart it. 
Like the Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention had no enforcement 
provisions. The UK, the US and the Soviet governments served as depository parties for 
the Convention, but this was as much to give themselves seats at the bargaining table as 
it was an expression of interest in actually ridding the world of biological weapons. 
Included in the four-page text were provisions for future review of progress on fulfilling the 
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convention’s obligations, and meetings to develop a protocol. But the Soviets, apparently 
convinced that Nixon’s renunciation was a subterfuge, in fact intensified their own 
weapons research. When, during the 1970s, US military intelligence fed them false 
information about a secret biological and chemical weapons program, the ploy backfired. 
The Soviets redoubled their efforts, with significant breakthroughs “including development 
of highly lethal, stable, and persistent formulations of the microbes that cause anthrax, 
plague, tularemia, and small-pox, as well as advanced delivery systems such as 
refrigerated warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles.”62 The illicit Soviet program, 
now massive in scale by dint of the Americans’ goading, and their determination to hide it, 
would be one of the detriments to the ultimately fruitless negotiations for a verification and 
enforcement protocol to accompany the BWC. 
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
UNSCR 1540 was passed in April of 2004, over 30 years after the BWC and 
nearly 80 years after the Geneva Protocol. While citing and building on those earlier 
versions of the biothreat, in the new accord, security for the first time moved to center 
stage as the object of protection. The threat presented was weapons of mass destruction 
in the hands of “non-State actors.” The solution devised was to stop the acquiring, 
developing, trafficking in or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their 
means of delivery, and related materials. As will be discussed though, a focus on 
proliferation is no longer adequate if the risk has moved from materials to that of know-
how.  
Of concern to some, and noteworthy as a procedure in the process of creating 
customary international law, the resolution was passed by the 15-member Security 
Council, rather than the General Assembly. Despite this, as a Chapter VII resolution it is 
technically binding on all members. UNSCR 1540 functions by requiring member nations 
to pass domestic legislation preventing the proliferation of such weapons and their means 
of delivery, and establishing controls over precursor materials. It affirmed already existing 
treaties and encouraged international cooperation in the implementation of the resolution, 
and subsequent verification. Much of this legislation was what I collected for the 
biocriminalization template at Interpol. 
Despite the cooperative rhetoric of the text, UNSCR 1540 was severely criticized. 
The resolution was viewed as having been pushed through by the United States to 
support an at least partially discredited antiterrorism agenda. Negotiated principally by the 
permanent five members in the Security Council, the great majority of states were 
excluded from its development. Complaints arose about the Security Council acting as a 
global legislator. The language of 1540 was also ambiguous about disarmament and 
nonproliferation, adding fuel to long-smoldering complaints about an international double 
standard that strengthened the position of those who were already armed and impeded 
the pacific technological development of those who were not. In many ways, these 
paralleled the problems that had arisen in the development a protocol for the Biological 
Weapons Convention, an attempt shelved in the summer of 2001.63  
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Historian Susan Wright has detailed extensively how biological weapons came to 
be linked with terrorism in such a way that their use became a matter of not if, but when 
and where. According to former National Security Council senior staff members, Wright 
reports, before 9/11 “terrorism was perceived as ‘a nuisance to be attended to, not a 
strategic threat.’’’64 The 1993 World Trade Center bombings were considered the work of 
unstable fanatics rather than the brazen act of an organized terrorist network that 
demanded immediate retaliation and countering. That first WTC attack was not, according 
to the staff members Wright quotes, ‘‘the kind of issue to provide an organizing principle 
for America’s dealings with the world.’’65 Terrorism was thought of as a demand for media 
attention on a desired cause. Killing massive numbers of people would offend rather than 
convert, and ultimately turn people away from joining or even supporting. Wright attributes 
the change in relation to biological threats to a small group of people with strong 
convictions. These individuals had the connections to make their concerns matter. In a 
deluge of detail, she describes how they became convinced that the threat from 
bioterrorism was real, in what ways their campaign was also self-serving, and the manner 
in which they disseminated their beliefs.  
As one among many other elements, she points to Richard Preston’s bioterrorism 
novel The Cobra Effect as an influence on then-president William J. Clinton. Wright 
identifies a subsequent 1998 Clinton address in which “the threats of the twenty-first 
century would come from connections between ‘rogue’ states and terrorists and from the 
real risks that chemical and biological weapons would be transferred from the former to 
the latter.”66 Another historian of science, Nicholas King, has argued that the book 
crystallized the American discourse on bioterrorism, which “is both a legitimate response 
to a nascent threat and a subterranean dialogue shaped by peculiarly American ambitions 
and anxieties about social change in a globalizing era."67 Bioterrorism has become, 
according to him, “a focal point of American anxieties about globalization, demonstrating 
the difficulty of maintaining security amidst global transportation and information 
networks.”68 In Preston's novel, “these bioterrorism experts treaded a fine line between 
speculation and analysis, constructing fictional scenarios in order to develop medical and 
political responses to future events.”69 The worst-case scenarios in the novel were no 
different that those developed by real world experts, in disaster preparation, disease 
modeling and asymmetrical warfare. 
A body of security and social science literature has explored this construction of 
bioterrorism, poking at the speculative seams of such scenarios. At one extreme is the 
claim that bioterrorism is predominantly a representation of social insecurity, and its 
significance “lies in the fear that it generates, `threat' in this context constituting not just a 
physical manifestation of impending danger but also a reflection of a subjective 
vulnerability derived from a fear of an eventuality that cannot be predicted, identified or 
controlled.”70 Melinda Cooper has focused on how and why bioterrorism, on her view “is 
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becoming the paradigmatic threat of US defense policy, the virtual characteristically 
emergent event around which it is reorganizing its whole vision of warfare.”71 She 
surmises that an understanding of biological knowledge as emergent and unpredictable 
cannot be dealt with by previous probability and risk approaches, and instead is easily tied 
to a military doctrine of preemption, which deals with the uncertainty of potential 
catastrophe by turning it instead into a future of its choosing, or in Deleuzian terms, 
actualizing it.  
Others, such as longtime bioweapons specialist Milton Leitenberg, emphasize the 
incongruence of devoting vast resources to a threat that, in terms of historical antecedents 
and probability pales next to poverty, infectious disease or global warming.72 Richard 
Danzig, lawyer, former Secretary of the Navy, and one the individuals Wright indicates as 
shaping the current biothreats framing, lays out the reasons for his position and activism. 
While “biological weapons currently pose a threat somewhere between conventional 
explosives and nuclear weapons, the “ability to ‘reload’ and attack repeatedly with 
biological weapons is likely to be very attractive to terrorists. It will give them a supreme 
opportunity to hold us hostage.”73 He emphasizes that skills to produce biological 
weapons are proliferating, so that “Only a thin wall of terrorist ignorance and inexperience 
now protects us.” Finally, “there is a frightening category of biological weapons—those 
that do not exist in nature” but could be engineered in the future. This last is the main 
concern of molecular biologist Roger Brent, which he expressed to me in an ongoing 
correspondence on the subject as, “The thing to worry about is an attack with a 
contagious disease. The equivalent of a "strategic" attack with nuclear weapons.  That 
kills zillions of people. All else is less important.” 
The feasibility of this last assertion forms a divide between biosecurity experts. 
Wright observes of the late 1990s period, “Many people understood at this point that 
producing bioweapons with the capacity for mass destruction would not be readily 
accomplished by a few people operating alone in a basement laboratory. This required 
technical expertise and substantial support.”74 This position is still maintained by many in 
both policy and the social sciences. At variance with it, writing in 2005, Brent declared “the 
history of the use of biological weapons in war and of the 20th century germ war programs 
is largely irrelevant to the current strategic situation.” He elaborated in his testimony 
before the US House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 
Biological Attack that same year: 
Just as with computers, revolutionary changes sustained over time have 
revolutionary consequences, and much of the first part of this century will reflect 
these changes breaking surface to impact human affairs… 
…there are tens of thousands of people worldwide who can now engineer drug 
resistant bacteria, and thousands with the ability to remake a virus like SARS, or 
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perform other engineering tasks too numerous to mention. Their numbers will only 
grow, so I would not be surprised if, by 2010, there were more than 100,000 
people worldwide who had the knowledge and access to the lab equipment they 
would need to use to make, say, anthrax resistant to Ciproflaxin. Since the breadth 
of dissemination of this technical knowledge base will only increase, if you assume 
that some of these people may be motivated to undertake these tasks, then you 
have to look at the next decades are a time of great and increasing risk. If you 
further assume that some individuals or groups may be motivated to use relatively 
crude deployment methods, at the limit including infecting themselves and 
spreading the disease by human transmission, then you have to figure that the 
increase in the risk is higher still. These projects could be carried out by individuals 
or small groups of people; there would be no need to recreate the Cold War 
programs of the nation states.75 
Kathleen Vogel, a chemist who has worked in science policy and academia, 
discusses what she characterized as the “biotech revolution model.” She is not concerned 
with proving or disproving the threat, although she suggests that it doesn’t yet exist in the 
way that concerns Brent. Rather she examines how framing biosecurity directs and limits 
the way it is approached. “Instead of a revolutionary model,” she argues, “empirical 
studies suggest that as biotechnology moves from the scientific bench to a more applied 
setting, it follows a well-established historical pattern of slow and incremental change and 
diffusion consistent with other major technologies.”76 “[W]ell-established laboratory 
practices and techniques,” according to her research, are what made possible the 
experiments that are often used as examples of impending infectious danger (synthesis of 
the poliovirus and phiX bacteriophage synthesis). Countering the notion of the infinite 
possibility and proliferation of technoscience, she maintains that there is a difference 
between tacit and explicit knowledge and this could become a focus of preventative 
measures.77 She concludes, “the current dominant biosecurity frame takes away policy 
attention from other important considerations for assessing the threat from 
biotechnologies and designing appropriate policy responses.”78 
Brent’s opinion is in some ways in agreement with Vogel’s. “Most of the helpful 
steps are not technical but social,” he wrote me in another exchange, but he is less 
assured about the social impediments to the transmission of tacit knowledge. The 
situation, as he views it, can be framed in analogy with advances in computing, hackers 
and computer viruses:  
There is a decentralized, Moore’s law type, revolution in biological understanding 
and capability going on worldwide for more than half a century. In some cases, 
biotechnology is advancing faster than computer technology. For example, the 
density of components on computer chips continues to double every 18 months—
while certain abilities to read and write DNA double more like every 12 months. 79 
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The implication is that if a lone computer hacker can produce a devastating digital 
virus, then a solitary mad scientist could produce a catastrophic organic virus. Little 
institutional framework would be necessary. To his mind even more dangerous is the 
possibility of a biohacker community within which a veneer of renegade chic would be 
associated with clever, subversive destruction. Vogel proposes that biosecurity be 
approached with a “material and informational focus,” intervening in “more qualitative 
aspects of biotechnology, such development of laboratory skills and disciplines, 
organizational communities of scientific practice, contingency and complexity of laboratory 
work, and so forth.”80 Brent concentrates more on creating a moral climate among 
researchers, such that the potential for harm is fully and negatively understood. He 
promotes the adoption of a code of conduct and ethics oath for biological scientists, with 
the goal of constituting an alternative community, which he views in moral terms, and 
instilling in researchers an internal injunction against malevolent use of biology.  
What an oath might do pragmatically would be to raise awareness that someone 
might want to do harm. It can therefore have the effect of increasing vigilance, and 
creating a climate in which whistleblowers are inclined to come forward. The problem with 
tools such as codes and oaths is that ethical behavior, understood as intrinsically a form 
of self-responsibility, cannot be imposed. The people who would take the oath seriously 
do not need it. They already work consistently to emerge from their self-imposed 
immaturity. The risk of a mandatory oath is that it would be taken as an empty infliction of 
authority, so that the sense of self-responsibility, which is in fact the goal, is undermined. 
Researchers would not necessarily do harm, but the oath, if it did not inspire reflection, 
would similarly leave unaffected their decisions or behavior. This can cheapen the very 
values sought, as indicated by the history of the California State loyalty oath,81 or even the 
US Pledge of Allegiance.  
Deterrence  
A year to the day of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, then-President George 
W. Bush signed into place a new US National Security Strategy. The assumption in the 
strategy was that “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist 
enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents.”82 
Over the course of the next few years, however, thinking seemed to change. The 2006 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism concluded: “A new deterrence calculus 
combines the need to deter terrorists and supporters from contemplating a WMD attack 
and, failing that, to dissuade them from actually conducting an attack.”83  
Breaking down this statement helps identify something important. Deterring 
terrorists from “contemplating a WMD attack” refers not to operational impediments, which 
falls under dissuasion from “actually conducting” it, but suggests that a biological weapons 
attack should be “unthinkable.” It should not be an option under consideration because it 
would be counterproductive. This is an important conceptual and strategic shift. The word 
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itself, “deter,” appeared in the mid-sixteenth century, coming literally from the latin 
deterrere, joining de- “away from” + terrere “to frighten.”  
While “frightening away” is most often associated with punishment, it can also 
indicate more subtly the effects of stigmatization, or changing the accepted norm. In legal 
terms:  
Criminal law is not only a price tariff but also an expression of society's disapproval 
of forbidden behavior, a fact influencing citizens in various ways. Most people have 
a certain respect for formal law as such. Moreover, the criminalization of a certain 
type of behavior may work as a moral eye-opener, making people realize the 
socially harmful character of the act ("the law as a teacher of right and wrong"). 
The moral condemnation expressed through the criminal law may also affect the 
moral attitudes of the individual in a less reflective way. Various labels are used to 
characterize these effects: the moral, the educative, the socializing, the attitude-
shaping, or the norm-strengthening influence of the law. From the legislator's 
perspective, the creation of moral inhibitions is of greater value than mere 
deterrence, because the former may work even in situations in which a person 
need not fear detection and punishment. In the Scandinavian countries and 
Germany the moral component in general prevention is considered to be essential. 
For the moral effect of criminal law the perceived legitimacy of the system, rooted 
in the application of principles of justice, proportionality and fairness, are regarded 
as more important than severity of sentences.84 
“New,” however, is a relative term. Deterrence as retaliation is described as 
outdated, but the replacement in many places is “consequence mitigation,”85 or 
“deterrence by denial—the ability to defeat, defend against, and operate in the context of 
WMD and, if needed, overcome the effects of WMD use.”86 In keeping with this approach, 
the former Center for Deterrence of Biowarfare became the Center for Health Hazards 
Preparedness (CHHP). Preparedness became understood in some circles as the best 
form of deterrence, and in fact synonymous with it. The acting director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter, at the time said, "What we've developed since 
9/11, in six or seven years, is a better understanding of the support that is necessary for 
terrorists, the network which provides that support, whether it's financial or material or 
expertise.” One form of deterrence is certainly to target those networks. "We've now 
begun to develop more sophisticated thoughts about deterrence looking at each one of 
those," Leiter said in an interview. "Terrorists don't operate in a vacuum."87  
Leiter points to the fact that terrorism is not random violence. Unless the terrorist 
identity is constructed purely on opposition, and violence is intended to strengthen 
internal cohesion, a group has two intended audiences: victims and observers. 
Observers can identify with either the terrorist or the victims, and thus be either 
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galvanized to join the cause or repulsed. The new deterrence focuses on those 
who might previously have been inspired, aiming to change the audience so that 
the act of terror is viewed negatively. This version of soft propaganda 
, even covert, is not new either, and has antecedents in war efforts, marketing and 
political campaigns. What is emergent in the scenario is only the recognition that it could 
be effective against terrorism at a grass roots level. Described in a 2008 New York Times 
article, 
American officials have spent the last several years trying to identify other types of 
"territory" that extremists hold dear, and they say they believe that one important 
aspect may be the terrorists' reputation and credibility with Muslims. It aims to 
mute Al Qaeda's message, turn the jihadi movement's own weaknesses against it 
and illuminate Al Qaeda's errors whenever possible.88 
This sense of deterrence is fits with the law and law enforcement understanding of the 
goals of criminalization. A narcotics veteran I interviewed once used a similar logic to 
explain the role of drug enforcement, “It is, at least in part, stigmatization.”  
The deterrence of which Leiter spoke works on changing the milieu within which 
terrorism has effect. The argument is made, for example, that by engaging in torture the 
United States delegitimized itself. In this same milieu, the U.S. must now reestablish 
credibility. Evidence in favor of the power of a moral framework includes the refusal of 
Indian Muslims to bury the 2008 Mumbai attackers. M.J. Akbar, the Indian-Muslim editor 
of Covert, an Indian investigative journal, declared: 
Terrorism has no place in Islamic doctrine. The Koranic term for the killing of 
innocents is ‘fasad.’ Terrorists are fasadis, not jihadis. In a beautiful verse, the 
Koran says that the killing of an innocent is akin to slaying the whole community. 
Since the ... terrorists were neither Indian nor true Muslims, they had no right to an 
Islamic burial in an Indian Muslim cemetery.89  
He was quoted in an New York Times op-ed by Thomas Friedman who added, “The only 
effective way to stop this trend is for “the village” — the Muslim community itself — to say 
“no more.” When a culture and a faith community delegitimizes this kind of behavior, 
openly, loudly and consistently, it is more important than metal detectors or extra police. 
Religion and culture are the most important sources of restraint in a society.” 90 
Tracking the Threat  
Returning to the World at Risk report and its conceptualization of the threat: the 
claims and beliefs about bioweapons encapsulated in the agreements have become so 
effectively normalized that it requires a certain effort to see the extent to which they 
present contingent conceptualizations. The contemporary framing of the problem and 
attendant focus on non-proliferation was expressed in the words of the WMD 
Commission: 
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The proliferation of these weapons increases the risk that they may be used in a 
terrorist attack in two ways. First, it increases the number of states that will be in a 
position either to use the weapons themselves or to transfer materials and know-
how to those who might use WMD against us. The more proliferation that occurs, 
the greater the risk of additional proliferation, as nations that have to this point 
declined to acquire nuclear weapons will believe it necessary to counter their 
neighbors who have developed those capabilities. Second, it increases the 
prospect that these weapons will be poorly secured and thus may be stolen by 
terrorists or by others who intend to sell them to those who would do us harm.  
Counterproliferation, like counterterrorism, denotes proactive measures. There is a 
distinction made between the antiterrorism and counterterrorism in the military that seems 
to have drifted into other realms, although the news media generally conflates them in 
favor of the term counterterrorism. Antiterrorism is used by the military to refer to 
preventative efforts (e.g. erecting a barrier outside of an airport to prevent bomb attacks) 
or neutralizing, “preparedness” actions (e.g. vaccines for a bioterrorism attack). 
Counterterrorism in contrast is understood to be pro-active, such as operations in pursuit 
of terrorists. Thus when Jason Ellis, research professor at the Center for 
Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, writes “counterproliferation—
defined by the secretary of defense as the ‘full range of military preparations and activities 
to reduce, and protect against, the threat posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons and their associated delivery means’—is of central importance,”91 this is code for 
proactive measures. Proactive, in turn, can mean preemptive, including strikes to destroy 
physical locations, but also controlling materials, as well as gathering operational 
intelligence about acts of terrorism, or investigating financial networks.  
Despite the bravado of counterproliferation thus expounded, it still suggests the 
containment of something, such as knowledge, which in the context of biology should 
rather be considered uncontainable. Marc Ostfield, US State Department advisor on 
bioterrorism, biodefense and health security, argues that counterproliferation is not only 
the wrong word, but the wrong approach: the necessary bioscientfic skills have already 
proliferated. “Control” is the wrong conceptualization and wrong tactic. He returns us 
instead to deterrence. The debate, ultimately, is muddled by overlapping but 
incommensurate analytical frames. 
Andrew Lakoff and Stephen Collier have together developed a schema for thinking 
through types of collective security. Different types can be analyzed as having: an object, 
a moment of articulation, a normative rationality, a type of threat, an exemplary form of 
knowledge and a basic operation.92 In these terms, international security can be thought 
of as the converse of sovereign state security: the unit, or object is not the state but more 
exactly the stable relations between states. The moment of articulation can be traced to 
the conventions and treaties relating to warfare around the turn of the twentieth century, 
and then the League of Nations, followed by the United Nations. These were 
organizations with the power to produce laws that abstractly, would govern the community 
of nations. The operation that Lakoff and Collier pinpoint for sovereign state security is 
deterrence and defense against enemies. For international security qua stability, the 
principal operation has been the passage of treaties and legislation that nations are then 
obliged to fulfill domestically. Treaties and legislation have become the major 
                                                
91 Ellis, "The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security," 116. 
92 Andrew Lakoff, "The Generic Threat, or How We Became Unprepared," Cultural Anthropology 
23, no. 3 (2008): 403. 
  73 
governmental – but not scientific – strategy for dealing with biological threats identified as 
international, supported by watchdog NGOs that document, critique, agitate and in some 
arenas assist in the implementation and verification of the promises between countries.  
One point to notice is the way that biotechnological prowess and the terrorist are 
understood. As mentioned, the conventional wisdom long held that a technology transfer 
from a rogue state would be necessary for a truly devastating biological attack. In 
Preston’s The Cobra Effect, Clinton’s address and even UNSCR 1540, with its focus on 
nonproliferation, the idea that bioweapons could only be developed by a state power still 
prevailed. One stroke of erasure of this belief, at least in some scientific and policy circles, 
has come from advances in the biological sciences. The threat is reframed in terms of 
knowledge and skills, removing the need for a state actor to transfer either the weapons or 
the know-how. Another stroke of erasure was the gradual acceptance, which came only 
after the 9/11 Commission Report, that a non-state organization such as al-Qaeda was 
organized and strong enough to commit a major act of terrorism without direct state 
support. Wright, among others, discusses views of terrorism experts that debates on 
bioweapons tend to ignore the history of terrorist actions and intent. RAND Corporation 
expert Brian Jenkins asserted in 1999, “Threat assessment based on infinite 
vulnerabilities, conjured foes, worst-case scenarios, and the wrath of our children can 
degenerate into a fact-free scaffold of anxieties and arguments—dramatic, emotionally 
powerful, compelling, but analytically feeble.’’ Although less than 3000 people were killed 
on September 11, 2001, in the grandiosity of the act, it became conceivable that a terrorist 
goal would be mass death. By this interpretation, rather than numbers, 9/11 altered the 
previous expert opinion that, ‘‘Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people 
dead.”93 The 9/11 Commission report also opened the doors to scenario-imagining in 
another way. One of their findings was that analysts had lacked imagination. Referring to 
the US government just before the Japanese attack of 6 December 1941, Thomas C. 
Schelling observed: “There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the 
improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks 
strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.”94 
The Commission’s emphasis on imagination not only liberated thinkers from the need to 
consider only the probable, it pushed for thinking the unthinkable, and bioterrorism 
presented itself as that unlikely but possible candidate for the position of favored threat. 
Jez Littlewood, in an assessment for the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Commission (WMDC), attempted to reform the terminology of biological threats at its core: 
“The key issue,” he affirmed, “is the ‘problem’ and not the ‘threat’.”95  What Littlewood 
meant is that there have been a number of versions over time, but the fact of threat has 
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remained constant. This continuity should be the focus, not the weapons themselves or a 
weapons convention, disarmament, or bioterrorism. The biological weapons problem is “a 
spectrum of risks and threats involving biological weapons” but “this spectrum is itself only 
part of a number of risks related to biological organisms and/or the life sciences, such as 
genetically modified organisms, synthetic biology, accidents involving pathogens, natural 
outbreaks of disease, etc.”96 As a result,  “the biological weapons problem is one to be 
‘managed’; not solved.”97 This is where the normative effect of the international accords 
comes in. Both the 1925 Protocol and the 1972 Convention are concerned with 
acceptable practices of war. Nixon’s renunciation, in the midst of Vietnam, was specifically 
about total war.  
There is debate among historians about how far back the concept of total warfare 
can be traced and still retain enough specificity to refer to and be useful for describing 
conflicts today. The Peloponnesian war is sometimes labeled the first documented “total 
war,” in comparison to what are described as more ritualistic, earlier Greek wars, fought 
exclusively between soldiers. The key differences were that the civilian population was 
deemed a legitimate target and that the economies of the city-states were mobilized in 
function of the war. Other military historians argue that complete redirection of resources 
only becomes possible after the industrial revolution, or that total warfare appears with the 
advent of aerial bombings, which diminished the importance of the battle line, and made 
vulnerable populations otherwise removed from battle. The register of the debate among 
historians is technical, not conceptual. It does not address a notion of the interpellation of 
a people when presented with war—that when a country goes to war, a citizen may 
support or reject the mobilization but regardless is compelled to respond. Instead, the 
historians generally differ in which real world war should serve as the ideal type, in relation 
to which other wars are categorized. They leave aside the possibility of considering at 
what point, or via what means fundamental relations between politics and the population 
shifted.98 
That relationship is crucial to the imaginary within with biological weapons came to 
be developed, produced and eventually prohibited, although not abandoned. The impetus 
to civilize war by limiting it to soldiers vied with and often lost to the goal of victory. The 
history of biological weapons development is tied to the rise and fall of that impetus rather 
than its success or failure. Nuclear weapons had introduced the idea of existential threat 
but it would take the advances in genomic science for biological weapons to enter this 
space as well. Even if the concept of total war is reserved for industrial-age conflicts, and 
the definition of biological weapons limited to scientifically developed military projects, the 
purposeful use of disease indicates a willingness to assault the general population. In the 
latest incarnation of bioterrorism, technoscience became both the problem of engineered 
germs, and the solution of a system of technological surveillance, improved disease 
detection and identification, and flexible vaccines that can go into rapid production. 
International legislation more generally can be understood as a political and 
normative framework through which certain kinds of threats have been made accessible 
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to technical intervention. Terrorism and total war share the characteristics of targeting 
civilians and disregard for other, “civilized” conventions of war. Such legislation moves 
slowly and tends to build on previous models, so that the nonproliferation models are 
based on an idea of the biological weapons threat that dates to an era when terrorism was 
most commonly coupled with “state-sponsored” and weapons needed the support of a 
state apparatus to be developed. Nonetheless, this legislation is a necessary if not 
sufficient, step.  
The development and use of each kind of specified weapon in UNSCR 1540 is 
regulated by previous agreements—the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and tracked, in 
the case of the first two, by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Biological weapons, notably, lack a parallel 
implementation and verification organization. Even with a treaty or resolution in place, 
implementation is a separate, and often interminable, process. Littlewood, whose 
argument is representative of a range of disarmament NGOs, makes the case for 
pursuing this course nonetheless. 
If the BWC continues to remain peripheral to efforts to counter biological 
weapons—as it currently does—its purpose and function will be thrown further into 
doubt.  That will lead only to erosion of the law underpinning biological 
disarmament, the law and the norm against the use of such weapons, and the 
moral revulsion against them (which itself is routinely cited but rarely given any 
meaning).99 
Nonproliferation accords are unlikely to control the flow of knowledge and materials used 
to develop weapons, but that does not mean they are useless. What they do, at very high 
level, is create a moral climate. Their relevance comes from their normative power.
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Chapter Five. Events and Failures 
From the moment it became clear—as a second plane struck the World Trade 
Center— that a non-natural disaster was unfolding in the United States, two phrases 
spontaneously shaped the experience: Pearl Harbor and intelligence failure.1 Terrorism 
was invoked descriptively, but the connections to World War II and intelligence were the 
first interpretations. They appeared immediately, unprompted, in television and radio 
commentary across the nation. Both stuck. Having done so, they gave form to the event of 
9/11, and ultimately influenced responses to it. The impression of rupture of that day 
would become part of the story, the narrative hub of causes and effects.  
Gilles Deleuze, in early work and later with collaborator Guattari, proposed an 
influential concept of the event, detailing its nature, temporality and actualization. Their 
identification and specification of an “event” is a useful analytic for evaluating what would 
become 9/11.2 Drawing on the Stoics, Deleuze defined “bodies” as things with “tensions, 
physical qualities, actions and passions.”3 At a given point in time, bodies are in a static 
relationship with each other. The relationship changes when bodies interact, producing an 
“event.” For example, “a knife in flesh” is a relationship of two bodies; “being cut” is the 
effect, and an event. Within their framework, the effect/event is incorporeal, and events do 
not cause other events. “Incorporeal effects are never themselves causes in relation to 
each other,”4  although Deleuze allowed that they may be “quasi-causes.”  
“Actualization” is Deleuze and Guattari’s word for describing the event “embodied 
in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person, the moment we designate by saying 'here, 
the moment has come.'”5 Within this period, “The future and the past of the event are only 
evaluated with respect to this definitive present.”6 “On the other hand,” Deleuze notes, 
“there is the future and past of the event, considered in itself… free of the limitations of a 
state of affairs.”7 For Deleuze, these are two distinct kinds of time. In the former, an event 
takes specific, defined form; in the latter, it is a “pure event,” “the expressed of statements 
and the 'sense' of what happens."8 The pure event does not exist outside of human 
cognizance. It is “sense itself,“ and requires description.9 Pertinent to the events of to be 
discussed below, Paul Patton writes, “language use is not primarily the communication of 
information but a matter of acting in or upon the world: event attributions do not simply 
describe or report pre-existing events, they help to actualize particular events in the social 
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field. That is why politics frequently takes the form of struggle over the appropriate 
description of events."10  
It is worth noting that description is not confined to words; much of 9/11 
documentation was pictorial. Jean Baudrillard analyzed this mediation, concerned that 
“Even as the image exalts the event, it takes it hostage.”11 He writes. 
This is what is always forgotten when we speak of the “danger” of the media. The 
image consumes the event by absorbing it and offering it up to the consumer. To 
be sure, it lends the event an unedited impact to a point, but it remains an image-
event nonetheless… [b]ecause reality is a starting point, a first principle, and it's 
this principle that has been lost. Reality and fiction are inextricable, and fascination 
with the attack is above all fascination with the image.  
The actual event of 9/11 was experienced in many ways, though, and the television 
images were only one. Patton, among many others, notes ”...the representation of events, 
in television and print media, has become part of the unfolding of events themselves."12  
He adds, “as Deleuze and Guattari point out, there is no reason why [their] conception of 
the pragmatics of language should be confined to spoken or written discourse…. [W]e can 
understand the media representation of a demonstration or a humanitarian crisis as 
integral to its actualization as a certain kind of event,” without reducing it to that 
representation.13  
Sociologist Eric Fassin takes up a Deleuzian definition of events most significantly 
as a series of singularities. “[S]ingularities,” he argues, “only have meaning within the 
series that they delimit, dividing a past and a future: before the Affair, after the Affair. Both 
revealing and catalyzing, the Affair is thus nothing but the manifestation of a major social 
shift, a rupture in intelligibility.”14 Fassin adds, "The event thus appears... as a break in 
intelligibility. But this is not simply an accidental feature of the landscape. The chasm of 
meaning does not open up by chance, in an aleatory way: there is nothing accidental 
about the event. The break in intelligibility, in fact, refers to a relation of power whose shift 
it makes apparent."15 In his use of “appears” he marks that he seeks to identify breaks 
rather than create them.  
Fassin and Alban Bensa try to pick up on certain series already in effect but 
hitherto invisible. The two proceed with an examination of possible series within which 
9/11 might fit.16 They suggest first the “grid” of international relations, and posit that 9/11 
could be understood as the end of a strategic series of terrorist acts born of the Cold War, 
or a post-Cold War terrorism series. Shifting slightly, it could be, following Michel Feher, 
“the first post-colonial event.”17 If colonialism involved battles fought on foreign soils in 
which the colonized were merely grist for the cannon, the attacks on New York and 
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Washington were a version with reversed exoticism in the heart of the “west”; the deaths 
paralleled so many others in Cold War proxy battles.  
Another grid is that of American history, for which they propose 9/11 not as the 
end, but the beginning of a series relating to valorization of the public domain. They align 
this possible domain more closely to class than race or gender, yet in a social rather then 
or at least in addition to, economic register. In the images of the 11th of September, 
aftermath and recovery, they identify a new kind of working-class hero, connected to the 
legitimacy in public service of the firemen, policemen and yet all the victims as well. They 
point to the remediation of the flag of the Reagan conservative years, which had been 
defined against the Vietnam generation's rejection, into a subtly different symbol. What 
they describe, they admit, may be short lived and perhaps only secondary. It is easier to 
correctly diagnose in hindsight, to identify when “sense” broke down, than to identify in 
real time the opening of a series and assess what it means.  
Government reorganization came out of a certain understanding of what had 
occurred and why. The moment of the working-class hero they diagnose, even if already 
passed, was the one in which current policy was designed and put into action, and was 
also the moment when state and local law enforcement officers began to move into 
counterterrorism. The specific ways 9/11 was described and interpreted directed the 
changes that were implemented. This brings us back to how 9/11 was actualized, 
beginning with the role of Pearl Harbor and “intelligence failure” in defining the event, and 
the series in which those specific rhetorical resources themselves fit.  
Pearl Harbor 
President George W. Bush wrote to his diary on September 11, 2001, “The Pearl 
Harbor of the 21st century took place today.”18 9/11 was the deadliest and most expensive 
peacetime attack on US shores since 60 years earlier,19 yet the analogy is not 
straightforward. Both sides are burdened with mixed meaning. Certainly Pearl Harbor was 
a point of reference on September 11th and in subsequent reporting and analysis. As 
historian Emily Rosenberg observed, "No one needed to command the widespread use of 
Pearl Harbor imagery. Commentators around the country spontaneously invoked it, and 
many Americans seemed actually to 'experience' the attacks through the memories that 
the Pear Harbor-hyped summer of 2001 had helped forged.”20  
What “Pearl Harbor” itself means, however, has evolved over the years. Making 
sense of a World War II disaster, its ostensible causes and inferred messages, has been 
a contested process from the start. Government-sponsored committees, active 
stakeholders (such as the relatives or supporters of the men who took the blame) together 
with those interested in its possible lessons did long work of research and reacticulation. 
These were often construed during the Cold War as indicating intelligence and defense 
buildup. History, Rosenberg points out, is not an avenue “to ‘recover’ some ‘authentic’ 
version of the past but…[is rather] ever-changing and inevitably mediated fields of 
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contestation over how to structure the past's representation.”21 Different groups vied to 
have their account and/or explanation accepted as official. The shifts and versions must 
be examined, then, in order to see what those connecting Pearl Harbor to 9/11 are 
referencing, or claiming and promoting.  
At 7:50 AM PST on December 7, 1941, the Japanese air strike commander 
signaled the beginning of a raid that would damage or destroy most of the US Army and 
Navy war craft stationed in Hawaii, and leave 1,178 Americans wounded and 2,403 
dead.22 Although an attack had been long suspected, the date and location were not 
identified in a morass of intelligence information; surprise was complete and humiliating. 
The two countries had been and still were in diplomatic negotiations, adding to a US 
feeling of betrayal. The United States quickly declared war on Japan, followed with 
declarations against Germany and the other Axis powers. An investigation into who 
should take the blame, the first of ten (the last concluded in 1995), was launched within 
two weeks.  
With this brief outline, some reasons for the Pearl Harbor–9/11 analogy are 
obvious (and some differences highlighted). Both were destructive attacks, and 
successfully caught the targets and general population by surprise. They were also 
literally attacks on the United States, or at least, Pearl Harbor was carefully presented, 
and remembered, that way: Roosevelt crafted his message to emphasize the “Hawaiian 
Islands,” not yet a state, over the other Japanese attacks in the Pacific.23 2001 was also 
the crescendo of the World War II adulation begun in the 1970s. It was the 60th 
anniversary of the air strike, and an eponymous Hollywood mega production had been 
released at the beginning of summer, after an extravagant build-up that aimed to make 
attending the movie a patriotic act, a kind of vicarious participation in the (just and 
victorious) “Good War.”24 The film avoided potentially touchy subjects, such as American 
military inadequacy before the strike, denigration of Japanese character, possible 
negligence by responsible individuals or the isolationist refusal to enter World War II. In its 
ahistoricity and general mediocrity (aside from special effects), the result was a 
memorable title for a generic tale, the details forgettable. 
Rosenberg convincingly argues that, in repackaging certain traditional narratives, 
the movie placed Pearl Harbor in the tradition of Custer's last stand and the Alamo. These 
were frontier myths where defeats became opportunities for virile revenge, transforming 
ignominy into triumph and placing an emblematic failure within a greater story of 
success.25 The movie’s familiarization of the name Pearl Harbor, without specific historical 
content, made it into a mnemonic for well-known story outlines onto which 9/11 could be 
grafted. Victim became hero became patriot; harm was suffered, followed by struggle, 
then triumph. Pearl Harbor from the perspective of history was subtly heartening—it had, 
after all, been avenged. Official presidential pronouncements after 9/11 employed the 
frontier / Old West leitmotif, with its implicit assertion of eventual victory. On September 
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15th, George W. Bush swore, “we will find those who did it; we will smoke them out of 
their holes; we will get them running and we'll bring them to justice.”26 Two days later, he 
added, “I want justice. There's an old poster out west, as I recall, that said, ‘Wanted: Dead 
or Alive.’”27 The Pearl Harbor analogy also indicated a course of action. Lance Morrow, in 
Time magazine’s first issue after 9/11, held up a starting gate banner: “A day cannot live 
in infamy without the nourishment of rage. Let's have rage. What's needed is a unified, 
unifying, Pearl Harbor sort of purple American fury—a ruthless indignation that doesn't 
leak away in a week or two.”28 
The administration further capitalized on the 9/11–Pearl Harbor association by 
extending the analogy to World War II and its “war on terrorism.” The connection asserted 
the war on terror as the next great civilizational struggle, a successor to WWII and the 
Cold War: “What happened at Pearl Harbor was the start of a long and terrible war for 
America,” Bush pronounced.29  “Yet, out of that surprise attack grew a steadfast resolve 
that made America freedom's defender. And that mission—our great calling—continues to 
this hour, as the brave men and women of our military fight the forces of terror in 
Afghanistan and around the world.”30 The war of retaliation against the Afghanistan 
Taliban for providing safe harbor to al-Qaeda was followed by the war to depose Iraqi 
president Saddam Hussein. The invasions were rhetorically linked as part of the broader 
symbolic battle for democracy and “fundamental human freedoms.”31 Subsequent to both, 
Bush proclaimed, “we are again a nation at war. Once again, war came to our shores with 
a surprise attack that killed thousands in cold blood. Once again, we face determined 
enemies who follow a ruthless ideology that despises everything America stands for. 
Once again, America and our allies are waging a global campaign with forces deployed on 
virtually every continent. And once again, we will not rest until victory is America's and our 
freedom is secure.”32 The heroic framing of the war on terrorism was successful for only a 
short time, but its ability to produce long lasting consequences were in part to the 
persuasive allure of the earlier period.33  
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“War” itself was perhaps a useful mobilizing tool. Historian David H. Noon 
summarizes the common argument that Americans define themselves through wars, 
literally or figuratively, writing: "Strictly speaking, the idea of a ‘postwar’ American culture 
is unintelligible.”34 He refers not just to American military engagements, but also to the 
way that social policy versions of wars (on drugs, or the trade war with Japan) appear in 
the absence of a major mobilizing political and military agenda such as Korea, or the Cold 
War against Communism. Combining domestic and international counterterrorism into a 
“war on terrorism” comes in this tradition. The definition of victory has in these social 
policy campaigns has often been vague, which might be interpreted as intentional, a way 
to allow their continuation despite the lack of signs of advancement. The “War on Drugs” 
did not keep drugs from entering the US, nor away from the population. It was effective 
instead as way to get resources to law enforcement, as justification for international policy 
both related and unrelated to drugs, and a way of maintaining budget, equipment and 
personnel skills in the absence of major conflict.35  
While successful in these latter goals, withal, social policy campaigns do not 
mobilize government or society in the same way that a human enemy does. One retired 
narcotics agent, Jon, scoffed in an interview in early 2005 that the war on drugs was never 
a war: “[A]t most there was a heated skirmish. War when it is used that way is a political 
term. It's used when someone’s kid dies, to say 'we're doing something.' It’s a catchword, 
it says we’re putting forth maximum effort, joining together against a threat, a common 
enemy, or the source of a threat." Jon described it essentially as a rhetorical strategy. 
Casting domestic counterterrorism as war can then be partly understood in this tradition of 
American politics. Hence the history of presenting social policy as war is also a cautionary 
tale, given its limited effectiveness. 
Another reason to frame the “war on terror” through World War II is the prodigious 
prestige the latter has acquired, notable in an extensive “memory boom.”36 Messy 
actuality cannot compete with the rosy glow of memory and moral certainty yielded by the 
editing of time and nostalgia. A suitable distance in the past, that war seemed to fill a 
romantic void for which Vietnam and social policy programs were unfit. Studs Terkel’s 
Pulitzer Prize winning “The Good War” (1984), Tom Brokaw’s television series “The 
Greatest Generation,” a long series of Stephan Ambrose books (including “Citizen 
Soldiers, Band of Brothers, The Wild Blue, and D-Day, as well as five edited volumes, 
contributions to six essay collections, forwards to 18 books written by others, and a 2001 
calendar”), among innumerable other examples, gave proof to a huge market for World 
War II before September 11, 2001.37 Museums and memorials were dedicated, and 
movies such as Saving Private Ryan (1998) were produced. The Arts and Entertainment 
Network identified such a strong trend that they established the History Channel, “an 
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instant hit.”38 Trenchantly, “Documentaries about the World War II era proved so popular 
and pervasive that some channel surfers satirically dubbed it the "Hitler-Channel."39 
Rough edges were smoothed over in the transformation of World War II into 
resonant American mythology. Before this happened, Pearl Harbor was for years 
discussed as a failure of the American people. The Lynchburg News’s early self-
chastisement (“our blindness, our provincialism, our complacency, even our ignorance as 
a people”) was later echoed by President Truman’s pronouncement that “the country as a 
whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take adequate 
measures to defense [sic] until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure to 
do so.”40 As late as 1979, Vice President Walter Mondale remarked that the United States 
and other nations “failed the test of civilization” by not doing more, sooner, for European 
refugees.”41 After Pearl Harbor, industrial, government and civilian resources began to be 
mobilized, but as historian Gordon W. Prange admonished, “one must not exaggerate the 
type of unity the Japanese bestowed upon the Americans. The entire nation had not 
suddenly become of a unanimous mind,” but rather “the national energies had mobilized 
to achieve a single, readily identifiable goal.”42 In the words of one Roosevelt opponent, “It 
is the feeling of the man in the street that he tricked us into this war.”43 Roosevelt had 
campaigned on the promise of not entering a “foreign war,” underplaying that a domestic 
strike would of course make it an American war. Decrying such verbal subtlety as 
chicanery, his detractors developed the “backdoor theory,” that “the president and his 
advisors had schemed to provoke Japan, deliberately withheld any warning, and 
orchestrated a massive coverup.”44 A long series of investigations stemmed partially from 
this theory, partially from the fact that blame was assigned to the responsible military 
commanders, whom many claimed were scapegoated. These results were to have a 
direct impact on the 9/11 Commission.45  
The notable point here is that entrance into World War II and the war itself were 
still subject to critique. Since that time, World War II has been imbued with unassailable 
morality. The enormity of Holocaust lent support to a simplified national self-narrative, in 
which the United States was goaded into action by Pearl Harbor, but in fact entered the 
war to save the Jews. As Noon points out, however, “the centrality of the Holocaust in 
American popular memory of World War II was belated, linked more to the events of the 
1960s, bracketed by the trial of Adolph Eichmann in 1961 and the Six-Day War in 1967.46 
US actions were enfolded in another American narrative, “of a nation that summons its 
economic and military strength to create a better world,” or in the words of President G.W. 
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Bush, prefers “greatness to power and justice to glory.”47 World War II would not have 
been so appealing as a motivational metaphor for the war on terrorism if it had not, as 
Christopher Hayes argues, been “scrubbed clean of its moral complexity. There is no 
mention of American big business financing the build-up of the Nazi war machine, no 
America First campaign determined not to shed American blood for European Jews, no 
firebombing of civilians in Dresden.”48  
In addition to providing a symbolic lineage, viewing 9/11 through the prism of Pearl 
Harbor and World War II had other, heuristic effects. The emotive connection with history 
was politically advantageous, aiding to push through a Bush-administration agenda, but, 
clearly, that history also influenced perceptions about what needed to change and how. 
Much governmental and scholarly understanding of what constitutes intelligence failure 
and its causes has been developed through analysis of World War II. James Wirtz, in a 
review article comparing responses to both attacks, noted, "The Pearl Harbor experience, 
especially the history of the investigations that followed and Wohlstetter’s (1962) seminal 
study Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, exerted an important influence on the way 
scholars and officials approached the post mortem of the September 11 tragedy."49 
Intelligence Failure 
The 9/11 Commission, a primary player in actualizing manifold singularities into a 
recognizable event, tried to avoid the accusations of scapegoating and partisanship that 
had hounded the Pearl Harbor investigation by producing a unanimous report. At the 
same time, they purposefully set out to do what Roberta Wohlstetter had recommended in 
her study on surprise and intelligence, which was to produce documentation of the 
historical context within which decisions were made and facts interpreted. Wohlstetter’s 
main points, echoed by many others, were drawn from reams of Pearl Harbor archives. 
They can also be found everywhere from public pronouncements by the Executive cabinet 
to the Commission’s report. This view of intelligence, its possibilities and limits, was what 
resulted in changes in law enforcement and criminal intelligence. 
The verdict pronounced on September 11th was repeated in newspapers the 
following day: “the failure to penetrate the plot in advance constitutes ‘an intelligence 
failure,’” said the vice chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, Alabama Senator 
Richard C. Shelby.50 Those hesitant to jump the gun seemed nonetheless in counterpoint 
to this dominant narrative. The chairman of the intelligence committee, Florida democratic 
Senator Bob Graham, “told reporters that it was ‘premature’ to label the lack of warning as 
an intelligence failure. But Mr. Graham conceded that there were ''ongoing weaknesses 
that we need to address in the intelligence community.”51 By October 7, it was stated that 
“In hindsight, it is becoming clear that the CIA, FBI and other agencies had significant 
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fragments of information that, under ideal circumstances, could have provided some 
warning if they had all been pieced together and shared rapidly.”52  
The intelligence failure label stuck, and on one level, the “failure” is 
straightforward: planes were successfully hijacked, crashed into buildings, and no one 
seemed to have known this would happen. What else could this be, but a failure, and if 
the intelligence community were the ones supposed to have information, surely they 
failed. Yet as the history of Pearl Harbor and its ten investigations in order to assign blame 
have indicated, such a conclusion is anything but uncomplicated. To begin, it is necessary 
to specify what those people asserting intelligence failure mean and how the causes of 
failure are understood. 
Anthropologist Rob Johnston studied analytical methods in the US intelligence 
community (comprised of sixteen members, each with multiple agencies, services, 
bureaus, and other organizations). From “489 interviews, direct observations, participant 
observations, and focus groups...” as well as “personal letters, email exchanges, and 
archival material," he developed composite definitions for intelligence, analysis and 
intelligence failure.53 Johnston reported that for his informants, “Intelligence errors are 
factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting from poor or missing data; intelligence failure is 
systemic organizational surprise resulting from incorrect, missing, discarded, or 
inadequate hypotheses."54 One can make a decision between two options and be wrong. 
But if something entirely different happens and one is surprised, then intelligence has 
failed. The literature on intelligence failure is, in point of fact, that of "strategic surprise." 
Parker and Stern’s review of this literature found that (paraphrasing)  "strategic surprise" 
is the abrupt revelation that one has been working with a faulty threat perception 
regarding an acute, imminent danger posed by a foreign threat to core national values, 
which often occurs after being victimized by an attack or a sudden shift in the security 
environment.55 Breaking this down, "first, the attack is contrary to the victim’s 
expectations; second, there is a failure of advanced warning; and third, the attack lays 
bare the lack of adequate preparation."56  
Roberta Wohlstetter’s 1962 book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision sifted 
through what information had been available before that attack, the way it was organized, 
and the bureaucratic structure, in order to figure out how and why the United States had 
been surprised by the Japanese raid. "If our intelligence system and all our other channels 
of information failed to produce an accurate image of Japanese intentions and 
capabilities,” she observed, “it was not for want of relevant materials. Never before have 
we had so complete an intelligence picture of the enemy." (The same has been noted in 
even stronger language about 9/11.)57 Rather than a lack of information, the problem is 
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that it is "much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals. After 
the event, of course, a signal is always crystal clear; we can see now what disaster it was 
signaling, since the disaster has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and pregnant 
with conflicting meanings."58 Some percentage of failure, she concluded, is inherent to the 
practice of intelligence. 
Wohlstetter wrote that she was "concerned almost exclusively with the facts of 
warning and surprise and their implications for today." To wit, her focus was what could be 
gleaned about the practice of intelligence, and indirectly, the proper implications for policy. 
Rosenberg, in her timeline of what Pearl Harbor has variously meant, writes that when 
Wohlstetter’s book was published, “Implicitly, her thesis backed post-Bay of Pigs 
proposals for a more active, better funded intelligence agency, an agenda that her 
husband, security analyst Albert Wohlstetter, advocated over the next decade as he 
warned against underestimating the Soviet threat.”59 At least as significant as support for 
an already-common Cold War view, however, was the inference that if failure is evitable, 
one must aim for preparedness. Wirtz notes,  
The idea that a secure-second strike force must ride out a nuclear attack and 
survive, an extraordinarily expensive and problematic standard of effectiveness, 
became a centerpiece of US nuclear deterrent strategy. Wohlstetter’s 
message…suggested to policy makers that it was easier and more prudent to 
protect weapons systems from a nuclear-armed adversary than to count on policy 
makers, analysts, and military commanders to respond effectively to signals of 
impending attack.60 
The recommendations on intelligence and preparedness stemming from the Pearl Harbor 
investigations and subsequent review have been repeated nearly verbatim in analyses of 
9/11: reorganize intelligence, create a central authority and so forth. Yet by dint of verbal 
contortions, the authors of the 9/11 Commission Report did not label 9/11 an intelligence 
failure; the phrase did not appear in their 585 page document. Instead, after quoting 
Wohlstetter on the inherent difficulty of sorting data, they wrote, “we asked ourselves, 
before we judged others, whether the insights that seem apparent now would really have 
been meaningful at the time, given the limits of what people then could reasonably have 
known or done. We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, 
policy, capabilities, and management.”61 Even if the 9/11 Truth Movement conspiracy 
theorists are correct and no one in power was actually surprised because they had 
orchestrated a media event to push a war agenda, the Commission’s missing “failure” 
bears further consideration. 
Mindful of the troubled Pearl Harbor investigations, the Commission hoped to 
produce a document that was analytically precise and judgmentally vague. The 
investigation avoided localizing blame not only in individuals, but also in the system, as 
that could lead to blame on those who had not changed the system in the Clinton or Bush 
administrations. The generous reading of this decision on the Commission’s part is that 
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blame would lead to accusations of partisanship, and impede efforts at improvement. By 
“not identifying individuals whose acts of omission or commission directly contributed to 
the success of the al Qaeda attacks, and…not creating a list of failures that could be used 
as the basis of a political indictment of any government organization or administration,” 
the country could focus on fixing the problems themselves.62 In order to walk this thin line, 
and refrain from assigning accountability, the 9/11 Commission took up academic 
discussions such as Wohlstetter’s about the inherent limitations of intelligence.  
Critics did not have a generous reading, and the evaluation of the Commission’s 
position as rational or only expedient depends on if the danger of al Qaeda was clear 
enough that inaction was negligence. If so, specific people could be held accountable. For 
Pearl Harbor, two people were found officially negligent and removed from duty, and 
General George C. Marshall, then Army Chief of Staff and a celebrated hero, was 
severely criticized. In relation to individual responsibility, Wirtz, among many others, 
makes the case that intelligence analysts and “policy makers prior to September 11 were 
even better informed about their potential opponent’s intentions than their counterparts in 
the Roosevelt administration.”63 One critique of the Commission’s report notes "Tellingly, 
the historical and analytical sections of the commission’s report do not indicate or argue 
that the US government was improperly organized prior to 9/11."64 Arguing structural 
problems and individual negligence, Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism when the attacks occurred, writes:  
Somewhere in the CIA there was information that two known al Qaeda terrorists 
had come into the United States. Somewhere in FBI there was information that 
strange things had been going on at flight schools in the United States...red lights 
and bells should have been going off. They had specific information about 
individual terrorists from which one could have deduced what was about to 
happen.65  
 
Successful “surprise” attacks are understood to be avoidable and yet inevitable. Any given 
failure could have been avoided if the right actions were taken, but it is impossible to 
always take the right actions. Ephraim Kam, a political scientist and analyst in the Israeli 
Department of Defense, surmises along the lines of Wohlstetter that "it is doubtful whether 
one can ever really determine who is to be blamed for estimate failure. On the one hand 
analysts and decision makers are interdependent and share responsibility for failure; on 
the other, since surprise attack is common, indeed almost inevitable, it is questionable 
whether anybody should be blamed for the failure to prevent it."66 The litany of missed 
opportunities to stop the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon grew 
quickly after the attacks: hijackers known by the CIA to be terrorists were given US visas 
by an unsuspecting State Department; a report had come from Arizona that middle 
easterners with radical ideology were learning how to fly; ten out of nineteen hijackers 
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were identified but no one thought to not let them on the plane—procedure was only to 
hold their bags until they had boarded. The list goes on. 
While in retrospect these omissions or malfunctions stand out, at the time, the 
argument goes, correct prioritization was not possible. Kam discusses the difficulty in 
eliminating errors in intelligence estimates, but he reminds that the “failure to prevent a 
surprise attack does not evolve overnight’” nor is it “the result of any single factor…[or] 
mistakes committed on any one level.”67 A singular incident and organizational failure 
have different temporalities, a point which is intuitively grasped. It is therefore not so easy 
to blame the actors who did not change the structure and laws guiding the intelligence 
community. There was, however, a way to put the system on alert. The key actors are 
held accountable by positing that if they had given ample generalized warning that 
something dire was going to occur, and put the whole system on alert in the manner of the 
millennium threat, 9/11 could have been averted. This moves the failure, or cause of 
surprise, from faulty intelligence operations and organization to the implementation of 
policy. The counterpoint is that the people in charge must weigh “known” versus only 
potential costs. “Commanders,” Wirtz observes, are “hampered by a sensitivity to the 
known costs of maintaining a heightened state of readiness, such as loss of training time 
and wear and tear on equipment and personnel, compared to the potential costs of enemy 
action."68 He adds, "no method has been devised to overcome the basic problem 
Wohlstetter identified more than 40 years ago: Warnings will always appear to be 
ambiguous, if not dubious, while the costs of responding to the possibility of enemy action 
will be clear and high."69  
The 9/11 Commission, resolute, refused to evaluate if someone should have taken 
general actions to step up security in the face of clear warnings that something was going 
to happen. On the absence of preventative security measures, Richard Falkenrath 
contended that this constituted “failures of performance by specific government officials, 
whom the commission elected not to criticize directly."70 Political scientist Amy Zegart 
countered by arguing that too much attention has been paid to individual failure, and it is 
instead necessary to change pathologies in either structure and organization, or “culture.” 
The efforts of Zegart to shift the focus away from individual blame could be seen as 
biased in that she studied under Condoleezza Rice, the US National Security Advisor from 
2001–2005. (Zegart’s work, however, had always been on the bureaucracy of national 
security agencies.) For those who felt that government procedures had not kept pace with 
the world, the silver lining in the destruction of potent American symbols was the space for 
change that was opened. “America,” lamented Richard Clarke, “seems only to respond 
well to disasters, to be undistracted by warnings."71 Immune to suggestions of her own 
culpability, National Security Advisor Rice found it “tragic” that it sometimes happens that 
“until there is a catastrophic event that forces people to think differently, that forces people 
to overcome all customs and old culture and old fears about domestic intelligence and the 
relationship, that you don't get that kind of change.”72  
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The “old fears about domestic intelligence” were of course rooted in a long history 
of law enforcement abuses, but the Bush administration capitalized on the moment to 
push through both structural and legislative changes. Two significant approaches 
prevailed: preparedness and prevention, especially through preemption. The latter idea, 
advanced through the PATRIOT Act, would have its far-reaching implications for law 
enforcement. Turning the metaphor of global war into domestic practices proved 
contentious, in fact, as did the role of the Pentagon in enacting those changes. Zegart 
placed much of the blame for bureaucracies failure to adapt to a changing world and the 
need for a new approach, even after the attacks, at the Department of Defense: “There's a 
reason why no president since Harry S. Truman has gotten serious about overhauling 
intelligence agencies through executive orders or legislation. It's called the Pentagon. For 
decades, the Defense Department has controlled about 80 percent of the intelligence 
budget and housed most of the agencies. And for decades, it has fiercely resisted any 
move to realign power in the CIA or anywhere else.”73  
The “war on terrorism,” Jon, the former narcotics agent commented,  "is against 
people. It’s a war model. We always prosecuted the war on drugs as criminal justice, 
locking people up and taking them to jail, not killing them. It was a criminal model.” The 
criminal justice model does not tend to produce the kind of black and white case that 
lends itself to patriotic fervor or later, nostalgic devotion. This boded poorly for its status as 
a generational crusade. “Whatever the natural similarities between December 7, 1941, 
and September 11, 2001,” Christopher Hayes remarked in connecting the World War II 
adulation with the War in Iraq, “the association of the two has led us to convert—first in 
rhetoric, later in fact—a battle against a small band of clever, murderous fundamentalists 
into a worldwide war of epic scale.”74 The rhetoric gradually began to shift, even during the 
Bush administration, and police as well. This led to alternatives such “global 
counterinsurgency” abroad, and more subtly, a focus on security, rather than danger, at 
home.75 The legislation that had been passed, however, remained in place, including 
government powers related to surveillance, searches and habeas corpus, precisely at the 
elided war–crime nexus to which Jon pointed.  
After the September 11th attacks, Zegart began studying the intelligence 
community’s previous design and subsequent reorganization. She combed through twelve 
government-commissioned reviews of the intelligence system between the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the fall of 2001, and concluded that there was “surprising agreement on 
four major problems.”76 The intelligence community lacked a sense of community, the 
personnel systems did not encourage personnel to develop the right skills or to share 
information with each other, the system for setting intelligence priorities was weak and—
most germane to this dissertation—there was simply insufficient human intelligence.  
Terrorism as crime? 
The FBI, by mandate, was responsible for domestic terrorism. The problem was 
the infamous “wall” between its investigative functions that ended in the criminal justice 
system, and an ideally preventative intelligence process. Six years into the reorganization 
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of the intelligence community, “The ‘new FBI’ is still fighting the old FBI's cops-and-
robbers culture,” Zegart admonished, with descriptive examples: 
Visit the bureau's Web site, where job postings are divided into two categories—
special agents who wear badges, carry guns and catch bad guys, and everyone 
else. Analysts, those dot-connectors who since 9/11 have been touted as equal 
partners in the FBI's counterterrorism mission, are still relegated to "professional 
support staff," alongside auto mechanics and janitors.77 
Privileging criminal cases had another effect. The reputation of FBI agents as “men of 
action,” was partly the legacy of J. Edgar Hoover’s public relations machine. He “worked 
assiduously to develop a culture and image of FBI agents... In 1935 alone, 65 movies 
featured the FBI. All of them glorified FBI agents as intrepid heroes, guns in hand, who 
worked the streets to solve crimes and always got their man."78 The problem, as one FBI 
agent put it me, was “we don’t know anyone. Local cops, they know everyone.” 
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Chapter Six. Collecting the Dots 
“Every terrorism case that I’ve ever worked has been started by a patrolman,” 
Jerome, the deputy director of the fusion center told me. We were in his office, the door 
shut to keep out the sound of the flat screen TV tuned to FOX news. “It has always been a 
patrolman,” he went on. “It is not going to be your FBI agent, your CIA officer reporting 
these things to you and saying, ‘here is the bad guy.’” Jerome’s comment summed up the 
logic of integrating state and local law enforcement into homeland security. His belief, 
based on personal experience, attains the status of general truth as it ascends 
government circles. “We all know that it won’t be a bureaucrat in Washington who will 
thwart the next terrorist attack,”1 was how Representative Jane Harmon (D-CA) put it at a 
House Subcommittee hearing. 
[A] diligent police or sheriffs' officer somewhere in America—during the course of 
his or her daily work—will see something or someone out of place, and guided by 
timely, accurate and actionable information, will connect the dots that will unravel a 
plot in-the-making.2 
"We have to collect and connect the dots," added California’s Executive Director of 
Homeland Security. The job, he extrapolated, belonged to cops and analysts.3  
The government-wide plan for “collecting and connecting the dots” is called the 
National Information Sharing Environment Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (ISE-
SAR).4 Suspicious Activity Reports are inputs of information to a larger, comprehensive 
project to coordinate “policies, rules, standards, architectures, and systems.” The goal is 
to produce a unified information system, rather than one divided along the lines of 
government bureaucracies. The concept of operations is that cops describe suspicious 
activities, potentially terrorist-related, in reports. These are sent to analysts at regionally 
run fusion centers, nodes in the national system. Analysts put pieces together and search 
for links. Data are vetted, standardized and, if deemed relevant to a terrorism nexus, 
distributed in the environment. Follow-up is generally done by the FBI, which holds 
responsibility for domestic terrorism, perhaps in conjunction with the reporting entity. The 
picture drawn of real-world organizations and their plots are supposed to be relayed back 
down the line in a form which state and local law enforcement can use to prioritize their 
own resources and counter threats. In the words of the Director of Homeland Security 
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Janet Napolitano in 2009, a “seamless network of information-sharing” will create a 
“seamless web of security.”5 Knowledge will keep us safe. 
Safe, though, from what? Although the Information Sharing Environment program 
emphasizes that it is not “building a massive new information system,”6 rather leveraging 
what already exists, it is nonetheless an investment. Creating a seamless web to “detect, 
prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the territory, 
people, and interests of the United States of America” might be seen as a profligate 
response to attacks that succeeded in killing three thousand people,7 but not three 
hundred thousand, or three million. Inadequate health, education, standard of living and 
opportunity cause more harm to a greater numbers of people. In a world of limited means, 
the allocation of resources amounts to an ethical decision. More pointedly, the system 
itself has been decried as a threat. When legal barriers to domestic surveillance have 
been lowered to address security concerns, historically the result has been a coincident 
breach of civil liberties. Even before counterterrorism duties and authority are added to the 
mix between local police and the public, relations are often tense. What justifies such a 
system, when the odds are greater that one will be killed by a car, or a police officer, than 
a terrorist? 
Mortality, however, was not the metric of September 11th. No one thought that the 
United States population level was threatened. Routine violence, from accidents to fatal 
disputes, inevitably kills many people, but its toll is proportional to the number of acts. 
Such violence too is viscidly familiar. Even the almost cyclical occurrences of police 
transgression, now often captured on video, are part of the quotidian rather than the 
exceptional. The danger of the attacks was understood as existential, but existential to a 
multiform set of values, a “way of life,” a political system. In the specter of terrorism with 
nuclear weapons or contagious, fatal disease, social and mortal fears are melded. Mass 
casualty terrorism may be “unlikely,” but probability is not a useful calculation if the rare 
event is regarded as too horrific to let happen. The creation of an “information sharing 
environment” was an approach that developed when a probabilistic calculus of risk, and a 
deterministic relationship between the present and the future, became understood as 
inadequate to dangers with asymmetrical consequences.8  
The metaphor of dots codifies an otherwise infinite and messy realm of objects, 
people, interactions and behaviors. Units of action, objects, or behaviors can be 
documented, categorized, transferred, and assessed. They are pieces of the present, and 
future, which once discerned as such are available for intervention. It is a deft 
conceptualization of reality for the digital age. Yet vexingly, we are “drowning in data, but 
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starving for knowledge,” constantly trying to clamber out of “data tombs.”9 The continuous 
accumulation of more data does not provide a solution. The reason is because knowledge 
is not the opposite of ignorance, but complementary to it. As the amount there is to know 
increases, the amount one doesn’t know grows in tandem. As information accumulates, 
so do possibilities, and therefore uncertainty about the future and what to do. Yet the 
world has not, in fact, ground to a halt. Clearly, other ways of making decisions have been 
employed.  
The goal of the Information Sharing Environment is not to prevent or prepare for 
an already-actualized event, such as another airplane attack. Ideally the ISE seeks to 
avoid “legacy futures,” old conceptions of the future that constrain planning to imaginable 
events.10 “Terrorists don’t do movie plots,” as one security expert put it.11 Concretely, or at 
the real-world level of actions that become dots of data, the ISE cannot and does not quite 
aim to escape them, as we will see. Yet it does not constrict or limit the ever-growing 
mountains of data either. Instead, the ISE is designed to function as an agile assemblage 
that makes accessible the potential of data to discern a threat, even if its shape is 
unknown.12 If information is composed of infinite dots, and within these are contained the 
potential of the future, the problem becomes how to pick out the significant ones. “What is 
significant” refers to sites where intervention is possible, across a wide range of registers. 
Strategy and operations present different temporalities and modes of action, as do local 
police department and national security agencies. There are also differences, 
unsurprisingly, between theory and practice. 
This chapter is about the role of the police in the Information Sharing Environment. 
That is to say, it is about the use of law enforcement in intelligence gathering, and the 
inherent friction caused by a group with one set of rules and objectives being given a task 
that is governed by a different set of rules and objectives. The first step is the collection of 
information. “Suspicious activity” may be called in by someone, or observed in the course 
of duty. Cops, who are assumed to have experiential expertise in suspicious behaviors 
related to crime, are expected to learn those pertaining to terrorism. What constitutes an 
indicator of terrorism, and how a cop is supposed to recognize it, are two problems the 
ISE has aimed to resolve.  
*** 
In Jerome’s office, he continued his explanation of state and local law 
enforcement’s role in counterterrorism: 
It is always a local cop who saw something. On face value, a guy with a bunch of 
stolen credit cards may be an insignificant thing. The officers book him for that, 
forget it, walk away, let him do his probation. They don’t realize that while he’s out 
on probation, he’s raising money for a terrorist group. A lot of the officers have a 
misconception about what terrorism-related crimes are, because there is such a 
broad range of items it can be, other than just the guy out there doing the scouting, 
or the guy purchasing chemicals to make the bomb.  
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Terrorism involves an enormous network of people. Basically a whole network is 
supplying one person, who may do a terrorist mission. To be able to do that, there 
is an incredible amount of work that needs to be done. There are people supplying 
them with money, supplying them with locations to live, basic food, clothing. It is a 
large network to take care of everything from the logistics of the people going out 
there and actually finding a good target, to locating that, to setting up the 
preparations in order to get the folks trained overseas.  
Four ways that state and local cops are deputized in domestic counterterrorism are 
enfolded in Jerome’s description, and will be laid out in order. First, law enforcement can 
directly track the movement of funds. Financial investigations, by focusing on the money, 
offer a pathway that law enforcement can follow back to different kinds of crimes. Some of 
the ways that funds are raised, such as charitable donations, would be perfectly legitimate 
except for their end use. Criminality therefore depends on whether the recipient is a 
“designated terrorist organization.” This technicality has practical consequences. Second, 
cops are supposed to remain alert to signs of a possible connection to terrorism in the 
crimes they investigate. A “guy with a bunch of stolen credit cards” is committing an 
ordinary crime.13 What is clear in this case is that the act is criminal in and of itself. If 
stolen credit cards are used to raise “money for a terrorist group,” then he has committed 
the additional crime of terrorism financing.14 Third, in the course of answering service calls 
or otherwise maintaining the peace, cops should similarly look for indications of terrorism.  
The fourth and trickiest category is documenting “people going out there and 
actually finding a good target.” “All around the world,” protested one blogger, “cops and 
rent-a-cops are vigorously enforcing nonexistent anti-terrorist bans on photography in 
public places.”15 Public outcry and the poor results of “racial” profiling have led to the 
perhaps equally contentious, and difficult to separate solution of behavioral surveillance. 
Ostensibly ordinary behaviors present the same kind of shift in the locus of illegality as 
charitable fundraising: it is not the means but the end that count as crime. Separated from 
criminality, however, the indicators are largely activities protected by the First 
Amendment. There is no parallel to the “terrorist organization” designation, so the cop 
must conjecture suspect motive and intent.  
Money Trails 
 Terrorist plots get the most attention, Jerome told me, but fundraising crimes and 
laundering the proceeds are more constant and widespread problems. Under federal law, 
money laundering is “the flow of cash or other valuables derived from, or intended to 
facilitate, the commission of a criminal offense. It is the movement of the fruits and 
instruments of crime.”16  
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“Millions of dollars here in the United States, and especially from here in California, 
are going overseas to support terrorism activities,” Jerome went on. 
Right now we’re like a bucket with a bunch of holes in it, and money is just flowing 
from this country, from this state. Often times people who are experts in terrorism 
will say the reason they feel that California hasn’t been hit by a major terrorist 
attack is because it would disrupt the flow of money to the Middle East—or to the 
Philippines or to Sri Lanka or to Afghanistan or to Iraq. So, I hate to believe it, but it 
kind of makes sense.  
He touches on what has been called the "don’t-bite-the-hand-that-feeds-you” theory," that 
terrorist groups in the US are “unlikely to mount attacks within that country’s borders for 
fear of losing lucrative funding streams.”17 On the other hand, the "presence-equals-threat 
theory" holds that "the groups fundraising or providing support functions within the country 
present a viable and immediate threat to the United States as those support networks 
could easily go operational."18 Both ways, financial misdeeds can provide entry to a fuller 
terrorism investigation, as they have for other crimes for decades. “Looking at money 
laundering is a counternarcotics tactic,” a DEA agent told me, “and now drugs and 
terrorism are being fought the same way.” A retired IRS criminal investigator explained 
how, at least for domestic counterterrorism, this had taken place over the course of his 
career. 
All asset forfeiture prior to ‘83 was done by the IRS. To address proliferation of 
drug activity, we took away assets. No laws allowed for that except for tax 
purposes. US Title 26 granted the IRS this right, but no one else. So back then, 
the IRS had agents working DEA cases, FBI cases. A number of my friendships 
were developed in those days. Then came along Title 18 and 21, criminal 
procedure section 881 and 981. These granted DEA and FBI the right to seize 
assets. States followed suite, and passed legislation so that their police could 
seize assets.  
The changes in assets forfeiture he described had many repercussions, dispersing the 
tactic of financial investigation and incentivizing its use for pet expenditures such as 
cutting-edge equipment. The relationships formed as a result of collaboration on cases 
remained important: a truism but one especially pertinent in law enforcement. The crime 
arena is legally compartmentalized into missions and permissible investigative tools. This 
is one of the reasons for physical co-location in taskforces and fusion centers. Creating 
interagency personal relationships is another: cooperation and exchange work on the 
basis of trust.  
I asked IRS investigator, “Did terrorism come up, back in the 80s and 90s?” He 
responded. 
The way terrorism came up was in airport seizures. When someone would come in 
with a valise of money, at the time, screeners wouldn’t stop people, but they could 
notify us. If the passenger was on an outbound international plane, we’d wait. 
They’d close the plane, take away the walkway, and then we’d have them put it 
                                                
17 Siobhan O’Neil, "Terrorist Precursor Crimes: Issues and Options for Congress," (Congressional 
Research Service, 2007), 23. 
18 Ibid. 
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back, board and say, “Is this yours?” We’d take the cash and put it in the general 
fund. There are bills, trust funds for each area—Social Security, transportation, 
and so forth.  
This was all pre-9/11. One of the things we noticed while we were doing airport 
seizures is that we found “negotiable instruments.” Those are demand deposits—a 
check is a good example. We were finding huge amounts of demand deposits, on 
flights to places like Singapore and Pakistan. We started looking at where it was 
coming from. It was charitable organizations, hotels, liquor stores. Hotels with zero 
occupancy. Who owned the hotels? Were they front companies? What were they 
doing? Laundering money from criminal pursuits. Some money, to some places, 
tips you off. 
Following the money is done by an analyst who might be part of a fusion center, assigned 
to a task force, or part of a dedicated bureau at a number of federal agencies. Suspicious 
Activity Reports are a well-established practice in this arena. Investigations generally 
begin with suspicious transactions, which banks are required to report. There are many of 
these, and follow-up is often described as tedious, dull work. “Working financial crimes 
has always been an issue,” Jerome noted, “because it is not sexy.”  
There is what is called a “high-intensity financial crimes area” or HIFCA. We send 
our analysts to the meetings. What they are mainly doing is reviewing suspicious 
activity reports, SARs and Cash Transaction Reports, CTRs. For anything 
involving over $10,000, a CTR is required. Now, there could be no CTR, but the 
person in the bank identifies a suspicious trend in cash transactions. They will fill 
out a suspicious activity report. For example, people coming in doing multiple 
deposits of $9,999, keeping under the limit. Or having a business that wouldn’t 
quite generate over a million dollars or some extreme amount of money within a 
few weeks, and it just doesn’t look right to the person in the bank. They send all 
these SARs in, and the HIFCA collects them. And they give them out to the 
analysts to go through the information and process it, and see exactly, “OK, we’ve 
got this person with this business, is it possible they really are making the money 
with this business? Or do they have some type of income that would explain this 
amount of money going through their business or their account?” Analysts look 
into that, and then they put together a little profile of the person and the business, 
and see if these match. They try to see what previous transactions the person has 
done, if there are CTRs or SARS, to see if there is a pattern or a trend. At that 
point, the analyst goes and takes it to the HIFCA committee.  
The procedures form a well-defined process for discerning a racket. It is perfectly legal to 
have cash transactions over $10,000. Deciding that something is amiss is a judgment the 
analyst makes, based on experience. She begins with a set of reports and evaluates if the 
activity could be explained by normal business practice. Information is compared with 
what the analyst considers to be non-criminal patterns. If it cannot be reasonably 
matched, she will look to see if it forms a known pattern of crime. Parts of the process, 
such as beginning from a lead and the prominence of human judgment, should be noted, 
because newer, computer-based types of analysis are critiqued for changes in these 
aspects. 
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Criminal funding of course does not go only through the regular financial system, 
to which Jerome ascribed “a number of problems tracking that money because they are 
very smart at moving it.” 
There are people body-packing [cash]. There are people shipping out what we 
used to call “the black market peso,” which is shipping out the product rather than 
cash. We have seen a number of terrorist groups that do that. It is easier to move, 
say, a clothing item or a high tech product out of the country than it is to move the 
equal value in cash. So they will move these items out and transfer them to other 
parts of the world as cash. And over there, they will be changed into an item that 
they can use, or they’ll purchase equipment. There are hawalas too that have 
been set up throughout the US, transmitting money. Along those lines, it is mainly 
this large network of support that we see and target here.  
“We have this major problem,” Jerome elaborated, “where people are moving money, 
insane amounts of money in obvious scams. I wish I could give you some of the details on 
some of the things that they do.” 
“Maybe there is something that was already in the news that you could talk 
about?” Jerome obliged with a commonly mentioned counterterrorism bugaboo. 
The charitable organizations, I’ll go into those. We had a number of charitable 
organizations that were operating throughout the country, for Muslim aid. Which I 
am all for—charity and people getting the support they need to—but the problem is 
you can’t differentiate a lot of times when the money goes over seas, how much 
goes to support the charity work and how much goes to support the terrorism 
work, which is ugly. And that is even more muddied by Hezbollah, because it is a 
large political group in Lebanon. They are funding hospitals and clinics and things 
we like to see funded, but a portion of that money they are sending is also going to 
support people buying missiles, buying bombs and training people. So it is one of 
those Catch-22s. You don’t want to stop these groups from doing legitimate charity 
work, but it is hard to slow them down.  
The challenge with charities is that there is nothing illegal about fundraising itself. This is 
where the designation “foreign terrorist organization” becomes important. If the money can 
be connected to such an organization, the designation stands in for proving malfeasant 
motive and intent. Investigators have the basis for a case, and more tools at their 
disposal. The pattern of money flow does not reveal the crime, as it does for the 
suspicious activity reports. Rather, the money is a pathway investigators follow, which 
connects foreign terrorist organizations with domestic activities, and provides a site for 
intervention in the greater threat.  
 
Ordinary Crimes 
The link between crime and terrorism, from fraud schemes to cigarette smuggling, 
is generally accepted.19 The assumption, also accepted but less supported, is that given 
state, local and tribal officers’ “existing skill sets, legal authority to investigate and 
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prosecute such offenses, sheer numbers, and intimate familiarity with their jurisdictions,”20 
this nexus is the natural site for those groups to contribute. “Law enforcement and 
homeland security professionals,” according to the Information Sharing Environment 
literature, are in “the unique, yet demanding, position of identifying suspicious activities, 
behavior or materials as a byproduct or secondary element to a criminal enforcement or 
investigation activity.”21 Frank, a thirty-year narcotics officer, was another deputy director 
at the fusion center. He was tasked with producing strategy and working papers, while 
Jerome focused on operational administration. When I interviewed Frank, he told me a 
story about a house call. The incident occurred years before, but epitomizes the kind of 
contribution to counterterrorism it is hoped law enforcement will make. “I went to a 
townhouse to try to find a runaway girl,” he began. 
Her mother rang up saying her daughter was staying with this guy, who happened 
to be Iranian, but that has nothing to do with the story. She just rings up with this. 
We were concerned for the girl’s safety, and her mother was concerned. She felt 
that this gentleman was maybe physically violent with her daughter. Her daughter 
was fifteen, fifteen or sixteen. So, we went to the house. We had been there 
previously on domestic violence. In those days, they were “family-type disputes,” 
but were of a physical nature. So, we had some concern. We sent two officers and 
a sergeant. We went knocking on the door. The gentleman who opens the door 
was in his mid 30s.  He opened the door, we explained to him why we were there, 
“we’re looking for a runaway 15-year-old. He said, “Yeah, she’s here. Come on in.” 
So, we walked in the house and were going to try to get her to voluntarily go back 
to her mom’s house. She was at a point where she was ready to do that. As we 
accompanied her out the house, we walked through the kitchen, which was open 
on both ends, and I walked behind, as the cover officer. I was walking behind this 
officer who is a real veteran. We walked pass the stove and he looked at the stove 
to see what the guy was cooking, I imagine, just a side glance. I looked and 
recognized that he was free basing cocaine on the stove. The other officer didn’t 
recognize it. He just kept on going. And I said, “Sal, Sal! You see what he’s doing 
here? He’s cooking something.” “I don’t know what he’s cooking.” Sal had no 
experience in narcotics enforcement. So, we ultimately arrested this guy for 
possession of cocaine because he was freebasing right in front of us, or was 
preparing it. 
“Why did he let you in?” 
It’s amazing what people say yes to. I guess he thought he was all right, safe. If 
you think about, it fifty percent of us actually—I mean fifty percent of us who saw 
it—didn’t recognize it and had no idea what it was. So, you know, he was just as 
lucky as he was unlucky. Unlucky won out because he ended up going to jail that 
night. But that goes to the training. If Sal had had more experience or training on 
what it looks like to free base cocaine, he might have made that same observation. 
In this story, the cops were notified of the situation, which gave them cause to go to the 
house. The occupant invited them inside, giving them the right enter and observe. As it 
                                                
20 O’Neil, "Terrorist Precursor Crimes: Issues and Options for Congress," 23. 
21 "Information Sharing Environment (Ise) Functional Standard (Fs) Suspicious Activity Reporting 
(Sar)  Version 1.5," ed. Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) 
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turned out, the man was arrested on a drug-related charge. The idea, however, is that 
regardless of the outcome of a service visit or criminal incident, alert officers are in 
position to see anything suspicious. Frank continued. 
In traditional law enforcement, he goes to jail. We write a report. It goes to the DA 
[District Attorney], where there might be a press release. That’s it. And that may be 
all that’s needed. But if there’s a little bit more information to suggest that there 
might be a terrorism nexus—and I’m going beyond the fact that this guy happened 
to be Iranian, you know—perhaps some literature on the shelf that might have 
suggested a nexus to terrorism, anything like that. Where does that information 
go? 
Let’s take a heightened level of education and training. How about: recognizing 
that the fact that he’s got an under-aged female creates circumstances, but one of 
her concerns is “he says he is going to send me out of the country”? She really 
wanted to leave because he had been beating her. There could be human slavery 
involved here. OK, well, again, if you go to a larger perspective, is that a 
fundraising activity? Is there a nexus? Then there’s his ancestry: does his 
nationality have some importance? I don’t know. I’m not saying it does, but 
perhaps it does, or if it’s even, “I can’t tell,” where does that information then go? 
Theoretically, it would go up through the organization to a terrorism early-warning 
group and it would come to us [the fusion center].  
Frank illustrates common pro and con arguments for putting patrol officers in this 
counterterrorism role. Such service calls, not criminal investigations, are estimated to 
occupy four-fifths or more of patrol officers’ time.22 As conceptualized from the intelligence 
end, the man-hours consumed by service calls are advantageous. The time in contact 
with the community multiplied by the “sheer numbers” of cops make it more likely that they 
will happen upon the signs of pre-terrorism and foil a plot, disrupt the flow of money, or 
contribute intelligence about a larger terrorist network. For the suspicious activity report 
system, “peacekeeping” tasks are essential, although they are depreciated in a police 
hierarchy that rewards arrest statistics.23 The disparity suggests that changes in 
fundamental police administration, already long and unsuccessfully prescribed, would be 
necessary for this part of the SAR component of the Information Sharing Environment to 
succeed.  
Frank also mentions “literature on the shelf.” The Functional Standards for the 
Information Sharing Environment admit that criminal organizations’ “direct association with 
terrorism may be tenuous.”24 Cops’ extolled “existing skill set” is built on patrol duties and 
in the course of criminal investigations, so skill at spotting ostensible indications of 
terrorism needs to be taught. Based on the counterterrorism trainings offered through the 
fusion center where I worked, which drew on Bureau of Justice Assistance sanctioned 
courses from around the nation, officers are taught an abbreviated history of terrorism, 
and a shallow, occasionally preposterous version of Islam. They are offered little or no 
                                                
22 Rubén G. Rumbaut and Egon Bittner, "Changing Conceptions of the Police Role: A Sociological 
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23 Peter Moskos, "The Better Part of Valor: Court-Overtime Pay as the Main Determinant for 
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legal guidance on the civil liberties issues likely to arise. On the basis of these trainings, 
cops are asked to judge when possessing and reading religious pamphlets, a basic 
constitutional right, is suspicious. The emphasis, in the Functional Standards and in 
general police trainings, is on what Frank called “circumstances,” or technically, “attendant 
circumstances.”25 One course I attended suggested always documenting the incident, and 
then letting a terrorism liaison officer decide if the information should be funneled into the 
ISE system. This problem is compounded when there is no criminal context. 
 
Ordinary Behaviors. Field Contacts and Interviews 
The three law enforcement counterterrorism tactics described so far are: following 
the money, identifying a link to terrorism in a criminal scheme, and being alert for signs in 
the regular course of duty. In these scenarios, police involvement is sanctioned, and there 
are protocols that take the weight of complete discretion off officers’ hands. The fourth 
counterterrorism tactic that Jerome brought up, and the most elemental piece of the 
information sharing environment initiative, is less defined and leaves assignation of guilt to 
an officer’s sense of the situation. Cops, in Jerome’s earlier description, are positioned to 
see “the people going out there and actually finding a good target.” 
The first level of interaction with the public is variably called a field contact or field 
interview, depending on the nomenclature of the police or sheriff’s department. Filling out 
a Field Information, or FI, card is standard practice, not specific to counterterrorism 
operations. One cop who worked in a Northern California county sheriff’s office described 
it to me.  
Anytime you meet someone out in the field and you think you might run into them 
again, you would write up an FI card. Creating an incident would be the next level, 
and a report after that. An FI card would state that you had contact with so and so, 
when and how, if cooperative or not.  
He added, “If you’re being written up on an FI card you are already suspect.” There could 
be something suspicious about the interaction. He gave the example of a parolee who 
failed to identify himself as such, and once, an old man down in a gully with a young boy. 
I want to check what his prior was for. It’s more of a moral judgment. If anything’s a 
little odd, I document it, if the kid makes a complaint three years from now, you 
now have enough for a case. That is a lot of the reason you take an FI card, 
people hanging around—just in case later, you do have a robbery. 
There are regulations in place governing the interaction between a police officer 
and a member of the public. The nomenclature is not nationally standardized, but the 
categories are derived from federal judicial precedent, and are comparable. In a set of 
guidelines issued by a Texas police unit, for example, a “contact” is an encounter initiated 
by an officer in order to conduct an interview.26 An “interview” means questioning a person 
who is not suspected of criminal activity. In many situations responding to the officer is 
voluntary (not, however, in a car). If the person refuses to answer, that refusal alone is not 
                                                
25 Black's Law Dictionary, ed. Bryan A. Garner, 8th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2004). 
26 "Subject: Field Contacts, Number: 402/21," ed. State of Texas Alamo Community Colleges 
Police (2008). 
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enough for detention. An officer, though, has considerable leeway, as long as he or she is 
“able to point to specific suspicious conduct or circumstances that justify the detention.” 
Examples of these elements which would assist an officer in justifying a stop and 
detention are:  
1. The person is making evasive or furtive movements. 
2. The person fits a wanted notice. (BOLO)27  
3. The person is near the scene of a recently committed/reported crime.  
4. The person’s demeanor or presence is unusual for the time or the place.  
5. The officer has received information that the person is involved in criminal 
activity.  
6. In evaluating the person’s conduct or appearance, an officer can rely on his 
training and experience to determine whether or not the person is a suspect. 28  
The only real restriction, as example six makes evident, is that the officer be “able to 
explain the reason why a person was detained and interrogated.” As mentioned, the 
words used for these categories vary, and what the Texas unit called detention and 
interrogation would be a field interview (FI) in other regions. The requirements are the 
same. 
He does not need to point to any one thing that alone would justify his action but 
should refer to several things, each of which when taken alone may seem 
harmless, but when considered together by an officer who is trained or 
experienced in detecting criminal activity, raises a reasonable suspicion of a 
person’s involvement in criminal activity.  
An officer who initiates contact with someone in order to produce a Suspicious Activity 
Report is directed to follow these same guidelines. 
An incident is the next level up in official reporting. “A call for service, any 911 call, 
takes some kind of documentation, even a 911 hang-up.” The dispatcher perforce files 
them. The officer from the sheriff’s department explained, “a dispatcher pulls up a name, 
and can see an incident and an FI card, both of these can be pulled up.” As another cop 
told me, “All police work, if you can’t write it, it didn’t happen.” If it is written, it becomes 
part of an archive. The archive is used to keep track of people, those who have committed 
crimes or (and this is the significant bridge) seem like they might commit crimes. These 
contacts between officers and the public, along with minor crimes, 911 calls, and 
overnight bookings are entered into computer databases as text, images, maps and other 
media, becoming “data” and the building blocks of homeland security’s intelligence 
infrastructure. All of these tiny, actual events add up. 
The definition of suspicious activity in the second published ISE guidelines was 
observed behavior that is “reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to 
terrorism or other criminal activity." One assumption here is that there are a series of 
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recognizable preparations preliminary to an attack. A second assumption is that the 
policing management system in place has officers regularly patrolling an area, so that they 
are familiar with it. This may or may not be the case, depending on which policing theory 
guides officer management at a local department.  
The ISE functional directives provide criteria guidance for suspicious behaviors 
that should be documented. The first version provided an undifferentiated list. In response 
to criticism, a second version separated the behaviors into two categories, one of which 
was essentially criminal behavior that might also be related to terrorism, and the second of 
which was behavior that was noncriminal but might be related to terrorism: there’s nothing 
wrong with looking at a bridge unless your goal is to blow it up. The first, “Defined Criminal 
Activity and Potential Terrorism Nexus Activity” included: 
Breach/ Attempted Intrusion 
Misrepresentation 
Theft/ Loss/ Diversion 
Cyber Attack  
Sabotage/ Tampering/ Vandalism 
Expressed or Implied Threat 
Aviation Activity (in a manner reasonably suspicious or posing a threat) 
 
The second category was “Potential Criminal or Non-Criminal Activity Requiring Additional 
Fact Information During Investigation.”  
Eliciting Information 
Testing or Probing of Security 
Photography 
Observation/Surveillance 
Materials Acquisition/ Storage 
Acquisition of Expertise 
Weapons Discovery  
Sector-Specific Incident  
 
The additional qualification was that these actions must be exhibited “in a manner that 
would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person”. Addressing the complaints that had been 
made about the first version of the list which made no differentiation between criminal and 
noncriminal behaviors in terms of collecting and reporting information, a note was 
appended:  
These activities are generally First Amendment-protected activities and should not 
be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that 
support the source agency’s suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, 
but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, 
including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, 
national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that 
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create suspicion (although these factors may used as specific suspect 
descriptions).  
An ISE-SAR implementation project, in turn, developed a list of behaviors that officers on 
the street could use to code their reports. These attracted more attention than any aspect 
of the suspicious activity reporting before it, but before turning to them it is important to 
note that the shift to behaviors was in fact a response to criticisms about police profiling.  
In 2003, the US Department of Justice issued policy guidance to federal agencies 
on racial profiling. The guidelines, instead of offering a definition of the act of racial 
profiling, defined it by the circumstances in which it is used.  
Use of race or ethnicity is permitted only when the federal officer is pursuing a 
specific lead concerning the identifying characteristics of persons involved in an 
identified criminal activity.29 
• The information must be relevant to the locality or time frame of the 
criminal activity;  
• The information must be trustworthy; and,  
• The information concerning identifying characteristics must be tied to a 
particular criminal incident, a particular criminal scheme, or a particular 
criminal organization.  
The Fact Sheet then goes on, “federal law enforcement personnel must use every 
legitimate tool to prevent future attacks,” and so “race and ethnicity may be used in 
terrorist identification”.30 The common elements, culled by one nonprofit police-monitoring 
group, characterize it as “mainly police-initiated action that relies, in whole or in part, on 
the race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than information regarding or the behavior of a 
person”.31 While racial profiling may have been authorized in counterterrorism by a Bush 
administration justice department, there is no doubt that it is politically unacceptable to 
openly admit the practice.  
The UK provides an interesting contrast case, in part because profiling is not 
prohibited. Lord Carlile, the government’s terrorism policy watchdog, even argued, “The 
police are perfectly entitled to stop people who fall within a terrorism profile even if it 
creates a racial imbalance, as long as it is not racist”. However, a study by the United 
Kingdom’s M15 found that “assumptions cannot be made about suspects based on skin 
colour, ethnic heritage or nationality" because "British-based terrorists are as ethnically 
diverse as the UK Muslim population, with individuals from Pakistani, Middle Eastern and 
Caucasian backgrounds”.32 The UK’s Terrorism Act 2000, granted metropolitan cops the 
authority to “allow the police to search anyone in a designated area without suspicion that 
an offence has occurred”. In an ironic twist, police efforts to avoid allegations of prejudice 
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30 Ibid. 
31 "Racial Profiling," Police Assessment Resource Center (2009). 
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led to thousands of people being “stopped and searched by the police under their counter-
terrorism powers simply to provide a racial balance in official statistics.”33  
 
From Contacts and Incidents to Indicators 
 “You know about intelligence-led policing?” Jerome asked me. Intelligence-led 
policing was proposed in the early 1990s as a “conceptual model that used crime analysis 
and criminal intelligence in a strategic manner to determine offenders for targeting.” It is a 
general strategy of collecting and analyzing data in order to deploy resources, which might 
seem like common sense, but is in contrast to earlier and wide-spread belief in the 
effectiveness of guided police practice, such as randomized patrols (to surprise criminals).  
Crime reduction tactics concentrated on enforcement and the prevention of 
offender activity with a particular interest in using crime intelligence against the 
activities of prolific and serious offenders. Techniques included an expanded use 
of confidential informants, analysis of recorded crime and calls for service, 
surveillance of suspects, and offender interviews.34 
Intelligence-led policing, only one among several police management strategies such as 
COMSTAT or Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), lends itself particularly well to integration 
with fusion centers and the Information Sharing Environment program. Although it is far 
from universally employed, the feature that Jerome mentioned, collecting pre-terrorism 
indicators, are available from any of the management models. The ISE-SAR program in 
Los Angeles has modified the basic form that patrol officers fill out so that they can check 
a box and send it to their Major Crimes Division. In smaller police agencies, the process is 
much more precarious. Ideally, information is passed to a terrorism liaison officer, or TLO, 
who is the point of contact to a larger geographically encompassing entity, such as a 
regional fusion center. The fusion center where I worked with Jerome and Frank was 
responsible for providing the training to officers who either volunteered or were directed to 
take the TLO position. Frank elaborated. 
We’ve got a terrorism liaison officer program. We give the officers training on how 
to identity terrorism-related crimes. The trainings are for what the TLO—the 
terrorism liaison officers—should be doing as far as the collection, dissemination of 
information and pushing it.  
Implementation is not necessarily straightforward. Lieutenant Milton Nenneman, in the 
Sacramento Police Department, analyzed the program as deployed in his region around 
the California state capital. Some of the problems he found. 
An objective review of the program revealed several shortcomings. First, the TLO 
training was rolled out ahead of the TLO program itself. Secondly, agency 
administrators within the RTTAC [Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center] 
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region were largely unaware of the program, did not know the benefits of the 
program or what the expectation for their participation might be, or, what level of 
commitment would be expected. Third, the training was announced via the normal 
training announcement system, and officers self-selected to go to the training 
without administrative support or time commitments. Fourth, what was not included 
in the curriculum was how the TLOs were to operate within their own agencies or 
in relation to the RTTAC. What had been done gave the officers a fine orientation 
on terrorism and then sent them back to their agencies without adequate support 
or operational instruction. According to Tim Johnstone, the RTTAC Commander, 
training had been provided to 475 TLOs without adequate forethought, as a knee 
jerk response to the need to provide and collect intelligence. A re-organization was 
in order.35 
For everything to work, officers have to hear about the Terrorism Liaison Officer program 
and get trained. Their colleagues have to know to pass on the information to them. Frank 
was nonetheless ambitious. 
We feel this should be happening nationwide, state-wide, in our region. We really 
need to codify this push for trained TLOs, and put it down in writing. What should 
happen, what we’re hoping to happen, is to have TLOs be able to go out and do 
follow-up investigations. Because now, we can only do so much. We can set the 
framework but you actually need to have field agents that are out there knocking 
on doors, or sitting and watching, doing surveillance on people, seeing what their 
business is like.   
Jerome, as well, emphasized the importance of the TLOs and providing adequate training. 
There’s many other factors, many opportunities that people exploit to make money 
that these guys can identify. There is this whole issue of Middle Eastern organized 
crime as far as Middle Eastern terrorism but there’s other groups. People focus on 
them a lot, and I know I do a lot, just because of my background, but we have Abu 
Sayyaf, which is Philippino. We have Sri Lankan groups, Tamil Tigers in our area. 
And we also have converted extremist black Muslims, who are in our area, who all 
have the same goal of a jihad, a literal war, a physical war against the United 
States and the infidels. So we have all these groups out there and we’re trying to 
get the TLOs a broad knowledge base, and trained, to being able to share the 
information.  
 
Regardless of the match between ideal and implementation, the question is if this 
kind of day-to-day surveillance catches terrorists. It produces large amount of data, of 
which both the collection and processing occupy man-hours that could be otherwise 
spent. Another question is if requiring officers to report suspicious activities changes the 
dynamic of their public presence. For Jerome, it only made sense: 
There are requirements about domestic violence. Shouldn’t we have the same 
requirements about terrorism investigations? Shouldn’t they have the same 
priority? I think it is a serious matter that a spouse abuses another spouse. There 
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are reporting requirements on that. If an officer believes that there is a suspicious 
incident, maybe related to terrorism, and that’s something he’s trained in, shouldn’t 
we have the same requirement of reporting? But we don’t. There is no reporting 
requirement on suspicious activities. There’s no penalty on people [LE] not telling 
us or giving us the information. I think there should be. I think that agencies should 
be willing to give that information in the first place, but if there’s no requirement, 
people—especially cops—think “if you’re not required to do it, why do it”? 
Law enforcement is overworked as it is, I pointed out, quoting any or possibly all of my co-
workers. “How does this fit in, giving them another task”? Jerome looked intent, and then 
chuckled: 
I think it only adds to what they’re doing as far as law enforcement officers but 
you’re right, that does come up. I remember, one of our CHP [California Highway 
Patrol] officers who was doing terrorism liaison officer training to his own people. 
He was going out to the CHP, telling them the things to look for, what to see, what 
to report to them, so we could collocate all this information in the system. He was 
handing his cards out to people, and he got back up to the podium. An old crusty 
guy, who was an older gentlemen, a CHP officer, from the back of the room 
walked up to him, and threw his card down, said “I don’t need that”, and walked 
back. They got into it. Basically, he goes, “I got enough to do, I don’t need to do 
terrorism stuff too. That’s your job.”   
The little-discussed risk is that a dynamic is set up, in which law enforcement, 
seeking terrorism, find what they seek. Ordinary criminals are fit to the mold of terrorists. 
The statement that terrorism is too facilely identified is supported by criticisms that a low 
percentage of investigations have led to prosecutions, fewer have been successfully 
prosecuted as terrorism, and, of those, not all withstand scrutiny.36 This aggravates a 
common, although not ubiquitous, mindset among cops that as long as “bad guys” are 
being caught and punished, it makes no difference. In an interview, former 9/11 
Commission Co-Chair Thomas Kean commented. 
[Y]ou can't say there couldn't be threats, traditional threats, from all sorts of 
sources within the country, going to the Haymarket explosion in Chicago back two 
centuries ago. We've had anarchists; we've had people trying to do harm for one 
reason or another.37 
His point, however, is that they were not al-Qaeda. 
What we're talking about here is a specific organization that's now around the 
world in its scope, that has announced they want to do us harm and kill as many 
Americans as possible; that has technology to support them and has some very 
intelligent people. ... That is the enemy, and that is who we're fighting, and we've 
got to always keep our focus on that. 
The lack of al-Qaeda ties however, may be what makes these cases attractive for 
prosecution, as they suffice to show results, but are lacking in greater value intelligence 
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that would be lost in a prosecution. “Homegrown terrorists” in a US court are legally the 
same as any member of a major international terrorist group. In fact, they may have a 
connection to such a group, but if those in the news are indicative, they are operationally 
self-directed. 
In 2005, Kevin James and three converts to his prison Islam group, Jamiyyat Ul-
Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), were indicted in California. Their case, in which noticing 
“suspicious literature” played a part, became known as the Los Angeles bomb plots. 
Shortly after the last sentencing in 2009, former Los Angeles Chief of Police William 
Bratton pointed to it as an example of police excellence. 
We have thwarted some terrorist attempts in Los Angeles just by good, basic 
police work. There were a couple of guys holding up gas stations and convenience 
stores. One of the neighboring police departments, aware of that, set up a 
stakeout and caught the guys robbing the convenience store. But the detectives 
then did what good detectives do—they did roll-back warrants, meaning they went 
back to the residences where these guys lived to see if there was additional 
evidence that could be used in proving some earlier crimes. During one of those, 
they found material in Arabic. One of the detectives, who had been trained in 
counterterrorism, passed the material up to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and 
what we uncovered was a plot that had been hatched by an imam [James] in 
prison to attack US Army recruiting stations and Jewish places of worship here in 
Los Angeles. So if these characters had not been detected with the basic 
prevention of the holdup, who knows, six months down the line they might have 
gone ahead with their plan.38 
Chief Bratton’s description contained all the basic elements of the domestic version of the 
crime-terrorism link, and the “enemy within” phenomenon. Like the terrorist shoe-bomber 
Richard Reid and Jose Padilla, who was held as an enemy combatant, Jamiyyat Ul-Islam 
Is-Saheeh was identified as part of a worrisome trend towards prison radicalization. Since 
black men make up a disproportionate percentage of the prison population, this puts them 
in the historically familiar position of being a threat. Like the 2006 “Sears Tower Plot,” 
which involved a group of Islamic converts in Miami’s Haitian community, or that of Syed 
Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Sadequee, youths from Atlanta, Georgia, the JIS group in Los 
Angeles was not directed by al-Qaeda or any affiliate, but acted on its own.39  
The JIS counter-operation enacted the Department of Justice’s strategy of 
aggressively pursuing “terrorism-related” cases and closing in before imminent danger.  
The fuse that leads to an explosion of violence may be long, but once it is lit—once 
individuals unlawfully agree to support terrorist acts at home or abroad—we will 
prosecute them to snuff that fuse out.40  
The noteworthy point is that wrong-doing occurs in “agreeing to support terrorist acts.” As 
a result, plotters may be arrested and prosecuted before it becomes completely clear if 
they would ever have carried the plan to fruition. One of the reasons that JIS became 
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such a poster child was that there was fair certainty that they would go through with it. Not 
only had the outside men committed open-and-shut crimes, but they also named targets, 
wrote a provisional press release, and acquired firearms. James, who never left the 
prison, claimed that he did not found a radical Islamic group inside, and denied that the 
perpetrators had pledged loyalty to him. Nonetheless, he pled guilty to conspiracy to levy 
war against the government of the United States through terrorism, and to oppose by 
force the authority of the United States government. The others, except for one deemed 
mentally unfit to stand trial and sent to undergo psychiatric treatment, were also charged 
with conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms. 
Other cases are not always as neatly tied to crime, or as far along. The “Sears 
Tower Plot, by the Miami men, was described by terrorism expert Marc Sageman as 
“nonsense.” The New York Times wrote, “the FBI itself supplied Al Qaeda. Its informer, 
posing as a member of Al Qaeda, bought the men military boots and promised money and 
weapons even as the group began to crumble.”41 In Atlanta, Georgia, Sayed Haris Ahmed 
was found guilty of conspiring to provide material support to terrorists in the US and 
overseas. Although the youth and his partner met with “suspected terrorists” in Toronto 
and made amateur videos in Washington, DC, sent abroad to show they could get close 
to targets, his family believed that he “never would have followed through on any plans to 
engage in terrorism.”42 “His only crime,” they claimed, “was ideas.”43 Ahmed’s attorney 
argued that he “was an immature college student who had ‘momentary ideas, childish 
fantasies’ that were never carried out.”44 He traveled to Pakistan to join a terrorist training 
camp, but changed his mind and reenrolled at Georgia Tech. Yet, aggressive prosecution 
of these sorts of cases is what the government and some counterterrorism experts argue 
has kept the US from experiencing another major attack since September 11th. “This 
investigation is connected to arrests and convictions of multiple terrorist supporters in 
Atlanta and around the world,” claimed a US attorney about Ahmed and Sadequee, “all 
before any innocent people were killed.”45  
These cases gathered together represent the effects of an explicit shift in the 
Department of Justice’s approach to counterterrorism strategy. In its 2001 report, the 
Department of Justice’s published number one goal was to “protect America from 
terrorism.” After 2003, that goal became prevention.46 The top-down policy change filtered 
through the criminal justice system. The guidelines for implementing the Suspicious 
Activity Reporting program is one manifestation. The way cases such as these were 
prosecuted is another. The transition to prevention-oriented prosecutorial policies was 
enacted through a series of methods.47 
One sign is the increased use of the charge of “seditious conspiracy”, which was 
used against the 1993 World Trade Center bombers, and the Los Angeles plotters With 
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roots in the 1798 Sedition Act, it allows the government “to charge people who plan but do 
not carry out crimes against the United States.”48 The initial precedent was the 
requirement of a clear and present danger to rights the government lawfully protects. The 
assumption that these acts constitute such a danger is the fulcrum of the shift. Before, law 
enforcement might have waited for evidence that a plot would be carried out. Ahmed did, 
after all, turn back after making it to Pakistan. Now, evidence of the plot is enough. The 
pivotal judgment in these situations is whether someone will turn a violent fantasy into 
reality. There is no disagreement about what Ahmed did. In Ahmed’s case, there was 
much proof of the fantasy. He wrote about engaging in jihad, met with shadowy people in 
another country (Canada), filmed national landmarks as targets. In a chain of truth claims 
and corresponding jurisdictional consequences that repeats in the counterterrorism efforts 
to be discussed, the fantasy was accepted as proof of a plan “to provide terrorist support,” 
which was accepted as proof of future action. 
The US had antiterrorism laws before 2001. Legislation such as the Patriot Act 
gave law enforcement more authority and resources in pursuing investigations, created 
some new crimes, and increased penalties for others. Yet, especially for the examples 
discussed here, what can be seen is more a change in tolerance and tactics than law.  
Discernment and Discretion 
There has been a ludicrous, in some ways alarming uptick in aggressive police 
control of photos taken “with no apparent esthetic value.”49 Oppressive to those snared,50 
and unlikely to have a chilling effect of the production of bad pictures, the tactic has also 
served to make a mockery of the police. Because the illustration is exactly that of an 
artistic evaluation, politely understood to be an opinion that cannot be wrong, it highlights 
the delicacy of the decision given over to the street patrol officer in suspicious activity 
reporting. While the stories of cameras confiscated from photographers on art project 
shoots or class assignments make it seem obvious that the police exercised 
stereotypically poor taste (in a word association train that goes 
police…totalitarian…gigantically tasteless stone statues of rulers), there is another, subtle 
issue in play. The responsibility for discerning that an action is out of place lies with the 
officer. There is no reasonable and certainly no politically correct way to describe this 
threat at the level of a person on the street. Purely racial or ethnic or religious profiling is 
not legal nor has it been shown to work.  
Public officials were confronted on 9/11 with the terrifying dilemma that “terrorist” 
behavior could overlap with ordinary behavior in every way except for motive and intent. 
Suspicious activity reporting, followed by vetting at a fusion center, analysis and further 
evaluation in conjunction with data from the wider intelligence network tackled the problem 
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thus perceived. To grasp what was otherwise intangible, this new apparatus was 
developed. Yet, the process put a perhaps impossible task in the hands of street cops. 
The foundations of the intelligence architecture are the presumed capabilities of the police 
to discern suspicious activities. Their “gut instinct” is privileged while simultaneously 
defined as insufficient, the discrepancy to be made up with, first, clear guidelines and 
second, training. One of those guidelines, issued to the Los Angeles Police Department, 
was to be aware of photography with no apparent aesthetic value. Outcry greeted the 
publication of the list and, on the federal level, new functional standards specified, “Taking 
pictures or video of facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in a manner that would arouse 
suspicion in a reasonable person.”51  
The issue raised is if the police’s capability for discernment is not irrevocably 
delegitimized by the socioeconomic, racial, gender and other life lenses that everyone 
acquires, further distorted by a prejudice stereotypically assigned to the cop role. The 
closest parallel to the critique of impartiality seemingly required in suspicious activity 
reporting has been explored in the idea of discretion, “an officer’s decision to act or not act 
when there is an option to do otherwise.”52 Discretion was reputedly “discovered” by the 
legal community in the 1960s, but of course has been part of practice for at least as long 
as the word “police” can be understood to refer to more or less the same concept.53 Peter 
Moskos, a professor of Criminology and former police, provides a succinct history of the 
research. 
Overall, the literature establishes that police exercise considerable discretion in 
their day-to-day arrest decisions. While such discretion was initially seen as prima 
facie evidence of racism and something to be identified and eliminated, most 
contemporary research tends to see police discretion as inevitable and even 
desirable when used judiciously.54  
The idea that the law was not evenly applied to everyone could not seriously have been 
shocking at any point in history. The outrage must have been in many ways performative, 
but to be sure, rooted in the assumption that the inequality was systematically applied 
against certain groups, such as people of color or those living in high-crime 
neighborhoods. A positive valence of discretion came about from research showing that 
selective use of the law was sometimes a tool of peace-keeping.55 Cops might turn a blind 
eye to social public drinking during hot summer nights in apartment housing projects. To 
enforce the law, in the absence of rowdiness or noise, would be to refuse the inhabitants 
the enjoyment of their only public space, the stoop that served as front yard and town 
square. Other research confirmed that socioeconomic status of the neighborhood, 
“situational variables such as the demographic characteristics of an officer, the victim’s 
cooperativeness, the victim’s injuries, and the time of shift” all affected police discretion. 
Moskos’ own research pointed to “police officers’ desire for court and overtime pay as the 
main variable affecting quantity of low-level discretionary arrests.”56   
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Frank shared his ideal of discretion. 
I’ll tell you about one of the proudest moments in my life. There was this time 
where I was followed into the parking lot on a uniform patrol by a guy. As I drove 
around on a Sunday morning, he followed me in the car and I was getting 
increasingly concerned.  If I stopped, then he stopped and if I moved, he moved. I 
finally got out of my car, figuring “this is going to be bad, whatever it is”.  And he 
said…opened his car door and yelled at me, “You're Officer May, right?”  And I 
said “Yeah!”  I’m snapping my gun.  It looked really bad. I think he’s tossing the 
anger towards me, and he says, “I've been looking for you for a couple of years! 
You probably don’t remember me but you stopped me one night when I was a 
drunk driver. You arrested me and my life was pretty close to being at an end. I 
was getting a divorce.  My family was destroyed.  I have small kids and when you 
searched me, I had dope in my pocket. You lectured me, and you destroyed the 
dope right on the scene, and said that I would have enough problems doing the 
drunk driving and it was my option. You said to deal with the drunk driving. You 
said I can go get more dope, and continue to watch my life go down the toilet and 
lose my kids, or I can turn around and I would have lots of times to think about it. I 
was drunk at the jail.  And I did, and you made a difference of my life and I've been 
looking for you for over two and a half years to thank you. 
Like most cops, Frank viewed himself as a public servant—not necessarily a good one, 
but with a chosen vocation nonetheless. Domestic surveillance did not strike him as 
sinister, because he understood law enforcement as the “good guys.” A less rosy view of 
discretion, or the officer’s ability to apply it, is epitomized by the congressional testimony 
of constitutional and international law lawyer Bruce Fein. 
Core First Amendment principles will never be honored by law enforcement 
officers or public officials. Their psychological preoccupations are order and the 
status quo; they viscerally fear or are perturbed by the prospect of change or 
challenges to the existing power structure. Further, they are rewarded financially 
and professionally by the volume of intelligence collected. There are no serious 
quality controls because few if any are fit to separate the terrorist wheat from the 
innocuous chaff. 
Fein skips racism or other common accusations against law enforcement and their 
application of discretion. He bases his indictment of counterterrorism surveillance on a 
more general indictment of law enforcement and politicians. His point is that it is not in the 
self-interest of those in power to support First Amendment principles, presumably 
because he believes that the free exercise of religion, the press and speech will lead to 
change. He implicitly dismisses that training or regulation as useful restraints on abuse, in 
a leap of logic over why, with officers’ alleged preoccupation with the rules, they would not 
be similarly fixated on honoring core First Amendment principles. Alternatively, he 
assumes that the First Amendment would not activate their rigid allegiance to order and 
the status quo.  
The LAPD list was critiqued as the wrong guidance for cops, especially given that 
Fein’s view of the police is widespread. In reporting, experiential knowledge and skill at 
discretion is both privileged and assumed to require specific training for a new threat. 
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Frank, cognizant of such fears and suspicious behaviors’ delicate relationship to First 
Amendment rights, repeated to me, “We have to educate them. Training is one of the 
things we do to try to develop people so that they can identify terrorism-related crimes.” 
The list of suspicious behaviors does not mean that all actions are suspect. However, 
those behaviors defined as having the potential to be suspicious present no exclusively 
distinguishing diacritic. This suggests that any unmarked action could also be suspicious. 
The list might subtly criminalize one set of behaviors, while obscuring others, or narrow 
officer attention so that genuinely suspicious behaviors go unnoticed. Although it was 
probably not conceptualized this way, the list can more accurately be seen as a way to 
remind officers to simply pay attention: a technique for maintaining vigilance.  
 
The Seamless Network 
At one point, I asked Frank, “Where would the intelligence come from? The police 
on the street?” 
It will come from a cellular network of people who developed multidisciplinary 
relationships, so all first responders. 
Not just police? 
Not just police. The public would go to their local first responders whoever it is, be 
it fire service, medical service, law enforcement, for whatever their needs are. 
Those first responders would be networked together. They would supply the 
underlying information that becomes intelligence. Terrorists, they’ve got to have a 
network that is familiar with how to get around here, where to put them up, set 
them up, before they actually get to their operation. Here [at the fusion center], we 
get the training out to these folks who become our reporters basically, and call us, 
push the information to us. That is one of our main resources. We are getting 
these guys to supply us with the information on what they are seeing.  
For cops who view themselves as working in a committed way towards the security of the 
public, everyone should be behind this effort, and certainly firemen as well. The idea that 
firemen gathering up terrorist tips for an intelligence fusion center could be too much 
surveillance did not come up. One retired cop, when I suggested this might be viewed 
negatively by some, told me, “If they have nothing to hide, they have nothing to fear.” For 
example, Lieutenant Nenneman wrote an information-packed masters thesis on fusion 
centers. In concluding that greater participation on the part of the entire emergency 
response community must be encouraged, he unselfconsciously offered, “The ER 
community, particularly the non law enforcement community, needs to recognize that 
forwarding a tip is not an indictment, and that no onus is attached if an observation turns 
out to be merely innocent behavior.”57  
Despite Fein’s assertions, in the period of heightened fear after the quite real 
terrorist attack of September 11th, many public officials acted in good faith to develop an 
apparatus to deal with an apparent threat. Since it rapidly became known that some of the 
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data that could have prevented the attacks had been in hand, it made sense to mandate 
that there be technological means and procedural standardization for all segments of the 
US government to communicate. Yet it is an additional and not self-evident step to enlist 
state, local and tribal police as a ground-level social surveillance force. The point that both 
advocates and opponents make is that there are 780,000 sworn state and local law 
enforcement officers in the United States. As the war on terror geared up 2002, Giorgio 
Agamben advised, “When politics… reduces itself to police, the difference between state 
and terrorism threatens to disappear. In the end it may lead to security and terrorism 
forming a single deadly system in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others' 
actions.”58 Using the police in dubious counterterrorism activities, he suggests, risks 
fundamentally compromising the legitimacy of the state. Yet state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement were enlisted in an on-the-ground national intelligence force, with remarkably 
little notice. 
The legal basis can be traced back to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Significant documents, including the earlier Patriot Act, 
the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, and executive orders issued in response, developed 
the reasoning underlying the Intelligence Reform Act. The Patriot Act, determined to 
legally remove the largely cultural or habitual "wall" between intelligence and law 
enforcement, explicitly encouraged cooperation. The 9/11 Report identified resistance to 
sharing information as "the biggest impediment to...connecting the dots."59 The President 
followed on this with an executive order on “Sharing terrorism information to protect 
Americans,” which mentioned and included state and local law enforcement. Then, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Section 1016, ordered the creation of 
the Information Sharing Environment, to be run by a presidentially appointed Program 
Manager. While both the National Strategy for Information Sharing, and the Fusion Center 
Guidelines in 2005 emphasized the reporting of “information of intelligence value from 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities and private sector stakeholders,” the fusion 
centers guidelines pushed considerably closer to the subsequent ISE plan.60 
One of the principal outcomes should be the identification of terrorism-related 
leads—in other words, any “nexus” between crime-related and other information 
collected by local, state, and private entities and a terrorist organization and/or 
attack… 
Some of the recommended goals and functions for fusion centers include the following:  
Serve as a receipt-and-dissemination hub for law enforcement information 
provided by federal entities… 
Serve as the initial point of contact for the public and private sector personnel to 
report suspicious circumstances or threat-related information. 
It is recommended that all investigative or intelligence personnel, as well as 
nontraditional collectors of intelligence such as fire, emergency management, and 
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health personnel, receive awareness training.  Personnel should be equipped to 
identify suspicious activities or threats and provide information to fusion center 
personnel, as appropriate. (67) 
Real specificity, however, began with the guidelines developed by the office of the 
Program Manager. In January of 2008, the Information Sharing Environment program 
issued its first "functional standards" for reporting suspicious activities, containing a 
description of the process and definitions. The ACLU, already tuned-in to fusion centers, 
began a review. In spring of that year, as group of representatives from state, local and 
federal agencies began work on an implementation project. This group made site visits to 
police departments in Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston and Miami.  The report they 
produced in October contained the Los Angeles adaptation of the ISE Functional 
Standards that finally made the news media notice.  
Up to that point, the Information Sharing Environment plan and its implementation 
had attracted little attention. This was at least partially because the major news media 
appeared to understand it as part of a technology subgenre, and missed the importance to 
regular policing, more clearly a mainstream issue. Federal Computer Week’s Ben Bain 
was the only writer to cogently report on the ISE and SAR process. Reports on fusion 
centers and inadequate protection of civil liberties from the American Civil Liberties Union, 
the New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe or elsewhere were more common, 
but almost never connected with the Information Sharing Environment by name. 
 
Vigilance, Surveillance and the Dangerous Individual 
 
Vigilance “the action or state of keeping careful watch for possible danger or 
difficulties”61 comes from Latin vigilare. Surveillance, with the same root word, means 
“close observation, esp. of a suspected spy or criminal.” The difference is that of subject 
and object. Vigilance is a subject’s state, in relation to an environment, while surveillance 
is an action the subject takes, that of focusing attention on a suspicious person. Vigilance 
is the mode of subjectification both required and produced by surveillance. As Nicholas 
Langlitz observed in another context. 
In order to work, vigilance requires the cooperation of the citizenry: a self-
observation of and by the population. This, in turn, requires the formation of 
vigilance as a mode of subjectivity, which is inseparable from the formation of 
individual responsibility. Advanced liberal regimes require such internalizations of 
their political rationalities to govern their citizens at a distance.62 
To some extent, since 9/11 the US population has been asked to become vigilant. 
Citizens are asked to remain to alert, to report suspicious people or packages. There was 
a vocal minority that extorted Americans to feel that they were at war, to engage them in 
the existential battle. Even through the nation was in fact at war, in more than one country, 
the effort was not transformative. Mass surveillance of and by the population never 
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reached the kind of diffusion found, for example, in the United Kingdom. Instead, in the 
United States, the subjectification imposed by the SAR system is largely focused on the 
police. Cops are traditionally supposed to be vigilant for suspicious behavior, and the SAR 
process transforms what were heterogeneous pieces of information—freehand 
descriptions, subjective selection of important details—into standardized dots that can be 
cumulative and exchangeable. However, is there a difference between facilitating the 
reporting of terrorism and mandating it? Is there a difference in shifting from the traditional 
police role of vigilance to one of surveillance? 
In these terms, the SAR process, perhaps accidentally, forces the officer to make 
this shift. Here, Michel Foucault’s discussion of the dangerous individual is germane.  
Legal justice today has at least as much to do with criminals as with crimes. Or, 
more precisely, though for a long time the criminal had been no more than the 
person to whom a crime could be attributed and who could therefore be punished, 
today the crime tends to be no more than the event that signals the existence of a 
dangerous element—that is, more or less dangerous—in the social body.63 
Crime passed from being a transgression to an indicator.64 In the SAR-ISE system, 
suspicious activities are parallel to crimes. They signal the existence of a dangerous 
element. Of course, the problem is that many of the behaviors listed in the ISE functional 
standards and by the Los Angeles Police Department are also ordinary behaviors. The 
officer is presented with a paradox.  
For the modern system of sanctions—most striking since Beccaria—gives society 
a claim to individuals only because of what they do. Only an act, defined by law as 
an infraction, can result in a sanction, modifiable of course according to the 
circumstances or the intentions. But by bringing increasingly to the fore not only 
the criminal as author of the act, but also the dangerous individual as potential 
source of acts, does not one give society right over the individual based on what 
he is?... what he is by nature, according to his constitution , character traits, or his 
pathological variables. 
Intention becomes everything. Cesare Beccaria, the Italian reformer whose short treatise 
On Crimes and Punishment swept the world, tried to refuse any element of intention. 
Crimes, he argued in 1783, “are only to be measured by the injury done to society.”65 
They err…who imagine that a crime is greater or less according to the intention of 
the person by whom it is committed; for this will depend on the actual impression 
of objects on the senses, and on the previous disposition of the mind; both which 
will vary in different persons, and even in the same person at different times 
according to the succession of ideas, passions, and circumstances. Upon that 
system it would be necessary to form, not only a particular code for every 
individual, but a new penal law for every crime.  
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The problem then shifts to an evaluation of the individual, to a sense of his or her motive 
and intent. This rests on the discretion of the officer. Somehow the police have to judge 
what the person does, not who the person is, but the action is innocuous except in relation 
to its obscure purpose. The officer is instructed to pay attention to the totality of 
circumstances, to the environment. 
The formulators of the system are not unaware of this issue, for which there is no 
definitive solution. Instead they move the debate by countering that no sanctions are 
being imposed, and it is to this locus of truth claims that the argument shifts. “If you’ve 
done nothing wrong, you’ve nothing to worry about.” Is harm done to an individual by 
mention in a field contact or incident? Time magazine, hardly open to the accusation of 
overly liberal polemics that plague the ACLU, reported that “in 2005 and 2006 undercover 
members of the Maryland State Police had carried out surveillance of war protesters and 
death penalty opponents.”66 They entered “the names and personal information of 53 
peaceful left-wing activists” 67 into the Maryland fusion center’s database and the 
Washington-Baltimore High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area database, which possibly were 
shared with the National Security Agency.  
The procedures for including data in the Information Sharing Environment were 
modified to tighten the vetting system between the first and second version of the ISE 
functional standards. An SAR might come directly from a local precinct, but then goes 
through a two-step process. 
First, at the State or major urban area fusion center or Federal agency, an analyst 
or law enforcement officer reviews the newly reported information against ISE-
SAR behavior criteria. Second, based on available knowledge and information, the 
analyst or law enforcement officer determines whether the information meeting the 
criteria has a potential nexus to terrorism.68 
This change was made following the recommendation of privacy advocates, including the 
ACLU, but is of course no guarantee. How were the lives of people on such lists affected? 
The Maryland state police claimed that none of the protesters were entered into the official 
federal terrorist watch list, which has well-known consequences in the form of travel 
inconveniences, or even restrictions. Historically such lists have affected employment, 
housing and other aspects of life. There is also of course the problem of inaccurate data 
for computer analysis that relies on links between people, or “learns” based on the data 
that are input, and it is to this problem of how the dots are connected that we turn next. 
The Suspicious Activity Report project was thoughtfully designed and 
implemented, with feedback mechanisms and actual change resulting from the input of 
concerned public parties. For some the attention to detail may have been only a way to 
keep it under the media radar but for others, this was a sincere attempt to create a system 
that would maximally keep Americans safe with minimal invasion of privacy. This is cold 
comfort if the whole apparatus of surveillance strikes one as sinister, as is the fact that the 
single greatest impediment to its function is that no cop in his or her right mind wants the 
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added work, bureaucracy, and time away from career-relevant arrests, unless there is a 
very clear and present danger to the security of the community.  
  117 
Chapter Seven. Connecting the Dots 
 
“A ‘smart’ government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy 
as a whole,” asserted the 9/11 Commission Report in 2004.1 “Integrated all-source 
analysis,” it continued, “should also inform and shape strategies to collect more 
intelligence.” Otherwise, “it is not possible to ‘connect the dots.’”2 This sequence of claims 
would push the spontaneous participation of state and local law enforcement in 
counterterrorism begun in 2001 into congressionally approved law by 2007. By July of 
2008, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was issuing warnings about domestic 
intelligence and fusion centers:  
Overall, it is becoming increasingly clear that fusion centers are part of a new 
domestic intelligence apparatus. The elements of this nascent domestic 
surveillance system include:  
Watching and recording the everyday activities of an ever-growing list of 
individuals  
Channeling the flow of the resulting reports into a centralized security agency  
Sifting through (“data mining”) these reports and databases with computers to 
identify individuals for closer scrutiny  
Such a system, if allowed to permeate our society, would be nothing less than the 
creation of a total surveillance society. Recent reports have confirmed each of 
these elements.3   
There were between 50 and 60 fusion centers in the United States at the time of the 
ACLU publication. A year later there were 72.4 The first centers began as state responses 
to 9/11. Local leaders, as Jerome, the deputy director of the fusion center where I did 
research described it, felt keenly that they were responsible, and would be held 
answerable, for the safety of their constituents. The attacks proved to them that the 
federal government could not be counted on to ensure security, or to share the necessary 
information for local government to compensate. The early centers grew out of existing 
police intelligence and analysis units; some had been single-issue task forces within larger 
police departments, while others had existed as independent agencies, often a High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program site (the HIDTAs). They did not necessarily have 
experience producing strategic intelligence and planning. Most, however, already provided 
operational and/or administrative support to their base by sponsoring task force meetings 
for gangs or narcotics trafficking, and lending equipment and analytical staff. Legal 
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authority for the first fusion centers was cobbled together from their existing statutes and 
from memorandums of understanding with new partners.  
The federal government took notice of the initial wave of start-ups as they 
emerged, around 2003, and fusion centers began appearing in federal discussions of 
strategies for the new “homeland security.” Some fiscal support was offered beginning in 
2004 through a DHS Grant program. Members of the Department of Justice’s Global 
Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the Homeland Security Advisory Council started 
developing guidelines, together with representatives culled from law enforcement 
agencies across the US.5 In early 2005, a meeting of the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council issued a preliminary conclusion that “each state should establish an information 
center that serves as a 24/7 ‘all source,’ multi-disciplinary, information fusion center.”6 
When the guidelines were released later that year, they fostered a second wave of 
development. Building on the more general 2003 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan (revised in 2005), the publication specified goals, defined processes, listed 
components, and included model documents for establishing fusion centers. The National 
Governors Association, which meets annually and develops “best practices,” began 
discussing centers, eventually including them on the list of recommendations for new 
governors.  
Although the 2005 guidelines provided a blueprint, they were not technically legal 
authorization. Only in 2007 did the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act provide a legislative mandate for fusion centers, in a section on 
“Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships.”7 The 2007 initiative thus formally 
included fusion centers in the Information Sharing Environment. The functional standards 
for the ISE, as discussed in the last chapter, included a list of behaviors that, if done 
“suspiciously,” police should consider as possible pre-terrorism indicators. Reports 
documenting these behaviors are supposed to be vetted and added to national 
databases. The information is parlayed into different types of intelligence. With the dots 
collected, human and computer analysis is applied to connect them. The goal is to identify 
patterns, which will point to incipient plots or suspicious people. The fusion centers, as 
sites of information collection and dissemination for federal, state, local and tribal 
government, are intermediate nodes in this decentralized, jurisdictional web. 
What this chapter will explore is how the fusion centers and the data-analysis work 
done at them figure into a formulation of intelligence as a paradigmatic technology of 
security, which, in tandem other technologies, presents a distinctive apparatus for dealing 
with contemporary threats. Foucault, in his 1978-79 lectures, elaborated a 
conceptualization of security in relation to law and discipline. Each of the three—law, 
discipline and security—can be understood as a technology that developed and was 
adjusted to solve problems at a given time. That is to say, Foucault uses them as 
analytical constructs that refer to and aggregate ways of taking up problems. They can be 
characterized by their techniques for dealing with features such as space, the uncertain, 
and norms, with a distinctive logic, mode of action and metric for truth. “Law,” as Foucault 
formulates it, works through a legal/illegal binary. It decrees what cannot be done within 
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the borders of a territory.8 The United States passed laws criminalizing every stage of a 
terrorist act – funding, planning, providing logistical support and carrying it out. The United 
Nations Security Council (pushed by the US) similarly moved to criminalize these acts 
globally, by mandating each country to pass equivalent legislation within its territory. 
“Discipline” functions often in concert, by commanding what must be done, tending 
towards ever more detailed specification, and focusing on the individual body. Shoes are 
to be taken off to go through airport checkpoints, foreign visitors need the correct visa and 
can stay an exact amount of time.  
 “Security,” in this schema, is a way of dealing with problems, which deploys law 
and discipline according to different regulatory norms. Rather than ordering the world into 
legal and illegal, or dictating behaviors, security uses both strategies to modulate the 
milieu. “The apparatus of security,” Foucault observed, “lets things happen.”9 
Not that everything is left alone, but laisser-faire is indispensable at a certain 
level… In other words, discipline does not deal with detail in the same way as 
apparatuses of security. The basic function of discipline is to prevent everything, 
even and above all the detail. The function of security is to rely on details that are 
not valued as good or evil in themselves, that are taken to be necessary, inevitable 
processes, as natural processes in the broad sense, and it relies on these details, 
which are what they are, but which are not considered to be pertinent in 
themselves, in order to obtain something that is considered to be pertinent in itself 
because situated at the level of the population.  
Security here is concerned with the distribution and statistical patterning of behavior. 
Through the collection and study of data on the primary biological life of the population—
its birth rates, morbidity and morality statistics, and so forth—the population is constructed 
as an object. One idea in circulation today is that security requires us to be concerned 
with not just biological life, but the social life of the population. The term “data-mining” is 
applied, somewhat unfortunately, to three rather different processes. Data analysis can 
begin with a person, or with a rule that finds relations between people and behaviors. Or, 
at its most abstract and controversial, seeks to find patterns of data that will predict future 
behavior. All three are routinely used as to get intelligence for national security purposes, 
taking social life as raw data, from family ties and religious affiliations to habits and acts of 
air travel, online purchasing, social networking and cell phone calls. These, like birth and 
death rates, are taken to present “natural processes,” of normal and abnormal behavior, of 
legal and criminal lives. 
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Nikolas Luhmann marks a distinction between danger and risk. A danger is 
something that could cause future harm over which one has no control. If, however, 
control can be levied—a decision made, preparations taken, insurance bought—then the 
danger is transformed into a risk. The arc of approaches in the contemporary has been to 
increasingly transform unapproachable dangers (by definition) into something that instead 
provides purchase. Risks are calculated in relation to a “threat.” Venues such as fusion 
centers explicitly counter threats. Procedures and technical strategies are developed to 
turn law, discipline and security into real-world practices. The analysis of information so 
that it is transformed into intelligence is one such technical strategy. The range of 
“experts” in this arena includes computer scientists, lawyers, politicians, and intelligence, 
defense and law enforcement professionals. Fusion centers, data mining, and the issues 




When the law that implemented the 9/11 Commission recommendations, including 
the fusion center initiative, passed in 2007, I was in the middle of an internship undertaken 
as part of my doctoral work. The center where I was an intern is located in a grey 
government building, rising over a dirty and indifferent neighborhood. Guards just inside 
the entrance direct visitors through a metal detector, and operate a screening belt for 
bags. Employees with proper identification are waved through to the side. The first time I 
went, the guards reminded me to remove my shoes and made me leave my cell phone. 
Back then, in an exertion of control pointless except for its disciplinary effect, phones with 
cameras were not allowed, and were held at the entrance until the visitor returned. Past 
the guards, the stone floor stretched out to rows of elevators, each serving a limited block 
of floors. The elevator corridors are identical except for signs hung high, with tiny numbers 
identifying the destination. Picking the right row felt uncomfortably like a candid-camera 
set up. The men on the elevator—there were more men than women—were feds or narcs. 
The feds were clean-shaven, clean-cut and a bit stiff. They wore suits, and most were FBI. 
Some of the narcs were actually federal as well, from the DEA, but they are known as the 
cowboys, the least orthodox of the law enforcement agencies. Others were from regional 
narcotics operations. They ranged from massive, muscled drug warriors to scruffy uncover 
officers. There were some women: agents identifiable by their physical fitness, as well as 
administrators, intelligence analysts, and secretaries.  
Once up the elevators, there was a buzzer for the nondescript door of the 
authorized access area. In fact, this door and those on the same floor that led to DEA 
intelligence, were so nondescript that even after months working there, I sometimes 
walked right by them. Fusion centers tend to be imagined as futuristic assemblages with 
screens up to the ceiling that allow real-time event tracking, and some are, but as the 
Deputy Director of Intelligence for the Department of Homeland Security in the Bush 
Administration said, "If you've seen one fusion center—you've seen one fusion center."10 
Mine had cubicles and cheap carpet. Instead, the technology was in the range and depth 
of access to advanced analysis programs, databases and the equipment available on loan 
for surveillance operations within the jurisdiction. The office, under a single director, 
contained a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program (HIDTA), and a Regional 
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Terrorist Threat Assessment Center (RTTAC). HIDTAs served as models for many states 
establishing fusion centers after 9/11, although not everywhere did that result in co-
location. In this case, the two organizations worked side-by-side for several years. Each 
independently received grants and funding, but they shared costs on rent, software 
purchases and other items. Then the relationship was formalized by combining them into 
a Regional Intelligence Center. In follow-up interviews two years later, analysts said that 
the structure and division of work remained much the same, with dual missions sharing 
space and resources.  
The doors opened with RFID-controlled card passes, in addition to the buzzer. All 
nonemployees had to be met and signed into the visitor’s log. The entry way led to a line 
of cubicles and tall windows over downtown. To the left and right of the workspaces were 
whiteboards where analysts were supposed to write their Blackberry contact number, 
regular schedule, and upcoming absences for trainings, meetings or personal reasons. 
Most employees had long commutes, and used flex-time to work a ten-hour but four-day 
week, reducing the time and expense of travel. I worked at the end of this row, which did 
counternarcotics, and opened onto the central room with a meeting and lunch table, and 
some of the counterterrorism group’s desks. We occasionally stood at the windows and 
watched the cars and panhandlers below with binoculars, looking for crimes and guessing 
where the frequent, shrill emergency vehicles were headed. Working on crime produced a 
cheery fatalism. Successes were case-bound, mild corrections to an environment 
permeated with depravity. “Do the lions ever wipe out the wildebeest?” one DEA agent 
asked me and then answered immediately. “No, we always catch the weak and sick and 
stupid. We never get the big bull. In some ways we keep them stronger. The whole point 
is just to hold the line, to keep the ecosystem in balance.” On top of that, bureaucracy 
could consume hours, even weeks. Frustration with the protection granted to “bad guys,” 
by what were considered absurdly liberal laws and politicians, led my colleagues to joke, 
“It’s good the windows don’t open,” so that they didn’t jump. 
“Federal Fusion Center” is something of a misnomer; the median level of federal 
funding for the centers that existed in 2007 was 21 percent,11 meaning most of the start-
up and operational costs came from redirecting state and local funding streams. Annual 
budgets at the last estimate ranged from tens of thousands of dollars to several million 
dollars, with one outlier at reportedly $15 million. Some staff positions are paid out of 
these budgets; others, however, are often “on loan,” seconded from city, state and federal 
agencies that partly or wholly paid their salaries. For example, where I interned about half 
of the analysts were seconded from the National Guard. This is also an example of how 
“information sharing” was adapted into practice at least partially by “people sharing”. Army 
and Air Force National Guard made up the bulk of the HIDTA analysts, and the center 
also had representatives from sheriff’s departments, city police, and the Coast Guard. 
During the time of my internship, other public service entities were beginning to contribute 
seconded staff, towards the goal of developing a regional all-hazards center. Functionally, 
theses seconded individuals were points of contact with their home agency. This helped 
form the ever-extolled personal relationships of trust. “These things only work when you 
know someone,” was a typical remark, in this case from a drug intelligence analyst named 
Pete. Such relationships are deemed crucial in intelligence and law enforcement, as 
already discussed, and also in emergency response, which was part of the fusion center’s 
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regional coordination mission. Gabe, an analyst who was Air National Guard, explained to 
me how and why his employment arrangement had been worked out. 
Across the board, the occurrence of late, is that it is mandated that the agencies 
are now going to be cooperative. In DOJ and DOD, information sharing has 
become the norm. One of the ways that they decided to satisfy this requirement 
was with agencies like the HIDTA. They figured “we can utilize the National Guard 
assets to better serve law enforcement.” That way they can point to cooperation—
we’re it. Take communication: if there are National Guard in a location, they can 
install SiprNet—the military’s secure internet protocol router network—and then 
we, who are here, can use it and be the conduit for sharing the information. That 
could be necessary in an emergency, and we would be the only ones with access. 
Or for other kinds of information. One of the things they found along the way, from 
our military presence in other countries that have narcotics trafficking, is there is 
always information to be shared in that way. They are always concerned with 
political correctness though. Because of Posse Comitatus, they needed to make 
sure they followed guidelines if we were going to provide assistance and support.  
Posse Comitatus means “power of the country,” and first appeared as an English anti-riot 
law, in reference to the men of a region who could be called to service. In the aftermath of 
the US Civil War, the army occupied former Confederate states, to implement 
Reconstruction policies, and quash any flare-ups of rebellion. After a disputed presidential 
election, in which the troops were accused of having altered the outcome by their 
presence at the polls, a congressional deal removed the army from the south. The Posse 
Comitatus Act of 1878 was then formulated by Southern congressmen intent on 
preventing renewed federal dominance. The Act’s prohibition reinforced that it is foremost 
a state responsibility to police the land, maintain law and peace, and provide for orderly 
voting in elections (or to neglect this responsibility, as in the case of access to voting for 
African-Americans in the former Confederate states when the military withdrew). Posse 
Comitatus prohibited the army from being used as a domestic police force by the 
executive branch, and also came to be understood as a powerful restriction on military 
involvement in domestic affairs. Opponents of fusion centers, and more generally the 
militarization of government, have raised objections to the National Guards’ presence in 
its name.12  
The original text of the Act threatened a fine or imprisonment if the military (which 
at that time was the Army) was used “for the purpose of executing the laws.” Federal 
courts decided that “executing” disallowed an active role, such as making an arrest. 
However, a passive role such as providing “supplies, equipment, training, facilities, and 
certain types of intelligence information” could be justified,13 because the military had 
unique advantages in these arenas. As the task of national security diversified to 
encompass threats such as drug trafficking and illegal border crossings, “executing the 
laws” was more and more narrowly defined by judicial interpretation and legislation. 
Authorized uses of the military increasingly expanded. Weakening of the Act accelerated 
in the 1980s under President Reagan, who directed the Department of Defense to support 
counternarcotics and operations against illegal immigrants. Legislation legitimated this 
kind of military participation as logistical support to civilian law enforcement, not direct 
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execution of the laws. The use of soldiers, marines, and National Guard in the 1992 Los 
Angeles Riots, when the US hosted the Olympics, and on border patrol, followed.  
The National Guard analysts often had security clearances and previous 
intelligence training. They were part of the HIDTA side of the center, and therefore worked 
on law enforcement narcotics cases, rather than terrorism. Developing a prosecutable 
case was what was important to the agents for whom the analysts worked. Teams 
therefore erred on the side of caution when deciding what tasks an analyst seconded from 
the National Guard could do for a given case, because the distinction between “active” 
and “passive” could be critical when the case went to court. Gabe described the situation. 
The National Guard provided me with a course that was “Intro to Intelligence and 
Analytical Concepts.” Then I came here [to the HIDTA] and they gave me Penlink 
[software] training, DEA mobile fleet, more fundamentals. But we don’t do work 
that might enter into the chain of evidence. If it could require court testimony, such 
as listening on a wiretap, then it is just better that we don’t do it. Otherwise we 
[because we are members of the national guard] might get the case tossed out.  
The fusion center was not exactly, or at least literally, a law “enforcement” agency, 
for either narcotics or terrorism. It was an intermediate node in the Information Sharing 
Environment, and provided support to and coordination between local, state, tribal and 
federal agencies for their enforcement activities. Local departments borrowed analysts 
from the fusion center, which meant they could have help with a case at no cost, while 
retaining lead agency status and hence the eventual arrest statistics for the investigation. 
At least, for drug cases they often retained the case, while for terrorism this was rare, and 
more likely to be temporary. While “enforcement” capabilities in counternarcotics exist 
across the spectrum, from the federal Drug Enforcement Administration to city police 
departments, a terrorism-related investigation generally would be passed along to the 
FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), directly or via the center. A JTTF could be co-
located with a fusion center, bringing the center much closer to on-the-ground 
investigations, although this was not the case where I did research. The joint terrorism 
task forces included state and local representatives, so that ideally a connection was 
maintained to the original reporting and jurisdiction of the incident. It became FBI policy 
after 9/11 that all terrorism tips had be evaluated, but many are not deemed credible 
enough for further investigation, and are handed back over to the reporting department for 
non-terrorism related archiving or follow up.  
At the local level, dedicated terrorism units and investigations are not common, 
and commanders tend to be loath to let their subordinates spend time chasing leads 
instead of dealing with pressing public order and crime issues. They would rather give 
such investigations to the FBI, although there is a bottom-up tendency to expand the 
definition of terrorism in order to tap dedicated funding streams favoring counterterrorism, 
and a convergent top-down tendency in order to justify that allocation. Yet as the 
instrumentality of this expanding definition indicates, terrorism is not widely viewed as a 
pressing local issue.14 Smaller, local departments rank terrorism low in their threat 
assessments, although concern increases with the size and population density of 
jurisdictions. The FBI, in contrast, has expertise, equipment, and a clear counterterrorism 
mission directive covering both intelligence-gathering and investigation.  
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The HIDTA half of the fusion center offered its counternarcotics trainings, 
specialized tools (surveillance equipment, a wire room) and analyst services to the 
counties in its region. Support was limited to cases with a drug nexus. The “Terrorism 
Threat Assessment” half focused, at least in the early days when I was interning, on 
setting up a communication system. They needed to connect to the federal network in one 
direction, and to the public and regional first responders in the other direction. “We’re 
trying to make sure that people can do their job,” said deputy director Jerome, “which to 
me is the collection of information from outside resources and developing that information 
to a point where you have some intelligible intelligence product to give back to them.”  The 
other deputy director, Frank, gave me some examples of the system working. 
It might be something as simple as a cop getting a phone call or shopping in a 
store, or doing a shoplifting case where the people in the store say, “You know, 
this is going to sound real goofy but we’ve had a guy come into here for the last 
two years about every five months and get passport pictures. I think he’s a 
terrorist.” Nobody gets a passport that many times. And a little bit of checking finds 
that over the past two years, four times he’s reported a lost passport  
Or, a first responder may come to us [at the fusion center] and say, “I got some 
information on the call that we worked and I just can’t tell if there’s any truth to this. 
I need you to process this further. Can you assist? They are reporting to us that 
their neighbors are terrorists, and all we can determine from our preliminary review 
is that their neighbors are foreign nationals. We’ve identified names and identities 
but we can’t identify anything further. 
“Do people really call in with that kind of tip?” I asked him. “Absolutely, all the time,” he 
answered. Part of their challenge, though, was just getting word out about what they 
offered. Like the “Terrorism Liaison Officer” program, which had trouble getting cops to 
know whom to tell if they had an incident, the HIDTA had to work to make sure local 
departments knew they were there. “I know you don’t like the word ‘shop,’” the other 
analyst, Pete said, “but that is what we do. We have to shop our services to local law 
enforcement. They don’t know what we do until they’ve worked with us, so we have to go 
drum up business.”  
A study in California posed the question, is there “sufficient purely counterterrorist 
activity to consistently support a fully staffed fusion center”?15 Of the five center directors 
queried, “Two responded yes, one responded no, the fourth replied that fusion centers 
should be all crimes, and one skipped the question.” The directors felt that their centers 
needed to reflect local law enforcement problems. At the Department of Homeland 
Security and for others who see fusion centers as a solution, the issue of “buy-in,” or how 
to get state, local and tribal law enforcement to actively participate in and support the 
centers and its information network, is critically important. Homicide, and for that matter, 
hurricanes and fires, come along much more frequently than terrorist events. Frank 
pointed out that law enforcement wanted information that was relevant and would let them 
do a better job.  
When I started at this regional center, I went out and informally interviewed a 
network of people that I knew, predominantly in law enforcement but across 
                                                
15 Nenneman, "An Examination of State and Local Fusion Centers and Data Collection Methods ", 
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multiple counties, multiple jurisdictions, and the biggest single thing that I was told 
was, “Give me something that's pertinent to me locally.”  If I want to know what's 
going on in Baghdad, I’ll turn on CNN. Most local law enforcement folks seem to 
be suffering from information overload. Their inbox is absolutely overflowing. And 
as a result, some had decided that if it was important, someone would make a 
point of letting them know and they simply wouldn't even find out if that’s really the 
information. Others try to stay on top of it; some found it confusing. 
You know what we’d like to see far as intelligence gathering from cops on the 
street? What we’d like to see and what we’re talking about in the state, is having 
this established TLO [Terrorism Liaison Officers] program and designated TLOs in 
each department—terrorism liaison officers, who in reality will become general, all-
crimes experts because there is no one terrorism issue that people can say “ah-
ha, there is definitely a terrorist.”  
According to the Congressional Research Service, less than fifteen percent of fusion 
centers describe themselves as focusing solely on terrorism. A little over forty percent 
described themselves as all-crime, and a similar percentage as all-hazards.16 The labels, 
and what they describe, are for practical purposes still under negotiation. “All” can refer to 
sources of information, the government entities that are collaborating or the threats 
handled. From all-hazard’s origin as a FEMA term, it appears to have become more 
proactive, shifting from a term of preparedness to one of anticipation and prevention. 
[T]here are some indications that different fusion centers viewed “all-hazards” as 
pertaining to either their data streams, agency partners, or the center’s role. For 
some, all-hazards suggests the fusion center is receiving and reviewing streams of 
incoming information (i.e., intelligence and information) from agencies dealing with 
all-hazards, to include law enforcement, fire departments, emergency 
management, public health, etc. To others, all-hazards means that representatives 
from the aforementioned array of public sectors are represented in the center 
and/or considered partners to its mission. At some centers, all-hazards denotes 
the entity’s mission and scope—meaning the fusion center is responsible for 
preventing and help mitigating both man-made events and natural disasters. For 
others, “all-hazards” indicates both a pre-event prevention role as well as a post-
event response, and possibly recovery, role.17  
What the fusion centers describe as being responsive to their constituents, the ACLU has 
argued is “mission-creep.” Once fusion centers are in place and providing communication 
channels, they can be used to transmit information not only about suspicious activities, but 
serious weather or accidents. Not incidentally, expanding the scope of the center and 
involving representatives from more public service institutions also increases the variety 
and flow of the raw information for intelligence purposes. Thus the ACLU denounces a 
trend from counterterrorism to all-crimes to all-hazards as bureaucratic profiteering. The 
tendency of security, as Foucault pointed out, is to expand and include more elements. 
“Arguments against fusion centers,” reported the Congressional Research Service 
“often center around the idea that such centers are essentially pre-emptive law 
enforcement—that intelligence gathered in the absence of a criminal predicate is 
                                                
16 Masse, O'Neil, and Rollins, "Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress." 
17 Ibid. 
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unlawfully gathered intelligence.”18 In the post-9/11 haste to set up an apparatus to collect 
and connect the dots, the question of if domestic intelligence should take place was 
replaced with how to do it. US security agencies were given a clear and generative 
mandate to be proactive in preventing terrorism. Nonetheless, there is no clear conception 
of or simple guide to the legality of pre-emptive law enforcement. Each of the terms is a 
construct whose meaning is actively mutating. Is it legal for cops to write down suspicious 
but not necessarily illegal behavior? (The answer there is “yes”.) It is legal to investigate 
someone who has done something suspicious but not necessarily illegal in order to find 
proof for further investigation? The collection of some information is legal; for law 
enforcement, other types of information are protected, barring proof of wrong-doing. 
Legality depends on who is collecting, for what reason, and what will be done with it 
afterward.  
For years, guidelines for the FBI divided investigations into two types: criminal and 
national security.19 For these, there were three levels: threat assessment, preliminary 
investigation, and full field investigation. Each type, and level, had legal thresholds and 
investigative tools attached to it. The new guidelines issued in 2008 collapsed the 
distinction between types and reformulated the levels into: assessments, predicated 
investigations, and enterprise investigations. Thus there were two major shifts. The first 
was the elimination of the “wall” between criminal and national security investigative 
areas, and the “wall” between the FBI personnel who worked in the different areas. 
Instead, the “level of investigation” determined the available investigative tools, with their 
varying degrees of intrusiveness. The second was a pronounced shift to “proactive 
information gathering.” The guidelines describe the proactive methods of investigation for 
assessments—which do not require a supervisor’s permission or specific suspicion—as 
relatively non-intrusive, and they offer a nine-point list. Examples are “obtaining publicly 
available information, checking government records, and requesting information from 
members of the public.”20 The FBI does not need to receive specific information or an 
allegation about possible terrorist activity in order to use these authorized methods. The 
Guidelines add,  
These Guidelines do not authorize investigating or collecting or maintaining 
information on United States persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities 
protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States.21 
With the world “solely” more or less unlimited leeway is granted to investigators, in that 
protection of the First Amendment activities is eliminated, as long as a reason is given for 
surveillance and documentation. 
FBI guidelines do not of course apply to state or local law enforcement. The 
closest analog is 28 CFR Part 23.22 The regulation states, “A project shall collect and 
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19 The Guidelines draw their authority from Sections 509,510,533, and 534 of title 28, United States 
Code and Executive Order 12333, issued by President Ronald Reagan, on United States 
Intelligence Activities. 
20 "The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic Fbi Operations," ed. Department of Justice 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Attorney General, 2008).  
21 Ibid., 13. 
22 "28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23 (Executive Order 12291) Criminal Intelligence Systems 
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maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an individual only if there is 
reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity and the 
information is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity.” There are two points of note. 
One, the "reasonable suspicion" requirement means there must be an link to something 
criminal or suspicion of something criminal that can be verbally articulated (not a gut 
feeling). This standard, which dates from 1980, is clearly higher than the new one that the 
FBI has now given itself. Two, 28 CFR Part 23 technically only applies to multi-
jurisdictional organizations that receive federal funds, not a local precinct or sheriff’s 
department. Nonetheless, most law enforcement and specifically the fusion centers use it 
as a guide. Commercial databases, however, with transaction records on purchases, 
billing addresses for credit cards and shipping, utility bills pertaining to residences, do not. 
For law enforcement acting under 28 CFR Part 23, in order to search the commercial 
databases and then store the information, they need a basis for suspicion with regard to 
the subject on which they are searching. Law enforcement cannot gather the kind of 
private data in the commercial databases themselves, but they can search those 
databases for it. Once received in a search, it can be saved. Thus one issue of finicky 
detail, which typifies why it is difficult to assess exactly what forms of pre-emptive law 
enforcement and domestic intelligence are illegal, is that in this technicality, for state, local 
and tribal law enforcement, some of the restrictions on collecting information are 
overcome. Although direct collection would be illegal, buying is not. The FBI is aware that 
this is a loophole requiring some angling to slip through. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation conducted an inquiry into the privacy policy of the FBI’s Investigative Data 
Warehouse, the large, mysterious database that Bureau analysts can use to mine for data 
and assemble into intelligence. They submitted Freedom of Information Act requests, and 
received the following 2005 internal memo from the FBI’s Office of Congressional Affairs. 
We had agreed on the following sentence as a way of avoiding some of the 
intricacies of data mining policy: "Where permitted by law, and appropriate to an 
authorized work activity, information gleaned from searching non-FBI databases 
may be included in FBI systems and, once there, may be accessed by employees 
conducting searches in furtherance of other authorized activities."  
Unfortunately, I couldn't get that to fly, since that was the crux of the Senator's 
inquiry.23 
In 1976, standards were developed in response to the history of law enforcement abuses 
exposed by the Pike and Church Committees. These required, among other things, a 
criminal predicate for a subject to be entered in a criminal intelligence file. However, this 
does not apply to all information archives, even for law enforcement organizations working 
under 28 CFR Part 23. Rather, one of the purposes of other databases is to store non-
verified information, or information that does not meet more stringent reasonable 
suspicious criteria. 
Case management databases, tips and leads files, records management systems, 
criminal history records, and other nonintelligence databases used and maintained 
by an agency are not required to comply with 28 CFR Part 23. The reason is 
twofold. The purpose of case management databases is different from a criminal 
intelligence database. Case management databases are designed to assist a law 
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23 "Report on the Investigative Data Warehouse ", ed. Electronic Frontier Foundation (2009). 
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enforcement agency in managing its activities and provide factual information on 
subjects. Second, the information stored in these nonintelligence databases is not 
based on a determination of reasonable suspicion that a subject (individual or 
organization) is currently engaged in criminal activity. Much of the information 
stored in those databases tends to fall into one of two categories: uncorroborated 
information (such as tips) or fact-based information (such as arrest or criminal 
history information).24 
The privacy of some uninvolved and innocent people will be intruded upon in the course of 
an investigation. The idea behind keeping case management and criminal intelligence 
databases separate is that it puts limits on this intrusion. One of the problems with data 
aggregation and fusion is that the process can also knock over protective partitions. This 
is not a new problem. The Privacy Act of 1974 was a response to concerns over how 
computerized databases could impact privacy by fusing data from different sources to 
form a too-complete picture of a person’s life. Advances in technology have made 
interpretation of when and how to apply the law complex, and perhaps easier to 
circumvent. The act requires that when the government collects and shares information 
about individuals, it give notice to and get consent from them. The act also gives citizens 
the right to request and see the information the government has about them. The 
government must keep “fair information practices” and its databases must conform to 
standards of accuracy. But there were a number of exceptions to the notification 
requirement even in the original. Namely, law enforcement was exempt, and there was an 
easily exploitable “routine use” exception. The FBI Guidelines for example, hold the 
Bureau entirely exempt.  
Another concern with the effects of the centers, and previously of task forces, is 
that they allow “policy-shopping,” where investigative teams use the least restrictive 
requirements of those participating. I had a long interview in 2008 with the director of the 
fusion center on these topics. 
It is interesting. I am on a national committee that helped write the fusion center 
guidelines and the criminal intelligence sharing plan, and the federal government 
came to us and they said, “we might… what do you think about scrapping 28 CFR 
part 23?” That regulates how we share information. “Why don’t we… Do we really 
need that? Maybe we should just get rid of that.” And as a committee of law 
enforcement guys, where everybody assumed we would embrace that, “oh yeah, 
the fewer rules we got, the better,” instead we all said, collectively, almost 
unanimously, “we can’t get rid of that rule.” That is what gives the public 
confidence and it is also a rule that gives us a benchmark, gives us something to 
follow. Then we know our expectation. And if we got rid of it, we could have 
abuses. I mean, people could go off track. And so it was our recommendation that 
we not. In fact, what we pointed out to the US Department of Justice, who had 
asked the question, was 28 CFR part 23 only applies, really, to a narrow group of 
agencies that receive a specific type of information sharing funding. It really 
doesn’t apply to all law enforcement information sharing systems. It is only law 
enforcement sharing systems that receive money from specific funding streams, 
federal funding streams. It doesn’t apply to federal agencies, doesn’t apply to 
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agencies that fund their own stuff, it doesn’t apply even to agencies that get 
federal funding outside of that stream. But we pointed out that when you look 
across the board, most state and local agencies, and most regional information 
sharing projects, like the RISS systems, were all using 28 CFR part 23, many of 
them voluntarily, because they thought it was a good safeguard. So DOJ, I mean, 
they were actually shocked. They thought that we would embrace getting rid of the 
rules, and we didn’t.  
Right, well you could have a backlash. 
That is what we thought, and not only a public backlash, but at the end of the day, 
most of our guys, you know, want… they want a well-regulated business. A lot of 
us have been in law enforcement a long time and we have seen what happens 
when we don’t police ourselves, when we don’t regulate ourselves, when we don’t 
train our people effectively, we don’t have rules and regulations. People get in 
trouble. As far as public confidence, it’s bad. And it hurts people’s careers.  
The director was a career narcotics officer and had spent a lifetime dealing with 
the public and colleagues in their times of worst stress, fear and anger. He had illusions 
about neither civilians nor cops. Unlike some more gung-ho believers in righteousness, he 
refused the argument that law enforcement’s desire to catch bad guys would keep them 
from committing abuses. The Weekly Standard, for example, mocked fears that “Uncle 
Sam could end up listening to your phone conversations, reading your e-mail and 
monitoring your shopping trips."25 
[I]f defense intelligence analysts lose interest in al Qaeda and develop so strong a 
fascination with the quotidian affairs of John Q. Public that they are willing to risk 
their careers to abuse the system, that could happen.  
The director, who retained some romanticism about policing, also knew intimately the 
potential for both petty displays of power and serious violations in law enforcement, 
especially in the way the connection to the “serve and protect” mission was made more 
abstract by an intelligence assignment.  
I supported that decision to stick with those guidelines and that fact that we ought 
to re-review them all the time to make sure that they’re sufficient. If they aren’t, we 
ought to increase them. The ACLU and other groups that have a concern on 
privacy will probably never love the fact that we have intelligence fusion centers, 
and intelligence sharing guidelines between law enforcement. They are concerned 
about abuses, but I think at the end of the day, as long as we act prudently, and 
we always keep an eye on the constitutional issues and what is acceptable in 
society—kind of what the public expectation is—we can develop systems where 
we won’t get in trouble, where the average member of the public says, “yeah, I can 
live with that, what they’re doing is acceptable.”  
How can you counter abuses? 
I think a couple of ways, maybe three ways. First is, you have to develop the 
protocols, the policies. Somebody’s got to define what is acceptable and what is 
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not, and the authority to do what we do. I mean that has got to be defined: where 
do we get our authority and what is acceptable. Then we have to make sure that 
everybody is trained, and that everybody is trained on the same sheet of music. So 
people understand what their authority is and what their responsibilities are and 
what the restrictions are. And then, we have to hold people accountable. There 
has to be accountability when we violate laws or policies. When we violate laws, 
there should be criminal penalties. And when we violate policies, there should be 
administrative penalties. You know at work, sanctions at work. And we need to 
continue the training process, because it is easy to kinda forget exactly what the 
policies are, and it is easy to not stay current with changing policies, which change 
all the time, because laws change or public expectation changes. So it is a matter 
of recurrent training, keeping that training current and fresh, and constantly 
reviewing.  
 
Intelligence Analysis and Data-Mining 
These technologies do not "mine for data"; they "mine for knowledge"—they look 
through data to find knowledge. Calling this process "data mining" is like calling 
gold mining "rock mining", because we look through rock to find gold.26 
Subject-based data mining begins with a person, and proceeds to find out 
information about him or her. Two facets are, perhaps self-evidently, defining. One, the 
result will be only as good as the data. The information held in databases must accurately 
refer to a ground truth: an identity that matches a real person, numbers in the correct field 
and format. Second, it must be organized so that it is possible to pull together that 
information. For example, in a database of telephone calls, one must be able to check all 
the numbers called from a subscriber. Rule-based data mining starts instead with a rule, 
which is then used to search databases. For example, if multiple purchases of a new 
precursor used to process methamphetamine were found in conjunction with large 
financial transactions, then additional investigation might be warranted into illegal drug 
manufacture and trafficking. The rule could be drawn from known associations. Or, the 
rule could be reasonably developed through subject matter expertise in order to find 
something emergent. With rule-based searches, as with subject ones, having accurate, 
searchable, relatable data defines their worth.  
Patterns are another way of organizing inquiry. Pattern-based searches can be 
more complex versions of rule-based searches and as with rules, the pattern can be 
drawn from past incidents or an expert’s best guess about scenarios. For example, a 
pattern could be developed to go through data looking for some or all of the 
circumstances for the Oklahoma City bombings. Then, another situation matching those 
circumstances would indicate that a similar terrorism plot might be in the works. Or, a 
counterterrorism team might come up with a pattern based on recent attacks in another 
country. One indispensible element here would be the right body of data in which to look 
for patterns: if local purchases of materials are tracked but everyone in the region buys 
materials online and delivery can’t be tracked, the fact that the materials really are part of 
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the pattern won’t help the investigator. Another indispensible element is a training set, a 
body of real-world data against which the pattern, once identified, can be tested and 
adjusted, otherwise the original assumptions that define the pattern are wholly limiting. 
The Oklahoma City bombings are not sufficient to mark all the ways that a terrorism plot 
could be developed, so as plots are found they must be added to the training set. (One 
critique of this kind of data mining is that there are not enough plots to populate the 
training set.) A design in which the pattern is tested against a set and evaluated is called 
“supervised learning.” The original design is increasingly improved so that it matches real 
patterns. As well, the match must be verified to be something useful about terrorism, not 
just an intriguing or random statistical correlation.  
All of these techniques are limited to what is already known or can be imagined. In 
other vocabulary, they are in the realm of the possible. The question is, can this limitation 
be removed? The attempt to do so inverts the search for terrorist patterns. Instead, normal 
patterns are identified in large bodies of data, and deviations become significant. This 
way, one does not have to know what one is looking for. “Normal” can be established as 
the history of the behavior of an individual, a population or other unit. Previous behavior is 
as distinctive as a signature. Data-mining that seeks this kind of internal variation is 
therefore called “signature-based anomaly detection.”27 Or, “normal” can be defined in 
relation to a category of like kinds, such as all households that share certain demographic 
characteristics. 
Supervised learning requires a training set of terrorist indicators. One of its main 
problems though is too few cases of terrorism incidents and therefore too few sets of pre-
incident indicators for which to watch. Unsupervised learning, as anomaly detection is 
called, requires masses of data about everyday life. It aims to address the challenge of 
novelty by transforming data into numbers and according importance to difference, 
repetition, and change. Notably, limitations have not been removed but displaced by 
inverting the search from one for unusual patterns to one for deviations from the norm. 
Instead of a pattern of terrorist behavior, there must be patterns of normal behavior.   
Data mining refers, evidently, to very different processes. First I will go over the 
more traditional practices as analysts at the fusion center described them. Then I will 
describe “predictive” data-mining and accompanying debate. 
 
Criminal Analysis 
 “It just takes a lot more people to construct a chart, when all you have are sheets 
of graph paper and a calculator,” Pete, a contracted HIDTA analyst, observed dryly.  
Before there was analytic software like Penlink, to look at linkages, you made this 
kind of triangle chart, and there are places now that do it that way. When I did the 
criminal intell program up at State [college], it was mostly with people who were 
already working professionals, who already had jobs in analysis. When I got my 
internship here, one woman told me it would be great, ‘they have all the toys.’ A lot 
of places, these sheets of graph paper, that’s it.  
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Pete wanted to be interviewed, and so inadvertently transitioned me from the first, 
participatory phase of fieldwork, in which I was trained in criminal intelligence with a small 
group of new analysts, into more active inquiry via interviews. Everyone had been 
informed that I was studying “them”. The appropriate forms were signed and 
announcements sent out. I stated it when introduced. Nothing in day-to-day office life 
brought up the fact though, but Pete did not let me slide. “When do you want to do that 
interview?” he asked after I’d been there two months. I got approval from my supervisor, 
the assistant director, for us to meet during the regular workday and scheduled it for that 
afternoon. We sat in his cubicle. Gabe, the National Guard analyst who worked between 
us, listened in and popped his head over the side every once in a while. After a while, I 
was interviewing them both. “What was your first case?” I asked Pete. “I don’t want to say. 
I don’t want you to write it down, but it went well.” He was cautious, of course, correctly so. 
Specific cases were probably not appropriate for a future book or article in anthropology. 
Even if fully resolved, they could involve a new or clever investigative technique, or a 
detail might provide too many clues to a guarded identity. “The majority of our time,” noted 
Gabe, “is spent with intelligence analysis that is case-related. I want to demonstrate what I 
have found out so that case agents can easily understand it. They are the key players.” 
We are taking information that case agents have gathered from investigations, and 
using it to build a bigger picture of who is involved and to what capacity. We try to 
predict what capacity that might be, using toll records to identify who a particular 
subject is talking to, getting address information. If it becomes likely that a subject 
who came up is involved in the case, we could demonstrate a pattern in call 
activity, for example. We can tell when it is most likely that the person will be on 
the phone, or maybe what drug is involved. We can pull photos. The agent can put 
surveillance on him. We can do trash runs with them. We can make photo lineups 
of those involved. But then we can investigate even deeper: how much is someone 
a player in the whole operation, and trace out the operation by linking these people 
together. The analyst can tell who the people communicating with them are, if they 
are using email accounts that are encrypted, if they have cells that connect over 
the net. If an agent is going to go on surveillance, you can layout avenues of 
approach and where to flee, but they are going to want to do that themselves too. 
Basically, there are so many different means that can provide information. We are 
trying to put it together in a way the agents can understand.  
“How would you describe the analysis process you go through?” I asked Pete. 
When you are putting together a case, you ask yourself, “What holds together and 
what doesn’t?” You get the name of a phone subscriber, the name and address. 
Sometimes you look up an address but don’t find the person’s name. So, it could 
be a fake address that they’ve used to register for something. You try to establish 
if it’s a home or business. If it’s a restaurant, it may be where he works. Or it could 
be a fake subscriber name. When you look up a name, you say, “maybe that’s the 
person, maybe it’s not.” For example, with a phone subscriber, maybe the name is 
Jonathan Smith. You see two people at the house address. One is Jonathan 
Samson. Maybe he wanted to use his real first name, but a fake last name, 
because it is easier to keep track of or he figures it’s more likely that mail will get 
delivered 
Then you might look at maps, and see what other people are in the building. 
Sometimes you have to branch fairly far. You might be looking at someone here, 
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but when you run the name, the only person is in, say, San Diego. But maybe if 
you look harder, it might actually be the San Diego person, who is traveling. The 
driver’s license might come up with traffic ticket information, so that might be 
evidence that the person is traveling here. Seeking those kinds connections are 
the ones I really like. That’s great. The best part is you’re figuring out who is doing 
what and what is where. You’re alternating between gathering and hunting. You 
run a name out in one of the databases, like Accurint or CLETS, looking at 
information, and you see connections. You go to the agent with the answer, and 
you’re the analyst. They would never have time to track a person down like that. 
Accurint is a commercial database used by law enforcement. It is described as a 
specialized "locate-and-research tool" by its parent LexisNexis®, a massive information 
organization and retrieval company well known in legal work, academia, government and 
business. Autotrack, owned by ChoicePoint, is another. Both companies collect 
information from a vast number of sources and make them available for a fee that can be 
per search or a flat monthly rate. Different levels of information may be available. Gabe 
interjected. 
If you are a real estate agent, the level of information is limited. There is more 
available to law enforcement, and when we log in, it automatically identifies us has 
having that level of access.  
In a pay-per-file arrangement, a search will come back with a list of names and minimal 
information, and the investigator has to guess which one, or ones, to buy. In 2008, a 
comprehensive dossier from Accurint was around $5.50. CLETS, which Pete also 
mentioned, is the California Law Enforcement Telecommunication System and is not 
commercial. It provides a direct interface with government databases such as the 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications 
System (NLETS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Crime Information Center 
(FBI–NCIC), the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS), and the Oregon and Nevada 
law enforcement systems.28  
CLETS contains criminal histories. For law enforcement, access to and the 
confidentiality of these combined data sources are taken seriously. The result, in fine 
bureaucratic tradition, is that certification requires a painfully dull training. The daylong 
course is less on how to use CLETS than on the regulations for appropriate use. Each 
request for information, for example, must identify the requester, because users are 
audited every couple of years to make sure that their requests are related to an 
investigation, and therefore justified. Generic reasons are inadequate. A specific case 
number or department of corrections number must be provided. This means that for 
CLETS an analyst generally cannot do searches in order to begin an investigation. Agents 
and analysts are cautioned not to add just a name to their own searches for a pleading 
colleague, or to misuse case numbers, for searches that aren’t actually unconnected to 
the case. 
Every database system requires you to justify your search. The DMV for example 
has a byline for a case number. Each one has an audit trail system. You can’t 
even search your own information without a justifying purpose and it must be law 
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enforcement related.  
There are strict rules against looking up people for personal interest or malice—ex-lovers, 
famous people, the license plate of the person who always takes the best parking spot. 
These rules are inevitably if seldom broken. Scandal results and controls may be 
tightened, although the point is that the audit system actually worked to catch the 
transgressor.  
The interminable certification exam for CLETS is available online. It is open-book, 
and learning, or even memorization, is thereby implicitly downplayed. The point, as 
Foucault noted, is discipline, careful prescription of how things must be done. “Do you 
have to be re-certified?” I asked. Gabe answered. 
Not for Accurint and Autotrack, because they are commercial databases, they 
solely bill us on the searches that we do, but it does have a field for indicating 
purpose. CLETS on an annual basis will complete an audit, and there is an End 
User Agreement for every year I will be using. If you have access to the system 
but haven’t been using, it will lock you out. It’s a way of controlling who has 
access. CLETS will remind you if you log in, but otherwise you have to contact a 
CLETS administrator. Each database is tied to a certain agency, same for WSIN 
[Western States Information Network], EPIC [El Paso Intelligence Center], DMV. 
An agent or analyst begins collecting information on an individual with a search on these 
or similar databases. Gabe gave a concrete example, starting with a commercial 
database. 
We’re running up someone, and Accurint or Autorack will get us a current 
telephone number—because the individual called in to order a pizza. The 
databases we use draw on a lot of open-source information. Most of it is 
purchasing information, anything from a baby shower registry to having a 
magazine subscription. Companies will now put forth an option allowing you to opt 
out, but basically if you buy something, you are giving up privacy. Accurint works 
better if you give it more specific information. Like, if you put in a Chuck Jones 
query, you get an astounding number of results. Accurint, rather than attempting to 
provide this, will not complete the query. It will require that you add something 
else. Autotrack will give you back a lot, just an endless list. At least with Accurint, it 
tells you where it got the information. That is really useful.  
A commercial database search usually results in several similar appellations, which may 
be aliases, or pertain to different persons. Addresses can sometimes help sort these 
names into categories of mere variation versus distinct individuals, because the lack of 
shared geographic locations or life history at least suggest that the match is coincidental. 
But relatives, who are not automatically suspected, may reasonably have similar names 
and have lived together. Making a positive match with the known data can be tricky, and 
so the first sweep of the net is generally wider, and takes in people who are eventually 
found to be unconnected. Often it is only possible to narrow the options down to three or 
four from the limited information given in the initial search, all of which must purchased in 
order to dig deeper.  
Evidently, subject-based analysis blends into a search for links in order to develop 
criminal intelligence. Hunting leads almost inevitably to gathering and linking, then back to 
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subject specific hunting again. From an inquiry into a given subject, relationships to other 
people, locations, and activities appear. Pete explained how relationships were identified. 
Say we have an informant and he calls at a specific time asking for some dope. He 
talks to a subject, and requests it. The guy would call his source. We would be 
interested in whomever that person called immediately after. For the most cases 
we are just trying to identify subjects with the toll records, and identify if those 
persons are also involved in the criminal activity. If they dirty up the phone, we can 
follow that on a pen register. Another instance would be, a subject who has been 
arrested, or whose phone has been seized and brought into evidence, we can get 
numbers off the phone. 
Tolls records are lists of the calls made from a number by date and time, obtained from a 
telecommunications company by administrative subpoena. Hundreds of toll records, many 
useless, might be collected in order to try to diagram a communication network. Under the 
Federal Wiretap Act that applies to criminal investigations (called Title III, adopted in 1968 
and expanded in 1986), a pen register or “tap and trace” can be requested. This collects 
call information in real time, useful only for a telephone number confirmed significant to an 
investigation. Otherwise, it is simply a lot of work. A pen register does not include the 
content of the communication, unlike a wiretap, which is by several orders of magnitude 
even more labor intensive and under Title III requires a higher level of authorization 
(usually a judge’s order). Instead of Title III, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, or FISA, applies for national security related surveillance.  
As Pete explained, a subject may become a focus of investigation a number of 
ways. His or her name may be provided by an informant. Someone whose telephone 
records were subpoenaed might have made calls in a suspicious pattern to the subject’s 
phone, or the number might have been in a confiscated phone. License plates on a car 
parked at a house under surveillance could have been traced back to the person. Of 
course, homes, cars, even houses can be in someone else’s name. These are not proof 
of wrongdoing, and so they are also ways that information on innocent individuals can get 
added to a database. 
An investigator, for example, might start the process of developing a criminal case 
using the information contained in a tips and leads file. Investigating the tips and 
leads information could produce adequate information that, when analyzed, meets 
the reasonable suspicion standard. If it meets the reasonable suspicion standard, 
a record on that subject could be entered into a criminal intelligence database. The 
information from the tips and leads file, as well as any other investigative 
information gathered, should be kept as supporting documentation for that 
record.29 
The names of individuals not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement can be 
included in criminal databases, but must carry a clear disclaimer, and be connected to 
someone who does meet a standard of reasonable suspicion. Records can be kept for the 
federally regulated time of five years in case the individual surfaces again, but if not, must 
be permanently erased. This purging is required under 28 CFR Part 23, and therefore 
considered standard practice. Several different software programs combine analytical 
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features with databases, and many have built-in deletion features. Records that have 
been inactive will automatically come up for reevaluation, and erasure.  
Thus far the description of data-analysis has been limited to the production of 
intelligence that is one, criminal, and two, tactical or operational in nature. Criminal 
information can also be brought together to produce strategic intelligence. “Strategic 
intelligence analysis,” explained Gabe, “demonstrates patterns.” 
I have done some of it in the past. We were trying to put together a project with an 
interactive map, showing the locations of gang activity in the areas they claimed. 
The point was that it could be used by law enforcement to track if the gangs were 
trying to move into other territories, or to map outbreaks in violence and figure out 
why it was happening. 
The patterns he mentions are statistical representations, rather than the algorithmic 
abstractions of pure predictive data mining. Several different models have been 
developed for directing law enforcement resources that rely on calculations of crime 
trends in different districts and patrol regions. The best known of these is Compstat, a 
management model credited with New York City’s improved crime rate in the 1990s. 
Using GIS technology and software databases, “comparative statistics” on crime are 
mapped in close to real-time. The numbers generated by precinct are used to decide 
where and when to deploy police officers. The situation is adjusted to prepare for what is 
expected to happen based on these trends. Any confidence interval is in essence a 
probability calculation. Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is another managerial model, 
mentioned in the last chapter. Instead of focusing on middle management’s crime 
statistics, it began by using data to identify serious recidivist offenders as crime vectors. 
When originally proposed in the early 1990s, intelligence-led policing was seen as 
a conceptual model that used crime analysis and criminal intelligence in a strategic 
manner to determine offenders for targeting. Crime reduction tactics would 
concentrate on enforcement and the prevention of offender activity with a 
particular interest in using crime intelligence against the activities of prolific and 
serious offenders. The techniques to be deployed included an expanded use of 
confidential informants, analysis of recorded crime and calls for service, 
surveillance of suspects and offender interviews. Where intelligence-led policing 
was revolutionary was in the use of intelligence derived from covert information as 
a strategic planning resource rather than as a means to develop case-specific 
evidence, as had traditionally been the case. Furthermore, intelligence-led policing 
became synonymous with the greater integration of criminal intelligence and crime 
analysis.30 
ILP is rapidly matching Compstat in reputation and use. The model’s focus on “dangerous 
individuals” lends itself to terrorists as well. But more generally, its emphasis on the 
collection of information (which could be done through suspicious activity reports) to 
produce strategic intelligence makes it handily adaptable to a second use in the 
information-sharing environment.  
The collection of data and strategic planning that characterize Compstat and 
intelligence-led policing had not spread uniformly among departments from which I 
interviewed people, or the United States more generally. Where it has been adopted, 
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empirical inquiry is still needed to ascertain what true change this has meant within 
precinct walls or on the street. Clearly though, the way it produces information that can be 
woven into the wider security set facilitates law enforcement’s integration into homeland 
security. Jerome explained how intelligence-led policing fit into the center’s work. 
It’s the idea that we can use information and develop it though the intelligence 
cycle and create a product showing trends, projected analyses, future events, or 
future trends, which is a major thing. We collect the information from pre-incident 
indicators, things that we know are indicators of a terrorist cycle. As of a week ago, 
we really didn’t have anybody on a state basis looking at pre-incident indicators. 
And now that they have, last week they called me up and go, “you won’t believe 
this but we just found 4 suspicious incidents that appear to be linked.” 
 
Predictive Data Mining 
In an interview in 2004, then-Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney declared. 
Fundamentally, we recognize that we can’t protect the homeland by just putting a 
cop out on the corner of the street. We have too many bridges, roadways, 
hospitals, schools, tunnels, trains. You just can’t protect all of the possible terrorist 
targets. You have to find the bad guys before they carry out their bad acts. That 
requires intelligence. And the states and localities are going to finally have to be a 
major part of that.31 
Predictive data mining is intended to relieve a specific bind. Preventative counterterrorism, 
or crime for that matter, tends to be referenced in public debate to the Steven Spielberg’s 
2002 film Minority Report, in which psychics could see crimes before they occurred, and 
people were apprehended on the basis of pre-crime accusations. The allegorical 
connection between science fiction and reality is the fear that data mining denies the right 
to prove one’s innocence. As was pointedly demonstrated in 2006 when an AOL team 
released individual search data without names, but journalists and many others managed 
to correctly identify and contact the actual people who had done the searches,32 data 
mining can combine enough sources to identify individual people without the need for 
personal information such as names. If digital searches are equated with physical 
searches, and these are conducted on masses of undifferentiated data, there clearly 
cannot be the particularized reasonable suspicion necessary for the searches that the 
data mining itself is held to constitute. The mere search constitutes, at an extreme, not 
only a violation of privacy, but an unwarranted act of suspicion. 
Subject searches in law enforcement have traditionally required a predicate, a 
justification for intruding into someone’s life. This protection is based on the Fourth 
Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. Yet the dream of 
pattern-based searches is to identify subjects that merit such intrusion before there is a 
predicate as traditionally understood, and long before they commit an act of terrorism. 
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Since the First Amendment protects freedom of religion, speech, the press, to assemble 
and petition the government, these cannot form the sole basis of suspicion either. 
Including them in a mass of other information is technically legal although politically 
delicate. How then does one identify the dangerous individuals? 
There remains a genuine divide among experts as to the utility of predictive, 
pattern-based searches for identifying people who merit further investigation. There is no 
evidence that this kind of analysis is more effective than others, or that with improvements 
in technology it necessarily will be. The alternative is standard analytical procedures, in 
conjunction with human intelligence networks. The question is not posed as either/or, 
however, but both. All the kinds of data mining involve databases with a lot of personal 
information in them. By and large, these databases already exist, but they are not already 
linked, either physically or by an equivalent search. Linking them reduces privacy. On one 
side, in as much as the data is already held somewhere, not allowing it to be brought 
together or easily searched is essentially protective inefficiency. Yet, the US Supreme 
Court, in 1989, called this “practical obscurity” and upheld it as a protected safeguard of 
privacy.33  
Granted, in many contexts the fact that information is not freely available is no 
reason to exempt that information from a statute generally requiring its 
dissemination. But the issue here is whether the compilation of otherwise hard-to-
obtain information alters the privacy interest implicated by disclosure of that 
information. Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that might 
be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local 
police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a 
single clearinghouse of information. 
Practical obscurity is the antithesis of “a seamless network of information sharing” 
or “connecting the dots.” It became an untenable protection for privacy as the narrative of 
9/11 placed blame precisely, if not explicitly, on the anonymity of inefficient surveillance 
and archiving.  
Yet the generalized license for intrusion potentially supplied by large-scale data 
mining is critiqued in an article co-authored by a chief scientist at IBM and the Cato 
Institute’s Director of Information Policy Studies: 
Without patterns to use, one fallback for terrorism data mining is the idea that any 
anomaly may provide the basis for investigation of terrorism planning. Given a 
“typical” American pattern of Internet use, phone calling, doctor visits, purchases, 
travel, reading, and so on, perhaps all outliers merit some level of investigation. 34 
This scrutiny, they suggest, would penalize valued American freedom, let alone, 
idiosyncrasy. It would be necessary to watch “normal” behavior and deviation from the 
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norm would be the basis for reasonable suspicion. Privacy for everyone is diminished in 
this scenario, and at the same time, terrorists could simply act “normally.”  
A range of counterarguments have been assembled. Privacy does not trump 
public safety. Privacy is preserved in the very anonymity of computer abstraction. Better 
the anonymous analysis of an algorithm than the peering eye of a fellow human. “The 
search,” one lawyer protested on a technical level, “is not for outliers or deviants from 
normative models but, rather, for ‘in-liers,’ that is, terrorists engaged in generally 
normative behaviors but whose links or relationships may reveal illegal organization or 
activity.”35 Looking for a pattern of association between unrelated people based on a 
series of same-actions, such as book purchases, is looking for an association. If two 
people buy the same book, that might mean they have the same taste in literature and 
might also buy other books in common. It does not suggest that the people know each 
other or share other tastes. Instead of like behaviors, a counterterrorist search would 
instead look for unusual relations between people based on different kinds of actions, the 
information on which would be located in dissimilar databases. Department of Homeland 
Security’s ICEPIC [Immigration and Customs Enforcement Pattern Analysis and 
Information Collection System] program, for example, brings together information from 
databases on foreign visitors, student and exchange visas, and immigrants, among 
others, to look for suspicious patterns of relationships. 
To protect privacy in advanced data mining, real world “dots” are transformed into 
numbers. Normal and abnormal flows of data can be described without reference to 
content. When eddies and ripples are found in these purely numerical flows, content can 
then be restored so that grounded investigation into what is hopefully (but not at all 
necessarily) terrorism, stock market fraud or other illegal activities can begin. Instead of 
using too-rare historical examples of major terrorist events, lower level data are used. The 
distinction between this and something like Compstat’s representational arithmetic, which 
might begin with the same law enforcement intelligence in criminal records and 
commercial data, is that the patterns of the numbers themselves are held to be significant. 
If they can be modeled and applied to real-world data, they might describe (which would 
be to predict) what will happen. If there is an identifiable vector in aggregated data, 
plotters or plots, intervention is possible. Of course, the problem is that patterns in the 
numbers may mean nothing useful in the real world. As with fractals, another type of 
pattern explored for predictive use, it is not necessarily useful to turn data into dots and 
map them.36 An analyst must check and see what the results mean and if they are 
pertinent.  
The most infamous data-mining project to date is probably the Department of 
Defense’s Total Information Awareness Program. The goal of what were actually five 
distinct projects was "to develop technology not only for ‘connecting the dots,’ but also for 
deciding which dots to connect."37 With fear of sleeper cells pervading the nation after 
9/11, the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sought to 
automatically exact evidence about relationships among people, organizations, 
places, and things from unstructured textual data...this information can point to the 
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discovery of additional relevant relationships and patterns of activity that 
correspond to potential terrorist events, threats, or planned attacks. These 
technologies would be employed to provide more accurate, advance warnings of 
potential terrorist activities by known, or, more importantly, unknown individuals or 
groups. DARPA believes that they will allow for the identification of connected 
items of information from multiple sources and databases whose significance is 
not apparent until the connections are made.38 
The program would allow “analysts to search vast quantities of data for patterns that 
suggest terrorist activity.” The Scalable Social Network Analysis project, much like 
syndromic surveillance in the realm of public health,39 functioned by defining the 
significant as relative change in activity. They would “identify the transition of terrorist cells 
activity from dormant to active state by observing which social network metrics changed 
significantly and simultaneously."40  
As the project’s title highlights, public relations were poorly thought-out. John 
Poindexter of Iran-Contra scandal fame was appointed director. The logo was an eye atop 
a pyramid, overseeing the planet and the phrase scientia est potentia (“knowledge is 
power”). Drowning in negative media coverage, the project name was changed to 
Terrorism Information Awareness, a shift from means to ends. Regardless, Congress 
officially defunded it. By presidential signing statement, though, the programs were 
renamed and dispersed to other parts of the government.41 As one critic put it, “The 
names of key projects were changed, apparently to conceal their identities, but their 
funding remained intact, often under the same contracts.”42 
Technical experts are in agreement, however, that “code is law” or “architecture is 
politics,” the idea that “the architectures of cyberspace are as important as the law in 
defining and defeating the liberties of the Net.”43 Programs should be designed so that 
privacy features are built in. DARPA had claimed that they would ensure "security with 
privacy," by "providing certain critical data to analysts while controlling access to 
unauthorized information, enforcing laws and policies through software mechanisms, and 
ensuring that any misuse of data can be quickly detected and addressed."44 As a 
proponent admonished, the net result of complaints was to remove the technological effort 
from the public sphere where debate could occur.45  
The issue, one might say, is only partly in the data-mining technology, since in 
order for any government agency to use even carefully regulated and auditable programs, 
which DARPA’s Total Information Awareness project promised to develop, massive 
quantities of data would be have to be collected and housed. Such a database may well 
exist. The FBI’s Investigative Data Warehouse, or IDW comes close.  
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As of January 2005, the IDW contained "more than 47 sources of counterterrorism 
data, including information from FBI files, other government agency data, and 
open source news feeds." A chart in the FBI documents shows IDW growing 
rapidly, breaking the half-billion mark in 2005. By March 2006, the IDW had 53 
data sources and over half a billion (587,186,453) documents. By September 
2008, the IDW had grown to nearly one billion (997,368,450) unique documents. 
The Library of Congress, by way of comparison, has about 138 million 
(138,313,427) items in its collection. In addition to storing vast quantities of data, 
the IDW provides a content management and data mining system that is designed 
to permit a wide range of FBI personnel (investigative, analytical, administrative, 
and intelligence) to access and analyze aggregated data from over fifty previously 
separate datasets included in the warehouse. Moving forward, the FBI intends to 
increase its use of the IDW for "link analysis" (looking for links between suspects 
and other people—i.e. the Kevin Bacon game) and to start "pattern analysis" 
(defining a "predictive pattern of behavior" and searching for that pattern in the 
IDW's datasets before any criminal offence is committed—i.e. pre-crime).46 
According to a representative of the FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking taskforce, which 
helped develop the system, 
About a quarter of the information comes from the FBI's records and criminal case 
files. The rest—including suspicious financial activity reports, no-fly lists, and lost 
and stolen passport data—comes from the Treasury, State and Homeland Security 
departments and the Federal Bureau of Prisons… Names, Social Security 
numbers and driver's license details can be linked and cross-matched across 
hundreds of millions of records.47 
"It appears to be the largest collection of personal data ever amassed by the federal 
government,"48 noted the senior council of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a civil 
liberties watch group focused on the digital realm. What regulations there are on this is 
difficult to ascertain. In some senses, it is a misleading question. Giant warehouses can 
be made obsolete by a program that structures queries into different databases, which 
one of the DARPA programs aimed to develop, and certainly exist in varying degrees of 
power. Prohibiting consolidated databases would not necessarily inhibit the practices they 
facilitate.  
Pulling together commercial, law enforcement and other data creates a significant 
alteration of the previous standard of privacy. This would be an issue even if the FBI’s 
data warehouse were found to be a paragon of efficiency and due privacy controls, and 
even if counterterrorism data mining required no additional collection of data. Mission-
creep here is “the use of data for purposes other than that for which the data was 
originally collected.”49 Various proponents of the massive collection of data for 
counterterrorism purposes have argued that mission-creep can be guarded against, but 
that having the data available is indispensible. Not utilizing commercial information in 
nation security efforts, they say, handicaps law enforcement and defense efforts. There 
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are two counterarguments. One, businesses are checked by consumer perception and 
interest as politicians are checked by constituent goodwill. People vote with their wallets 
and in elections. Civil and military servants are bound much more loosely than politicians, 
who must answer to their electors. Government has recourse to secrecy beyond that of 
corporations, which can serve to mask abuse. Two, businesses aggregate information 
useful to them in targeting sales, detecting fraud and so forth. This is much more limited 
than the massive accumulation of data such as that in the FBI’s Investigative Data 
Warehouse. It is not simply a matter of denying the government what businesses already 
have, but a distinct power that would be solely that of the government, and given the 




Intelligence failure presents a paradox: it is both avoidable and yet inevitable. Any 
given successful attack could have been avoided if the right steps had been taken. Failure 
is therefore, strictly speaking, preventable. To take the right steps always, however, is an 
impossible absolute. Failure on a greater temporal scale is unpreventable. No theoretical 
solution has been found to this dilemma. After Pearl Harbor, this formulation of the 
problem of intelligence and its limits shaped the simultaneous build-up of intelligence and 
preparedness strategies. After 9/11, an initial intensification of both juridical and 
disciplinary measures gave way to intelligence as a technology of security and the 
ambition to overcome the failure’s hex. Instead of micro control, there would be micro 
collection of dots and data, and in their natural flow, the patterns of the future would be 
revealed and open to intervention. 
Law, discipline and security operate with varying degrees of dominance in different 
realms. The police of course combine law and discipline in many ways, in the fulfillment of 
their duties and in internal regulation. Intelligence, rather than prohibiting potentially 
threatening acts, documents and studies them. The mission is data itself; the metric of 
good or bad refers to more complete information. It takes up and even multiplies juridical 
and disciplinary elements, then redeploys them to constitute its own object, that of 
knowledge.50 Law enforcement is organized in a continuous feedback system that 
nonetheless accepts, and actually requires, crimes to continue occurring. Technologies 
that work on the level of individual crimes or cases are meant to minimize the overall level 
of crime but there is no expectation of eliminating it. “Zero-tolerance” rhetoric is rather in 
contradiction to police practice. In all practical matters, law enforcement assumes that 
crime will continue. This fact is the foundation of the “new intelligence architecture.” In the 
accumulation of details, processes will be revealed.  
These distinctions between law, discipline and security map onto the differences in 
criminal and national security intelligence that surface problematically in their junction. 
Fusion centers fuse not simply different sources of information. They also join strategic 
rationalities (prevention, preparedness, anticipation/prediction of events); local, state and 
federal jurisdictional powers; law enforcement with other first responders; military and 
private sector representatives; and missions ranging from terrorism to all-crimes to all-
hazards; as well as geographically specific threats from drug trafficking routes to port 
harbors. They are venues where law and discipline are brought together in the 
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management logic of security, and information is turned into intelligence. Data analysis, in 
its distinctively different guises, is a key technique.  
Increased surveillance and data sharing within the Suspicious Activity Reporting 
system introduces a new element. There has been some, perhaps surprisingly little, 
debate about how to best protect privacy yet still use the information already held by 
commercial and government databases in the work of protecting against terrorism. 
Increased surveillance, however, from tracking emails and phone calls to behavior on the 
street, means more information, and more different kinds of information. Should law 
enforcement be doing intelligence? Are they prepared, by training or experience, to 
perceive and deal appropriately with non-criminal, but somehow suspicious behavior? 
Historically, the farther law enforcement has gotten from case-specific work, the more 
prevalent are violations of civil liberties.51 Yet, the fact that for most fusion centers, 
(outside of New York, Los Angeles and Washington, DC) the actual amount of terrorism-
related activity is small means that a greater percentage of analysts’ time is spent on 
criminal cases. For these, the law is everything.  
Any transgression of criminal justice procedure might appear in court, and years of 
work by agents and analysts can be thrown out. Agents know the law enforcement rules 
and are accustomed to following them. Analysts and agents want to keep their cases. If 
they come from a law rather than intelligence background, and there is a chance for 
criminal prosecution, they will tend to remain within investigative guidelines. This creates a 
work environment that suggests that integrating the police into intelligence would have 
less of a detrimental effect than feared. Of course, from an intelligence perspective, law 
enforcement’s goal of an indictment is what diminishes the advisability of engaging them 
in such tasks to begin with, because more valuable information may be gained from 
surveillance rather than arrests.  
The proliferation of information, globalization, and catastrophic events has been 
described as a massive increase in uncertainty. Yet predictive data mining deploys 
certainty—certainty that events will occur, certainty that a massive event is composed of 
myriad microevents. If this conceptualization works, no one has to figure out what form the 
threat will take. It is enough that there be one. Dots are fit into patterns in which the 
potential for events can be discerned, and the human participants identified. The events 
remain unformed, or unactualized,52 and their potential is relocated into the figure of the 
terrorist, the dangerous individual. One of Foucault’s questions was if “we can really 
speak of a society of security… a general economy of power which has the form [of], or 
which is at any rate dominated by, the technology of security"?53 If not all of society—an 
imprecise concept at any rate—security as a technology operating through modulation, 
periodic assessment and correction has come to dominate intelligence. 
This distinctive approach and manipulation of law and social order can be 
recognized in the Information Sharing Environment, with its multiple techniques for 
collecting and connecting data, the development of the fusion centers, and the dream of 
predictive data mining. At the level of the police officer documenting public behaviors and 
detaining those who are perceived as suspicious, there is a disciplinary effect on freedom 
of action, control exerted as to what one can do and how one should behave. A 
suspicious activity report in relation to the larger information-sharing network, however, is 
exactly about information that must circulate if it is to be effective. The word seamless, 
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found throughout government documents, contains a clue. Terrorism was understood as a 
nation-state problem, and is now one of networks. A network is, as mentioned, not 
seamless. It is composed of links between nodes, a compilation of seams. The 
seamlessness, or wholeness, is not the idea of a single object, but rather perfect liaison 
between the elements, of perfect transmission and reception of information. 
In this light, security versus freedom is not the right formulation. Freedom rather 
becomes necessary to security, meaning: we can think of security practices as a 
combination of techniques and rationalities brought together in a technology. These are 
characterized by freedom of circulation of information, so that the information can turn into 
knowledge, and this can in turn produce the related sense of security as a way of dealing 
with threats. Intelligence cannot function through absolute control. Things must happen. 
Meetings must take place as tiny pieces of a larger puzzle. Imperfect discipline and minor 
infractions of the law are tools to coerce the development of an informants-network, or the 
entry points to tracking more important schemes. They can, and in fact must, occur as 
part of the milieu, if there is to be data flowing through the information environment.  
Yet, consider information sharing as a form of secrecy.54 The term refers 
exclusively to sharing within government and even in principle does not imply open 
government or transparency. To the contrary, that which is freely available does not need 
to be shared. The Information Sharing Environment is part of a portfolio of government 
policy that provides knowledge as a solution, ensuring security through the authorized, but 
not wholly free, flow of information. It seems to obscure a debate about where the 
information comes from. Information sharing does not per se mean domestic 
intelligence,55 but in policy and practice, the two are well on their way to inseparability.  
Counterintelligence in the United States was established as a law enforcement 
matter through a specific sequence of logic, lent credibility by a history of abuses. 
International law says little about spying beyond permitting satellite or electronic 
surveillance. Positive law, such as bilateral treaties, and customary law, as accepted by 
the international community, are silent about human spies. Nations recruit, train, and pay 
intelligence operatives; their activities are sanctioned abroad. Spy activities are legal 
against others. Yet they are illegal against citizens, or the self-same government. If 
domestic intelligence meant spying within the nation, on citizens, it was illegal. 
Counterintelligence was instead long conceptualized as pertaining to people who were in 
the US and breaking national laws by spying or plotting for other countries. Reasonably, 
then, it was a juridical and disciplinary matter, dealt with by investigations into criminal 
wrongdoing. Yet, law and discipline alone were inadequate to prevent 9/11. Intelligence 
had to be reconfigured to meet a perceived need.  
The issue is not choosing between this system and doing nothing, but rather, what 
is to be done? Security will tend to expand. The network of knowledge will form a web of 
security but that web will continue enveloping more elements. It does not have a principle 
of limitation—one is never too secure. If knowledge is a solution, then more and more 
knowledge will be needed. Frank offers the last, but not final, word. 
Intelligence, this new age of intelligence, is going to come out truthfully through law 
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enforcement as the natural outlet. They’re taking intelligence and pushing it 
because the emphasis is on prevention. And it’s simply talked about. It’s a 
collective focus locally, nationally and with other nations. In the past, these were 
deep dark secrets that were talked about in shadows. I think we have a different 
perspective now, maybe due to the nature of information, maybe due to the 
asymmetrical warfare that terrorism brings to us. I’m not really sure what the cause 
is but I think there should be a big recognition now about the role of intelligence 
from a daily operational perspective, for all of us.  
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